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Summary of the Work  
 
This submission draws upon a range of evidence to account for the non-verbal features of 
theatrical performance. By blending rhetoric and gesture studies with psychology, I shed light 
on the acting of Shakespeare’s plays in the past, and ask what a scientifically-informed 
analysis of non-verbal communication can bring to actor training and performance theory. 
The centrepiece is a book which uncovers a key concept from Classical oratory of ‘decorum’ 
and explains how this concept became central to the development of the professional actor, 
including where it was translated as ‘smoothness’ in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. The book traces 
a history of Shakespearean acting using a taxonomy drawn from psycholinguistics and 
manuals of gesture. I relate smoothness to Stereotype Content Theory within social 
psychology to show how non-verbal behaviour influences perceptions of warmth and 
competence and how actors have exploited this perceptual bias. The second item, a book 
chapter on the theatre pedagogue Jacques Lecoq, relates key concepts from his teaching to 
Shakespearean performance, in particular his insistence upon ‘élan’ in the embodiment of a 
role. I show how this concept is an extension of the idea of smoothness. The third item, a 
book chapter, asks upon what basis of evidence we can train an actor to improve their timing. 
I introduce evidence for the psychological present, a window of attention critical to the sense 
of timing, and connect it to smoothness.  I draw on the Stereotype Content Model to show 
how signals of warmth and competence play a primary role in an encounter, where 
smoothness of movement is such a signal. Finally, in a book chapter I outline the philosophy 
of Embodied Cognition, and show how it can be used to articulate a series of strategies for 
the rehearsal of a Shakespearean text. 
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1 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
This submission includes four pieces of work: a monograph and three book chapters. These 
four pieces chart the development of my thinking on the theory of Embodied Cognition in 
performance, and three out of the four focus upon this theory in relation to the performance 
of Shakespeare. Their contribution to the current discourse on Embodied Cognition within 
theatre and performance is threefold. Firstly, they provide a range of evidence from fields of 
knowledge that had been largely unexplored – the psychology of non-verbal communication, 
the psycholinguistics of gesture, social cognitive neuroscience; they relate this material to 
cultural and socio-historical contexts such as the history of rhetoric, and they discuss the 
implications, possibilities and limitations for performance studies of the evidence presented.  
 
Secondly, they offer an original approach to making sense of Shakespeare’s plays in the 
moment of performance, an approach that I hope has helped to fill a gap. This gap was made 
clear to me in the literature review I conducted for the monograph, which is to be found in its 
Introduction.  It became apparent that there were almost no scholars of Shakespeare, 
including among those who made it their business to consider the topic of embodiment, who 
drew upon valuable evidence and methods that were already available. This issue is discussed 
in the Introduction as part of the literature review offered there. Further review of existing 
literature is found in the chapter entitled ‘Embodied Cognition and Shakespearean 
Performance’, which acknowledges the growing interest in the subject area among some 
theatre scholars.  
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My starting point was a question: just what is it that actors do with their bodies when they are 
performing? At first sight the question seems hardly worth asking. Surely actors just behave 
as they would if they were carrying out the same actions offstage? After all, isn’t that the 
point about acting – that it is supposed to look like real behaviour? The moment one asks the 
question, however, what had seemed self-evident no longer appears so. Thus, each of the four 
items presented here sought to address, from differing positions, the question of what actors 
do with their bodies when they are acting. What unites them is my interest in the physical life 
of the actor on stage, and how that physical life is received.  
 
My book is placed first in this submission. However, the first attempt I made to explore the 
topic of this PhD submission is presented in second place here. That’s because it is submitted 
here in what was its final form - as a chapter for The Routledge Companion to Jacques Lecoq 
– and this appeared just after the book came out. The chapter, entitled ‘Lecoq and 
Shakespeare’, began life as a paper for the Shakespeare Association of America conference in 
Chicago in the summer of 2010. The paper sought to bring the ideas of the influential theatre 
teacher Jacques Lecoq to bear upon the question, ‘When I act Shakespeare, what do I do with 
my hands, and why?’ At that time, my answers to that question were very tentative. The 
paper was rewritten and published in Shakespeare Bulletin 30:4, as ‘Shakespeare and the 
Lecoq Tradition’. In the rewritten version, I brought in more of my experiences of working as 
a director upon Shakespeare’s plays in order to explain how some of Lecoq’s principles 
regarding the actor’s movement could inform the process of rehearsal. Nevertheless, the 
material was still rather hesitant and insufficiently supported by external sources of evidence.  
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For the final version of this piece as a book chapter, I drew much more upon the uses of 
Lecoq’s ideas by Ariane Mnouchkine and Theatre de Complicite in their work on 
Shakespeare. Mnouchkine in particular proved to be useful. Her decision to ‘turn to the East’ 
in her production of Richard II stood for me as a clear illustration of how Lecoq-influenced 
theatre artists are motivated to reject a straightforward correspondence between onstage and 
offstage behaviour. The chapter thus can be seen to argue for a kind of Modernist stylization 
of action on the stage as a solution to the question of what to do with one’s body in 
performance.  
 
Even while I was working on early versions of the chapter, though, I was aware that this was 
at best a partial answer to the question. One reason why I felt this was because of a 
dissatisfaction with what I was coming to understand as the limitations of a semiotic 
approach to theatrical embodiment, in which the audience is expected to decode a language 
of the body whose meaning is not immediately apparent. It is not so much that this decoding 
seemed not worth doing to me; it was more that it struck me as inadequate as a description of 
the communication that takes place between actor and audience. It seemed to me instead that 
there were deeper, simpler, perhaps less conscious and more emotionally direct effects still to 
be explained, and to my mind the existing literature within performance studies did not 
provide an adequate vocabulary for such an explanation. It had become clear to me by this 
point that I would have to look elsewhere for such a vocabulary.  
 
In 2012 I was commissioned by Stuart Hampton-Reeves and Bridget Escolme as editors of 
the Palgrave series Shakespeare in Practice to write a book on gesture. This book would 
become the opportunity I was looking for to articulate a conceptual field – one that was 
 4 | P a g e  
 
grounded in reliable evidence - for talking about the body in performance. The book took 
four and a half years to complete, with the bulk of the writing – essentially, a series of major 
rewrites – undertaken after I moved to the University of Surrey at the beginning of 2015.  The 
book reformulated my basic question as: ‘Supposing my task is to communicate the meaning 
or intention (as I see it) behind the words of Shakespeare for an audience – how do my 
body’s gestures support that act of communication?’ There were several areas of research that 
came together as I attempted to answer the question.  
 
The first was perhaps the most well-trodden: Shakespeare’s knowledge of the arts of 
Classical rhetoric. Here, my task was to draw down the fundamental precepts regarding the 
use of the body by orators that may have influenced how Shakespeare thought about gesture 
in performance, and that continued to exercise an influence beyond Shakespeare’s own time. 
The book thus extends the discussion by making use not only of the familiar material of 
Cicero, Quintilian and other theorists of rhetoric, but also of John Bulwer and of the writers 
of manuals of gesture and oratory popular in the eighteenth-century in which Classical ideals 
were used to bolster the argument for a universal language of gesture.   
 
The second area of interest for me was the impact of Renaissance treatises on courtesy – in 
particular, Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier – upon the public behaviour of the nobility in 
England. The book situates these guides to behaviour within what Norbert Elias identified as 
the long ‘civilizing process’. In the book I link Elias’s influential idea to concepts of social 
morality developed recently by the legal scholar Edward Rubin. It was Elias’s description of 
a gradual movement towards self-control in behaviour, to begin with among the elite then 
later filtering down into the middle classes, that led me to think through what Hamlet means 
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when he asks the Players to acquire and beget a temperance that may give smoothness to their 
passions. A fundamental idea that emerged in researching the book is that smoothness of 
movement is a signal of self-control, and that in Elizabethan England smoothness was 
regarded as a mark of high status. My point in the book, though, was not that this 
correspondence between smoothness and status is an arbitrary sign in need of decoding, but 
that it is automatically, subconsciously assumed by an observer.  
 
To support this idea, I turned in the book to social and cognitive psychology for evidence; in 
particular, I drew upon over fifty years of research into fundamental dimensions of social 
cognition. Smoothness of movement is taken as a sign of status because it demonstrates the 
agent’s mastery over animal impulses. My argument in the book is that by imitating the self-
mastery of behaviour that was held to be the mark of an elite person, actors were able over 
the course of time to accrue status as professionals and to use that as a shield against what 
Jonas Barish had identified as a historic anti-theatrical prejudice.  
 
The third area of research in the book was one that scholars at that time had left almost 
completely untouched. This was the science of non-verbal communication, such as the work 
of key scholars of gesture such as Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen, Adam Kendon, and the 
psycholinguists operating from the Chicago Gesture Lab under David McNeill and Susan 
Duncan. What their work offered was a rigorous framework of gestural description along 
with an extensive body of psychological data and a methodology for conducting research. 
The labelling systems of these scholars also resonated in fascinating ways with the 
classifications of gesture given in Classical and Neoclassical manuals of oratory. Since it was 
in this aspect of the book that I felt my strongest claim to originality lay, it was important to 
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me that the points I was making in the book were grounded in an accurate understanding of 
the psycholinguistics of gesture; thus, the final chapter included an extensive interview with 
David McNeill, whose participation afforded me the opportunity to check my own grasp of 
fundamental concepts.  
 
This field also opened up the possibility of discussing how actors deal with the bodily 
expression of emotion. A key text for the book became Darwin’s Expression of the Emotions 
in Man and Animals, which I saw as the crucial bridge between the Neoclassical explanation 
of the passions and modern theories of the basis of emotional reactions in psychophysiology.  
 
The book, then, offered a number of things: an argument about the social morality of non-
verbal communication; a clarification of how gesture has been interpreted and analysed over 
the last two thousand years, and an application of gesture theory to significant Shakespearean 
performances across history. The broader agenda of the book was to provide a model of how 
scholarship around embodiment in performance can find a secure foothold using a range of 
scientific and historical evidence. As the book progressed, this agenda took on a new 
importance for me, and influenced my decision to extensively redraft the material. It also fed 
into the next pieces of work for this submission.    
 
Following the presentation of a paper at the TAPRA conference of 2015, I was commissioned 
to write a chapter for the book Time and Performer Training by Routledge. The intention 
behind that volume was to consider the significance of time and temporality to performer 
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training conceived as both a conceptual field and as a practice. My chapter for it makes up the 
third contribution to this submission.  
 
The chapter, entitled ‘The Ecology of a Sense of Good Timing’, took up a thread that was 
present in the book but that I felt could have been further developed: this was the central 
importance of rhythm – of what in the performing arts is sometimes called a sense of 
musicality - to the interaction between actor and audience. What became necessary was to 
articulate what is meant by ‘good timing’ in a performance, and for this I wanted again to 
move away from subjective description and look for evidence in a biologically-grounded 
psychology. The solution – already suggested in the book but given more room to breathe in 
this chapter – was to combine two fundamental ideas: the psychological concept of a window 
of temporal integration (the so-called ‘three second window’) and a concept of efficiency of 
movement derived from Clinical Biomechanics. The argument of the chapter is that, given 
these two fundamental parameters within which movement perception is organized, it ought 
to be possible to define precisely how it is that a group of spectators can agree on a moment 
of good timing in a performance. Quite simply, good timing is not a matter of individual 
taste, but of how the mind perceives movement. The broad remit of the chapter, and of that 
volume as a whole, determined that I would not put Shakespeare at its centre, but its 
argument aligns with key themes in my own book.  
 
The final item to be presented here is the chapter ‘Embodied Cognition in Shakespearean 
Performance’, which was commissioned for The Routledge Companion to Theatre, 
Performance and Cognitive Science in 2017. In this chapter I return one more time to the 
question, ‘What do actors do with their bodies when they are doing Shakespeare?’ The 
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chapter explains the basic premise behind Embodied Cognition – that all thinking is grounded 
in bodily processes - before considering different approaches to a rehearsal situation. The 
essential idea here was to show that even those rehearsal tasks that seem most abstracted 
from physical action – such as ‘table talk’ – cannot escape the fact that mental processes are 
bodily processes and that, as proponents of Embodied Cognition have shown, these bodily 
processes will reveal themselves in the content of one’s thoughts. Since there are more and 
less radical versions of Embodied Cognition theory, in writing the chapter it was necessary to 
clarify my own position. It struck me at that point that I had reached a kind of answer to the 
question that had pushed my research on over four and half years. What actors do with their 
bodies, then, is think and as they do so the process of thinking (and of course, of feeling) is 
made visible to the spectator. Thus, actors use their bodies to facilitate the semblance of 
mentalizing – the belief that we have access to the contents of another person’s mind. But it is 
the process, not the product, that is made visible: the spectator can only access the content of 
thought (if at all) in a reliable manner through words, and it is ultimately the decision of a 
playwright like Shakespeare whether the product of thought is made explicit.  
 
Finally, as I will make clear in the conclusion, engaging directly with the philosophy of 
Embodied Cognition in this chapter helped to cement in my mind the necessity to see all 
human action, including performance, within an evolutionary framework. If thinking is 
embodied, and the human body is the product of evolution, then it makes no sense to imagine 
that thinking is somehow immune to evolutionary adaptation. Performance studies is only 
just beginning to overcome an historic ideological hostility and to grapple with the 
ramifications of this, and as the conclusion will note, there is still much work to do.  
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eds. The Routledge Companion to Jacques Lecoq. Abingdon and New York: 
Routledge. 4000 words.  
3. Tunstall, Darren (2018). ‘The Ecology of a Sense of Good Timing’, in Evans, Mark, 
Thomaidis, Konstantinos and Worth, Libby, eds. Time and Performer Training. 
Abingdon and New York: Routledge. 4000 words.  
4. Tunstall, Darren (2018). ‘Embodied Cognition and Shakespearean Performance’, in 
Kemp, Rick and McConachie, Bruce, eds. The Routledge Companion to Theatre, 
Performance and Cognitive Science. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. 4200 
words. 
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2.1.1 
 
SHAKESPEARE AND GESTURE IN PRACTICE  
 
Introduction 
 
What this book is about 
Gesture is a kind of speaking with the body. The body makes pictures, and these pictures 
seem to speak. What the pictures say, though, is not always quite what they show. For 
example, if I want to sew a button on a shirt, I will put my hand into a particular shape to 
hold the needle. If I make the same hand shape while talking to you, I will create an idea 
about myself that I hope will be planted in your mind. Exactly what idea, though, would 
depend on the way in which I perform the gesture – in other words, upon my behavioural 
style. It may be that I try to create the idea that I have a precise grasp of the subject under 
discussion; in this case, my intention may be to show you that I am a precise, i.e. 
conscientious, competent person. Or perhaps the gesture says that in my opinion things are 
OK between us, so by performing it I may be trying to show you that my intentions towards 
you are warm – that I am a sociable, agreeable kind of person. In this book, then, I am less 
interested in how gesture adds information to a person’s speech – which is a common belief 
about gesture – and more in how gesture may be used to create an idea about the speaker in 
another person’s mind. 
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This transformation of an action into a gesture is a metaphoric procedure.  In my example, the 
physical act of holding a needle between the index finger and the thumb is translated into an 
idea that exists only in the imagination – in this case, a belief about competence or warmth. 
The idea is communicated via a metaphor that makes use of our sensory knowledge of the 
real object, including how it can be used; in this way sensory metaphor helps to get the idea 
out of one person’s head into another. Poets like Shakespeare have always understood that 
metaphors emerging from sensory experience are sticky: that is, they are memorable. One of 
my beliefs about gesture is that, as a tool for sharing thought and feeling, it aspires to that 
same social stickiness by appealing to shared physical experience. The sense that cognition is 
embodied underpins the philosopher Henri Lefebvre’s contention that metaphor and 
metonymy ‘are not figures of speech – at least not at the outset. They become figures of 
speech. In principle, they are acts’ (Lefebvre 1991: 139). Metaphor is, as Lefebvre claims, a 
process whose ‘point of departure’ is ‘the body metamorphosed’ (ibid). Recent evidence from 
cognitive psychology has helped advance this insight regarding Embodied Cognition - the 
view that, at a basic level, our thought processes make use of metaphors arising from bodily 
experience (see Gibbs). To put it simply: we think with our bodies.   
 
This book is about how actors think Shakespeare with their bodies. More broadly, it is about 
how gesture offers a metaphoric window into thought and feeling, and thus into personality. 
There is nothing particularly new about this notion as far as contemporary scholarship is 
concerned. What is perhaps new is that I connect the premise that gestures are embodiments 
of cognitive acts with morality. I consider cognition not as an individual act but as a social 
one, subject to shared understandings about what is right and wrong. I believe that shared 
moral understandings expressed in gesture do not originate in some abstract symbolic realm: 
they emerge from bodily perceptions and experiences. Thus, to reflect upon gesture in 
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Shakespearean practice is to engage with the way that people form moral judgments. This 
deployment of gesture in the service of moral beliefs is also part of how a person tries to 
create an impression of herself in the mind of another.    
 
The book also tries to answer the question of how a performance achieves its effect – as 
opposed to what it might mean, or why it is the way it is. By narrowing the focus down to 
gesture in Shakespearean performance, I hope to engage with a relatively unexplored subject, 
as well as offer a range of case studies and examples. Inevitably, the discussion will at times 
venture out of the immediate zone of gesture into related fields involving the body, 
psychology and cultural history. That said, the subject is vast and the book cannot be an 
exhaustive study.  
 
Formal versus naturalistic Shakespeare  
Gesture is a difficult area for scholarship to deal with, since it would seem to require for 
evidence what has either already vanished into the past, or what is always fleeting and 
intangible – that is to say, acts of non-verbal communication. The lack of a complete and 
reliable visual archive of gesture (certainly before the year 1700) could be seen as the 
Achilles heel of the enterprise. It necessitates a degree of speculation that may seem to 
contradict the motive for writing. At the same time, if we fail to take account of gesture, we 
are in danger of missing a crucial ingredient in Shakespeare’s practice. And if we fail to 
account for the gestures we see in our own encounters with Shakespearean performance, we 
may as well close our eyes.  
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To begin, I would like to give a flavour of some of the issues that arise from looking into the 
current state of scholarship. Discussion of gesture in Shakespearean performance has often 
been annexed to the debate on formal versus naturalistic acting. This debate has been around 
since at least Alfred Harbage’s essay on ‘Elizabethan Acting’ in 1939. In support of him were 
Waldo McNeir (1941), Robert H. Bowers (1948), A.G.H. Bachrach (1949) and Bertram 
Joseph (1960). The reaction against their formalistic approach was spearheaded by John 
Russell Brown (1953), and gained support from Marvin Rosenberg (1954).  
 
Since then, a middle ground has been articulated by Peter Thomson (1992) and John 
Astington (2010) amongst others. Bernard Beckerman summarized the debate: ‘The 
formalists describe the means at the actor’s disposal, the techniques of voice and gesture; the 
naturalists, the effect at which he aimed, the imitation of life’ (Beckerman 111). This would 
seem to place someone like myself, who is concerned with the how of gesture in 
performance, in the camp of the formalists – except that I consider the distinction between 
means and effect to be false - as did many Elizabethans, who were fond of remarking that 
eloquence and wisdom were the same thing (Enterline 3).   
 
David Bevington, in his book Action is Eloquence, approached the subject by noting actions 
assumed to be called for in the playtext: kissing, kneeling, handshaking and so on. Bevington 
gives an edge to what would otherwise seem self-evident by arguing these actions have a 
contradictory aspect. While they appear to be displays of Shakespeare’s commitment to 
Tudor hierarchy, in performance some gestures take on subversive resonances in instances of 
what he calls ‘violated ceremony’ – as when Cordelia spoils the ritual set up by her father in 
the second scene of King Lear. The notion that a gesture can have contradictory aspects in 
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performance is interesting, and I will elaborate upon a related point in my exploration of 
competing social moralities in Elizabethan culture below.   
 
There have been no book-length studies of Shakespearean gesture apart from Bevington’s (at 
the time of writing Farah Karim-Cooper’s Shakespeare and the Hand is in press). Existing 
articles range from those of Steven Urkowitz, who deploys gesture to support a theory about 
Shakespeare’s authorship of ‘bad’ quartos, to Harold Frisch’s attempt to classify functions of 
gesture (he doesn’t make use of existing classifications from gesture studies). In a book on 
staging, Andrew Gurr and Mariko Ichikawa discuss the meanings of clutching one’s head 
with both hands, a gesture they think Hamlet makes when he says ‘Remember thee? Ay, thou 
poor ghost, while memory holds a seat/In this distracted Globe’ (1.5.95-7). This is 
encouraging material to read, but it doesn’t lead them into the subject any further. Finally, 
Ros King’s article on ‘Sound and Gesture in The Winter’s Tale’ contains much I find myself 
in sympathy with. Yet having promised in her title that she will consider the subject of 
gesture she leaves it alone, focussing instead on sound patterns in the text. She suggests that 
the actor playing Hermione would indicate pregnancy in the character’s opening scene 
‘perhaps by the physical stance’ (ibid 395). Two references to a posture as opposed to a 
gesture, plus a mention of Leontes wiping his son’s dirty nose - King’s article is 
representative of a general reluctance to tackle the specifics of the subject.  
 
There are two main reasons for this. One is, as I hinted above, the paucity of visual evidence, 
especially where one would most want to find it – in Shakespeare’s own context. But that is 
not to say that there is no evidence at all. There is some visual material, such as paintings and 
woodcuts, as well as some written description, and some thoughts can be extrapolated from 
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this material. After the revolution in mass publishing around 1700 the situation improves 
considerably. And of course with the arrival of cinema in the late 19th century, things really 
begin to look up. Best of all, modern video technologies have made it possible to access 
recordings of live performances that can be paused, replayed and analysed for the study of 
gesture. So, while it is necessary to recognize gaps in the evidence, that is no reason to stay 
silent on the subject. The other issue is that acting technique as such is not an area of 
expertise for many Shakespeare scholars. They are sometimes more comfortable with textual 
analysis than with talking about how actors use their bodies. However, this is changing, in 
part due to the efforts of a new generation of academics who are able to draw upon practical 
experience of theatre-making.  
 
Contemporary approaches 
Some recent approaches have made use of paradigms and concepts from cognitive semantics. 
A basic premise of this work is the continuity principle: the idea that human behaviour, since 
it is founded upon biology, must be continuous with the behaviour of those higher order 
mammals from which humans evolved. As Bruce McConachie has argued, the distinctions 
that we make between our thoughts, feelings and actions and those of, say, chimpanzees 
(with whom we share at least 97% of our DNA) are not ontological. They are not differences 
of kind; they are differences of degree. For writers like McConachie, performance is a pattern 
of behaviour that evolved from animal play. As well, the continuity hypothesis insists that 
even the most abstract cognitive reasoning processes are grounded in biology (see 
McConachie and Hart, eds. 2006 for a representative anthology).  
 
A lot of recent work attempting to find synergies between cognitive science and performance 
has fastened upon the theory that there may exist mirror neurons in an area of the human 
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brain called Broca’s Area. This area is implicated in both speech and hand gestures. The 
theory holds that these neurons activate not only when the individual carries out an action but 
when the individual observes another carrying out an action. This discovery has been used to 
support a conception of ‘simulation’ as the basis for empathy – motor mimicry, it seems, 
affords you the capacity to read the intentions of another person. It is a seductive theory, but 
it must be treated with caution. These neurons were originally found in macaques, not a 
species known for imitative behaviour; to extrapolate their functions to the brains of higher 
order primates is something of a leap in the dark. In addition, you may observe me 
performing an action, and your mirror system may fire up in response – but that does not 
mean you feel what I feel. Mirror neurons (if they exist in humans) may play a role in the 
perception of a person’s actions and intentions in relation to a physical object, but empathy is 
rather more than action perception. At least as important is the effect upon social behaviour 
of hormones such as oxytocin, which is strongly associated with feelings of warmth and trust 
(see Churchland). Mirror neuron theory cannot as yet account for human interaction in all its 
complexity. That said, the theory has influenced the work of scholars like Evelyn Tribble and 
Amy Cook, who treat gestures as evidence for Embodied Cognition in Shakespearean text 
and performance. In Shakespearean Neuroplay Cook introduces some concepts drawn from 
gesture studies (in particular, from the seminal work of psycholinguist David McNeill) but, 
coming then to Hamlet, she fails to find a way to deploy them, reverting instead to a more 
conventional literary criticism of the text that avoids talking directly about bodies. That said, 
and while there have been voices urging caution regarding some of the larger claims of 
neuroscience with respect to performance, this is nevertheless an exciting field of research 
which is already building promising bridges between ‘the two cultures’ of the humanities and 
sciences. At its heart is a strong call for the centrality of embodiment to all cognitive acts, and 
this book is in part a reply to that call. In these pages I try to expand the field of debate by 
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connecting performance practice to paradigms of social morality that have both a foundation 
in Embodied Cognition and specific historical manifestations.  
 
The thesis of the book: gesture, cognition and morality 
A central thesis of the book is that gesture offers a window not only into the mind of the actor 
but also into the wider socio-moral background in which the actor operates; in fact I do not 
separate the two. In the book I will refer to something called social cognition. This is most 
simply described, in the words of the neuroscientist Matthew D. Lieberman, as ‘thinking 
about other people, oneself, and the relation of oneself to other people’ (Lieberman 2013: 
18). Thinking about your relationships to others is not something you choose to do when you 
feel in the mood (although of course you can); it is what your brain automatically does when 
it is not doing anything else, because of a ‘default network’ that turns on like a reflex when 
your attention is not fixed upon a task.  It is ‘the brain’s preferred state of being, one that it 
returns to literally the second it has a chance’ (ibid 21). The default network directs you to 
consider people not only as physical things in the world but as creatures with minds, feelings, 
intentions and plans. It is present at birth, before babies can even focus their eyes properly, 
and thus ‘precedes any conscious interest in the social world, suggesting it might be 
instrumental in creating those interests’ (ibid 20). Quite simply, whenever you are not doing 
something specific, your brain immediately engages in social cognition.  
 
Morality is basic to social cognition because it influences the process by which people form 
impressions of others and build their own reputations. My view is that it is fundamental to 
behaviour that people try to manage ‘how they come across’ to others, although much of the 
time this management happens below the level of immediate awareness: people do not 
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always know they are doing it or why they are doing it. Nonetheless, it is inherent in almost 
every social context, and this was just as true in Shakespeare’s day as it is in ours. As the 
social historian Keith Thomas says: ‘In early modern England, the desire to secure the 
favourable opinion of other people was a primary determinant of human behaviour’ (Thomas 
147). What has changed over time are the specific ways in which people go about securing 
that favourable opinion. In early modern England, according to Lord Burghley, honour was 
‘the greatest possession that any man can have’ (quoted in ibid 148); nowadays, you may 
well be more concerned about the number of ‘likes’ you can get for a comment on Facebook. 
Yet both activities are tied into the same process of what is called social morality.  
 
In the words of the legal and political scholar Edward L. Rubin in Soul, Self and Society: The 
New Morality and the Modern State (2015), social morality is ‘a body of beliefs by which 
people organize their lives and form their judgments’ (Rubin 2015:3). Thus, by morality I 
mean the structure of values and beliefs that lead people to act, and that work to secure a 
person’s social reputation. Morality tells you whether a person you encounter is honest, 
sincere or trustworthy. Some recent work in social psychology suggests it is the primary 
driver of social judgment. In this view, when you encounter another person, the first thing 
you need to know is whether or not that person constitutes a threat to your safety – and, if 
not, whether instead that person represents an opportunity (see Brambilla and Leach). In the 
field of social psychology, this aspect of judgment goes under the name of warmth; its 
primary component is a sense of morality defined as a person’s basic honesty, sincerity or 
trustworthiness, while its secondary component is a sense of the person’s sociability – their 
aspect of openness, friendliness or kindness. The next thing you need to know in your 
encounter is whether the other person is actually capable of carrying out their intention with 
regard to you. This component is often called competence, and signals whether the person’s 
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behaviour seems efficient, intelligent, strong or otherwise capable of expressing their power 
to carry out actions designed to influence you.  
 
Morality is not simply a private matter or even a matter of micro-interactions between 
individuals. It has a two-way causal relationship to political governance – ‘the particular way 
by which the government controls and manages the behavior of the people who lie within its 
jurisdiction’ (Rubin 2015:5). The notion that social morality has a dialectical aspect resonates 
with the central argument of Stephen Greenblatt’s seminal work of new historicism 
Renaissance Self-Fashioning: that there was in the early modern period ‘an increased self-
consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process’ 
(Greenblatt 1980:1) which led to attempts to control behaviour from the institutions of the 
state and church as well as from within the individual. This for Greenblatt is linked to 
‘manners or demeanor, particularly that of the elite…hypocrisy or deception, an adherence to 
mere outward ceremony; it suggests representation of one’s nature or intention in speech and 
actions’ (ibid 3). As influential as his work was in its time, Greenblatt’s study should be 
placed within a context stretching back at least to Norbert Elias’s monumental 1939 work on 
The Civilizing Process. Behind both works is a key assumption that identity is constituted in 
large part by acts of repression – whether ideological, as with Greenblatt, or psychological, as 
with Elias. That assumption is in my view open to debate, but the belief that people are 
driven to create an idea or impression of their own personality (their ‘self’) in others, and that 
this process is subject to environmental and cultural influences, is one I share. 
 
Morality in the sense I am using the word, then, has a large-scale social and cultural 
dimension. Of course, to be culturally influential, there needs to be embedded in any moral 
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framework some claim to a shared referent. In Elizabethan culture, the large-scale socio-
cultural dimension of morality was reflected in a well-known metaphor. In the case of 
Shakespeare’s theatre, the basic metaphor that served as a shared referent was made quite 
explicit to the spectators – in fact it was written on a sign outside the Globe: ‘Totus mundus 
agit histrionem’. Everyone is an actor. It was a commonplace metaphor in his day as it is 
now. Yet at root it expresses a contradiction. On the one hand, it seems to say that you have a 
fixed role allotted to you in life. On the other, it suggests that you are not identical with your 
role, but rather you perform it, which means that in principle you could adopt a different role, 
or switch between roles if you prefer.  
 
Higher purposes and self-fulfilment 
The notion that you had a fixed role was very much in keeping with the official morality of 
Tudor England promulgated by the preachers, philosophers, teachers and writers who allied 
themselves to their elite patrons. Here is a typical example from a pamphlet entitled Certain 
Sermons or Homilies published in 1547: 
Every degree of people in their vocation, calling, and office hath appointed to them 
their duty and order. Some are in high degree, some in low; some kings and princes, 
some inferiors and subjects; priests and laymen, masters and servants, fathers and 
children, husbands and wives, rich and poor; and every one hath need of other so that in 
all things is to be lauded and praised the goodly order of God without the which no 
house, no city, no commonwealth, can continue and endure. (in Joseph 1971: 34) 
Here is how the Archbishop of Canterbury expresses it in Henry V: 
Therefore doth heaven divide 
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The state of man in diverse functions,  
Setting endeavour in continual motion,  
To which is fixed, as an aim or butt, 
Obedience.  (Henry V 1.2.184-8) 
 
In this moral framework, what mattered was not your pursuit of personal happiness, but 
rather a higher purpose: the salvation of your soul. You achieved salvation by serving God 
and your monarch. You served God by keeping the commandments and going to church. You 
served the monarch by performing your allotted role in life in an appropriate manner. You did 
not choose your role: God chose it for you; it was your calling, and you served the 
community by heeding it. Your reputation – called, variously, ‘honour’, ‘credit’, ‘good 
name’, ‘respectability’ and, a particular favourite of Shakespeare’s, ‘honesty’ – was held to 
rest upon your sticking to the calling that God had meant for you. In this way, it was 
believed, a stable social order would be maintained. If you did not stick to your calling, say 
by aspiring to better yourself, you could be accused of ‘ambition’, a word with mostly 
negative connotations in Tudor England.  
 
Such concerns with honour or reputation were not merely the preserve of the nobility and 
their apologists, as Keith Thomas states: ‘In the early modern period, the aristocracy was 
unique in managing to pass off its particular ethic as synonymous with honour itself. But 
every sector of society had its own values; and its members gained reputation by conforming 
to them’ (Thomas 174).  The economy, for one thing, was built almost entirely upon personal 
trust: there was no proper banking system, trade agreements were not formalized in written 
contracts, and there was a crisis in the supply of money. Worse still, there was no properly 
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functioning welfare system. Without a good name, you simply could not find the means to 
live beyond bare subsistence level (ibid 176).  
 
Yet, for all the official talk, there was social mobility in Shakespeare’s England – as long as 
you had the income or occupation to avoid manual labour, to keep yourself in the manner of a 
gentleman, and to pay a fee to the College of Heralds, then you could cross that fundamental 
dividing line between ‘gentle’ and ‘base’. Shakespeare was himself an example of such 
mobility. The alternative reading of the metaphor that everyone is an actor, with its 
suggestion of fluidity of role, can be seen to indicate a new social morality, one that in 
Shakespeare’s lifetime was coming into being and that later came to dominate the Western 
World. The new social morality insists upon self-fulfilment as of paramount importance. Your 
life is, in this view, a journey full of experiences, not leading towards a higher purpose such 
as salvation, but more or less meaningful in itself. The new morality is largely conditional 
upon your seeing yourself as free and equal to all other humans, with as much right to choose 
how you live as anyone else - provided you do not trample on other people’s equivalent 
rights. And anything that gets in the way of personal fulfilment is increasingly regarded as 
immoral. Your reputation now is premised upon how successful you are in achieving your 
individual goals, such as getting a higher-paid or more rewarding job. Of course, people have 
always wanted a fulfilling life. The matter is how you define what that is, and how you go 
about getting it, particularly when the opportunities available to you are limited, as they were 
for almost everyone in early modern England (see Thomas chapter one).    
 
One of the reasons for writing this book is to explore how gesture could provide evidence for 
this historical seismic shift from what Edward Rubin calls the morality of higher purposes – 
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the moral framework that dominated English culture in Shakespeare’s time – and the new 
morality of self-fulfilment – whose time had not yet fully arrived but whose outline 
Shakespeare was able to perceive. The situation was (and is) complex, since moral codes do 
not simply efface each other but tend to co-exist and overlap in time. In addition, the early 
feudal honour code, understood for centuries as the recognition of the superior worth of high 
status people, had not withered away, but was increasingly being reconfigured as ‘honesty’ 
and applied to all walks of life. ‘In the early modern period,’ writes Thomas, ‘when social 
mobility was upsetting traditional hierarchies, the need to assert one’s superiority was felt 
intensely, by the old-established and the parvenu alike’ (Thomas 151). Such complex moral 
layering would be reflected in the uses of the body. One of the interesting things about 
gesture is that while its forms – the hand shapes that people use when gesturing – follow 
recurring patterns through time and across cultures, these forms are then filled with shades of 
meaning determined by particular contexts. In other words, the metamorphoses of gesture 
reflect the metamorphoses of social morality.    
 
Outline of the book 
In the next chapter, I consider the changing meanings of the word ‘gesture’ through history, 
and how they can be seen to reflect changes in social morality, before giving an outline of 
how contemporary gesture scholars define it.  
 
Chapter two looks at the broad context of influences upon Shakespeare, making reference to 
the rhetorical tradition inherited from Classical antiquity and to the Reformation. Out of this I 
define and elaborate upon a central concept of the book - ‘smoothness’. This is essentially a 
quality of movement that aims to create an impression of self-possession. Movement that 
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displays such a quality has a conspicuously precise feel to it; indeed, its precision is amplified 
in order to plant an idea about status in the mind of the observer. I move on to outline how 
gesture theory flowered in the eighteenth century through a reconfiguration of the Classical 
tradition. I then indicate how the practice of gesture was, and still is, influenced by Darwin. 
This gives a context for the examples of Henry Irving and Stanislavski that I will examine in 
chapter four. In each case, I aim to suggest how connections can be forged between my core 
idea of smoothness in performance and the wider background of social morality.  
 
In chapter three, I give some issues and examples relating to gesture on Shakespeare’s stage. 
The chapter is of necessity speculative in places, since there is a paucity of hard evidence. 
However, some reflections are offered on what I take to have been the acting style of the 
company. As well, I consider the possibility that the ‘chirosopher’ John Bulwer may have had 
Shakespeare’s company in mind when he created a taxonomy of gestures. 
 
Chapter four offers a brief contextual background leading into some case studies from around 
1660 to around 1890. As well as describing the physical style of actors such as David Garrick 
and Sarah Siddons, I show how gesture in Shakespearean performance was conditioned in 
part by space. As stages and auditoria grew larger, gesture-in-performance adopted a more 
statuesque form modelled upon Classicism. I end this chapter by considering Henry Irving’s 
performances from the perspective of Darwinism.  
 
Chapter five considers the arrival of the intimate spaces of Realism and Naturalism, when 
Shakespearean performance adapted by revaluing psychology. Stanislavski’s Method of 
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Physical Actions, created in part out of his struggle with Othello, outlines a gestural economy 
that aligns closely with my core concept of smoothness. I also briefly suggest how some 
Modernist discourses of gesture have reconfigured the meaning of smoothness, partly in 
response to a rediscovery of Asian performance traditions like Noh theatre. A Modernist 
alternative to the gestures of Naturalism is considered through the avant-garde stylizations of 
Les Kurbas.  
 
In chapter six I look at the Postmodernist Shakespeares of Robert Lepage, dreamthinkspeak 
and The Wooster Group. At the close of this chapter I reflect upon the impact of digital 
technologies such as performance capture upon Shakespearean practice.  
 
The next chapter of the book consists of transcriptions of discussions with the influential 
scholar David McNeill and the choreographer Siân Williams, together with some closing 
thoughts on possible future directions for research into Shakespeare and gesture. In the final 
chapter, I offer an analysis of some recent examples of gesture in Shakespearean practice 
through the figure of Iago, examples which propose a video-based methodology for the study 
of gesture in performance. 
 
At this stage a proviso is warranted. In this book I am talking about Shakespearean 
performance, and I am dealing in the main with actors who managed to gain social status for 
their efforts. My agenda is in part to describe how that status was won. I am not making 
claims for other kinds of performances such as the popular entertainments that held sway in 
English suburbs and provinces. I agree with Tracy C. Davis when she writes that we must not 
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take the behaviour of (very often white male European) elite actors as representative of all 
performance everywhere (see especially Davis 1991 Chapter 1). Neither am I discounting the 
significant work of scholars, for example in the field of historical materialism, who have 
argued for an ideological component to the cultural construct known as ‘Shakespearean 
performance’. My aim instead is to relate those non-verbal features of acting that often go 
under the name of ‘technique’ to a larger discursive frame that will, I hope, allow for a range 
of viewpoints. The next section concerns itself with some of the theoretical issues that 
underpin this frame.   
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2.1.2 
PART I: THEORY 
 
One 
What is a Gesture? 
 
Historical definitions 
Before we can explore non-verbal acts in a Shakespeare performance, the word ‘gesture’ 
needs to be defined. Its derivation is the Latin gerere meaning ‘to bear, to carry, to carry on, 
to perform’. From the late middle ages up to the early nineteenth century it carried the 
meaning of ‘deportment’ – the carriage, or manner of bearing, the body. From the mid-
sixteenth to the early eighteenth-century, it also meant ‘a posture, or attitude of the body’. In 
the early twentieth century it took on a new meaning as an ‘action performed as a courtesy, 
formality or symbol to indicate an intention or evoke a response’ (all references from The 
Concise Oxford English Dictionary).  
 
Thus, from the beginning of the Renaissance up to around 1800 it described how an 
individual appeared to the world in a relatively fixed way; there was often a conflation of 
gesture with what we understand as posture. This fixity tallies with the concept, upheld in this 
book, that during this period life was less about the individual feeling entitled to self-
enhancement – an idea which holds the potential for flexibility in one’s choice of role as well 
as for a kind of equality between people - than it was about identifying the individual’s place 
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in the social order. Such an identification would be physical as well as abstract, and would 
extend to expectations regarding appropriate use of gestures in public. Thus it can also be 
seen as consistent with a social morality based on the idea of serving a higher purpose such as 
salvation of one’s soul through unwavering adherence to one’s calling. But from around 1550 
to around 1700 it was also used to refer to an individual’s changeable attitude. This chimes 
with the notion that from the early modern period there began to grow a new social morality 
based upon self-fulfilment, which demanded that a person be given the opportunity to make 
choices for determining her own happiness rather than live out her given social role. With the 
advent of the twentieth century, the definition of gesture came to suggest behaviour that was 
contingent on the demands of the moment – gesture as a temporary act was separated from 
posture as a held position. Not surprisingly, then, the history of the word is bound up with 
how Western culture viewed the individual within a social, cultural and moral frame.  
 
A related term is ‘gest’, from the same Latin root. This referred to (usually heroic) exploits 
that were recited by performers who later came to be called jesters, and that were recorded in 
medieval romance literature. As attitudes towards chivalric narrative began to alter in the 
early modern era, the word ‘jest’ emerged as a term for a jokey story. In the late Middle Ages 
and early sixteenth century ‘jest’ also came to mean a gesture in the sense of a person’s 
general deportment.  
 
‘Gesture’ and ‘jest’ combine in a scene from The Travels of the Three English Brothers 
(written in 1607 by John Day, William Rowley and George Wilkins): 
SERVANT.  Sir, here’s an Italianate harlequin come to offer a play to your lordship. 
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SIR ANTHONY.  We willingly accept it. Hark, Kemp: 
Because I like thy jesture and thy mirth 
Let me request thee play a part with them. (sc. ix, ll.73-6)  
Sir Anthony Sherley, the real-life inspiration for the play, met ‘Jesting Will’ (l.64) Kemp in 
1601, just after Kemp had stopped working for Shakespeare’s company.   
 
From the mid-sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries, ‘jest/gest’ was also used to refer to 
‘the stages of a (royal) journey’. Shakespeare applied it as well to the actual time given over 
to a stay, as when Hermione speaks of ‘the gest/Prefix’d’ for a ‘parting’ in The Winter’s Tale 
(1.2.99). This is Shakespeare’s only use of the word in this spelling – as opposed to the word 
‘jest’ which he used over a hundred times in the sense of ‘joke’, often with a connotation of 
disapproval or anger, as for example several times in The Comedy of Errors: 
ANTIPHOLUS OF SYRACUSE. Think’st thou I jest? Hold, take thou that, and that.   
(2.2.23) 
And in relation to the behaviour of Sir John Falstaff in Henry IV part 2: 
HENRY V. Reply not to me with a fool-born jest…   (5.5.55) 
 
The contemporary definition 
For modern scholars ‘gesture’ typically has the sense of a movement of the limbs to express a 
thought or feeling. This sense of the word begins in late Middle English. To summarize how 
it is nowadays usually understood:  
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1. A gesture is made predominantly by the arms and hands, while a posture involves at 
least the torso if not the whole body. In acting, though, bodily involvement is 
problematized by the conditions of the playing space and the impulse to stylize 
behaviour – that is, to consciously amplify and manipulate selected features. 
Conventional thinking may hold that the greater the degree of full body involvement, 
the more authentic or sincere the feeling behind the gesture. This is the assertion of 
the movement theorist Warren Lamb, whose notion of Posture-Gesture Merging is 
partly derived from his apprenticeship under the influential choreographer Rudolf 
Laban (see Davies 2006: 66). While the authenticity of full body involvement may or 
may not be a truism offstage, in acting it cannot be taken as read.  
2. A gesture carries an intention: it helps the individual express a particular thought or 
feeling. Yet intentionality is also problematized by acting: whose intention is being 
carried out, on behalf of whom?  
3. A gesture is brief, unlike a posture which is sustained. The question ‘how long is a 
gesture’, again, is complicated in the sphere of acting by the wish to stylize behaviour, 
which may well involve conscious manipulation of its timing. However, the very idea 
that a gesture’s duration can be stylized implies that there is a ‘natural’, i.e. average or 
default, timing that would in principle be perceivable by anyone. According to the 
biophysicist Ernst Pöppel, intentional gestures are usually performed within a specific 
time window (1989:87).  They occur in the psychological present, which acts as a 
temporal platform for consciousness. Typically, this platform is around three seconds 
long. In other words, every two to three seconds we segment reality into integrated 
‘pictures of the present’ (ibid 88). The three-second window of temporal integration, 
as it is known, is how everyone perceives the world around them. Evidence for 
temporal integration was gathered by Schleidt and Kien. They analysed 1,542 action 
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units drawn from five different cultural groups. An action unit was defined as a 
segment of movement if its ‘beginning and end could be clearly seen, if it had an 
observable goal, and thus the individual movements are functionally related (e.g. 
wiping the nose with the finger). The consecutive movements do not belong to the 
same action unit if they are not functionally related (e.g. wiping the nose and then 
scratching it)’ (Schleidt and Kien 1997: 79). They found that 93% of the action units 
they analysed took between two to three seconds. This principle applies to both 
voluntary gestures and involuntary movements like fidgeting. Some people of course 
move more quickly or slowly than others in their everyday life. In this case, they will 
usually still try to incorporate their movements within a given action unit, thereby 
confirming the three-second principle (Schleidt 1992). This contrasts with a posture, 
which is held for anything up to two minutes or more. Changes of posture often 
operate like large motion boundaries signalling a shift in the topic of a conversation 
(see Scheflen). To summarize: intentionally expressive gestures are two to three 
seconds long. That includes gestures-for-speaking, since they are timed to 
synchronize with speech and speaking itself ‘is embedded in temporal windows of up 
to 3 seconds duration giving speech its rhythmic structure’ (Pöppel 2004: 300). 
Pöppel found that the rule even applied to the vocal delivery of a line of iambic 
pentameter: subjects preferred the speaker to complete the line in about three seconds.  
So, if the average length of an Elizabethan play was about 3000 lines, then it would 
have taken on average 150 minutes to speak the play’s dialogue. Of course, that 
excludes any variables such as textual edits or non-verbal stage business, and we can 
only be really comfortable making such statements with respect to performances for 
which we have concrete evidence of duration.   
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4. A gesture comes in three parts: the preparation phase, during which the hand(s) come 
into play; the stroke, which is the key moment of the gesture, and the recovery phase, 
when the hand(s) return to their resting position. Some scholars also identify a pre-
stroke and a post-stroke hold, but these are not essential for the labelling of a gesture.  
Marr and Vaina (1982) showed that a movement sequence can be decomposed into 
motion segments. These motion segments are bounded by more or less static states, 
producing a tripartite structure (‘state-motion-state’). Newtson and Engquist (1976) 
demonstrated that perceived event boundaries (known as ‘breakpoints’) coincide with 
sudden changes of behaviour. People are remarkably consistent in segmenting 
observed motion events, and in viewing breakpoints as the most intelligible or salient 
aspect of the movement. Consistency of segmentation happens regardless of the 
specific interpretation people give to the motion event; that is, we perceive the 
boundaries of units of action in the same way whether or not we agree about the goal 
of the action. What this means is that people focus on the breakpoints – the 
boundaries – when they are making sense of gestures. Newton and Engquist argued 
that the breakpoint serves not only as a demarcation point but as a kind of summary of 
the meaning of the segment. What matters are the specific motion properties of the 
breakpoint – in other words, how the movement is begun and (even more important) 
how it is completed. In terms of gesture, the ‘completion breakpoint’ corresponds to 
the execution of the stroke – the key part of the gesture. Rubin and Richards (1985) 
extended this work on motion segments. They viewed visible motion boundaries as 
marked by a brief application of force constituting a start, a stop or a discontinuity 
such as a change of speed and/or direction. To summarize: gestures have a tripartite 
structure – they are like a mini-story, with a beginning, middle and end.  
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5. Gestures can be studied in isolation, but the total meaning of a segment of movement 
involves clusters of behaviour in a given context. To pluck a gesture out of its context 
for analysis can thus be a mistake; it should be considered within a larger pattern of 
movement. This causes potential difficulties if we are dealing with a visual archive 
that relies exclusively on still images, such as 18th century illustrations of actors.  
 
These general labelling constraints tend to rule out the idea that ‘gesture’ can refer to any 
action that is carried out on stage, such as fighting, eating, drinking, reading, writing, 
dressing, undressing and so on. Fighting may be an action or an activity, but in the strict 
sense under discussion here it would not constitute a gesture. Actions are instrumental, 
directed to a specific purpose. This purpose is not as a rule ‘to generate a metaphor in order to 
communicate an idea’. Gestures may or may not be instrumental, but they are always, as I 
stressed at the outset of this introduction, metaphorical. Again, though, this may be 
problematic in the special context of the stage, where actions like physical fighting might be 
seen as symbolic of some other conflict. However, as far as I am able I intend to stick within 
the narrow definition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 | P a g e  
 
2.1.3 
Two 
Ideas of Gesture – Before and After Shakespeare 
 
Having outlined an etymology of the word ‘gesture’ along with some labelling constraints, I 
now wish to relate gesture theory to a history of acting. Since this book deals principally with 
Shakespeare within a European tradition – and draws in large part upon English cultural 
contexts – my focus is of necessity limited to, firstly, possible influences upon his own 
practice and, secondly, what might be called posthumous threads of influence that can be 
traced from him.     
 
It is hardly original to claim that early modern culture was dominated by two seemingly 
competitive discourses: the Classical and the Christian. Shakespeare’s own work constantly 
reveals tensions, collisions and negotiations between the worlds revealed in the texts and 
imagery of Classical and Biblical traditions. It is inevitable, then, that his understanding of 
gesture in performance would have been contaminated by these discourses and traditions; it is 
necessary to tease out in some detail what they may have meant to him. I begin with the 
Classical world.  
 
The Classical background: the open palm of rhetoric 
In The Advancement of Learning (1605) Francis Bacon wrote: ‘It appeareth also that logic 
differeth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close, the other at large; but 
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much more in this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it 
is planted in popular opinions and manners’ (in Plett 59). In this widely-used gestural 
analogy, taken from the Classical philosopher Zeno, logic was like a clenched fist: tight, 
compressed and spare. By contrast, rhetoric was like an open palm: discursive, generous and 
relaxed.  
 
From an early stage within the context of the city-states of Greece and Rome, acting was 
linked to the rhetorical tradition. The word ‘actor’, derived from actio, was at first a legal 
term denoting a procedure in a civil court. Later, actio began to refer to the legal speech in 
itself, and then later to include other aspects of delivery such as voice and gesture (Fantham 
2002: 362-3). The worlds of oratory and acting are connected through the meaning of actio as 
‘skill in performance’ (Fantham 2006: 84). Shakespeare would most likely have discovered 
this connection at school.  
 
The Roman politician and orator Cicero probably underwent some of his training in rhetoric 
with the great actor Roscius. Elaine Fantham notes:  
Cicero repeatedly presents Roscius in De Oratore as the model for physical 
performance…The great actor stands for the aesthetic component in public speaking: 
for beauty (venustas) and consummate gesture, achieved by practice until something is 
impeccable. Roscius is made the embodiment of decere, grace and elegance. For 
Roscius, grace was the essence of art, and the one thing that could not be created by art 
itself…  (ibid) 
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Thus, from the beginning of the discourse relating acting to rhetoric, an emphasis is placed 
upon the need for physical grace. This emphasis is not merely aesthetic, it is moral: ‘Isn’t it 
true,’ Cicero wrote in On the Limits of Good and Evil, ‘that we consider many people worthy 
of our contempt when they seem, through a certain kind of movement or posture, to have 
scorned the law and limit of nature?’ (quoted and discussed in Corbeill 108). Cicero argued 
that both the gods and his fellow Roman citizens could and should ‘recognize deviance in a 
human being’s movement in the same way that it can judge an art object’, and that the same 
basic assumptions about what is natural lay behind the judging of an art work and the judging 
of virtue and vice in a person (ibid 109). We will see that Cicero’s assumptions were adopted 
by Italian humanists and widely promulgated in England in the Renaissance.  
 
There is in a contradictory agenda at work in the De Oratore. While the performance skills of 
Roscius are acknowledged as a resource for imitation by orators in training, the relationship 
between actor and orator is at the same time disavowed. This is because manuals like 
Cicero’s were written for the education of privileged Roman males, and it was essential that 
they felt keenly the responsibilities of their future roles as public figures. An orator was 
supposed to be truthful; Cicero argues that the speaker should genuinely feel the emotions of 
his speech as he delivers it (2.189). Actors, by contrast, were mere imitators (2.34; 2.193; 
3.214), even if there are times when they appear to be on fire with emotion (2.193). The 
orator was also supposed to show dignity and authority. His behaviour should not be tainted 
with suggestions of womanish effeminacy or slave-like vulgarity (Fögen 28-9).  
 
Cicero does not spend a lot of time discussing physical gestures. He does, though, offer the 
budding orator a set of vocal attitudes. These correspond to basic emotions: anger, 
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lamentation, fear, passion (really an intense form of masculine assertiveness), joy or pleasure 
and distress. He goes on to say that these emotions should be accompanied by gestures, but 
he does not give specific details. Instead, he states that the orator should not make obvious 
pictures with the hands but should use gesture suggestively to indicate the underlying idea of 
the speech (De Oratore 3.220). In Elaine Fantham’s gloss: ‘the orator should avoid 
theatricality and indicate rather than demonstrate the idea, with virile movements closer to 
those of combat than of drama, inhibiting the expressiveness of the hand and fingers, and 
extending the arm like a kind of weapon’ (Fantham 2006: 295).  
 
These gestures call upon the hand-and-arm’s capacity to imply decisiveness and dominance 
by suggesting the speaker is not afraid to solve problems using force. The primatologist John 
Napier distinguished between two basic prehensile movements: the Power Grip and the 
Precision Grip. You use a Power Grip to hold a hammer and a Precision Grip to hold a 
needle. Most grips are a variation on these two basic grips (Napier 62). Cicero is identifying 
the Power Grip with masculinity and the Precision Grip with femininity. He expressed 
irritation at argutiae digitorum (‘finger-twiddling’: Orator 59). He advocated a masculine 
idea of self-restraint as an essential aspect of delivery. In the Brutus (203) he praised the 
gestus venustus – the elegant gesturing - of Sulpicius, a tribune of the people. By contrast, he 
criticized orators such as the elder Curio (Brutus 216-7) and Sextus Titius (Brutus 225) for an 
effeminate lack of restraint in their hand and arm movements. The elite male class were being 
taught to display a physical behaviour that signalled their superiority. It is ironic that the best 
example that Cicero can find for this behaviour is a low-status actor – although Roscius was 
an exception in Cicero’s eyes since he had ‘more trustworthiness than artful skill, more truth 
than training. The Roman people judge him a better man than actor – his talent makes him as 
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worthy of the stage as his restraint makes him worthy of the senate house’ (in Corbeill 115). 
Cicero plays elsewhere on the double meaning of agere – to act – as ‘the natural actions of 
the body as well as its self-conscious performance’ (ibid 116). In the forthcoming section on 
smoothness in this chapter, I will show how Ciceronian aristocratic confidence in being able 
to distinguish (restrained) authentic behaviour from (emotionally excessive) hypocritical 
displays was put to new purposes in Shakespeare’s theatre.   
 
Turning from the Republic to the Empire in which Quintilian (c.35 – c.100 CE) worked, the 
field begins to open up somewhat. Quintilian’s manual Institutio Oratoria (c.95 CE), written 
in part for younger students of the rhetorical art (Fantham 1982: 244), provided practical 
advice on gesture. In recent years Classical scholars have argued that the ‘nonverbal 
vocabulary available to orators became much more elaborate’ between the periods of Cicero 
and Quintilian (Aldrete 166), and the Insitutio Oratoria reflects this elaboration. We can see 
some of this elaboration in the letters of the philosopher Seneca, as when he wrote, 
‘Everything has its own indicator, if you pay attention, and even the smallest details offer an 
indication of a person’s character. An effeminate man (impudicus) is revealed by his walk, 
from [the way] he brings his finger up to his head, and from his eye-movement…For those 
qualities come into the open through signs’ (quoted in Corbeill 114). The morally-charged 
word ‘impudent’ arrived into English through this Latin root in ‘effeminacy’.   
 
Quintilian believed that gestures can reveal the inner life of the speaker and can at times 
affect the audience even more than verbal language (11.3.67). The idea of delivery as mentis 
index involved ‘the principle that rhetorical delivery to be effective must be sustained by 
impulses of “natural” emotion’ and that ‘the art of delivery is to perfect the natural ability to 
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express these signals’ (Sonkowsky 256). In this Quintilian followed Cicero, whose influence 
is acknowledged throughout Book Eleven which deals with performance. But here arises the 
problem of truthfulness, of the relation between spontaneity and technique, which has dogged 
Western discourses on acting since Plato. Quintilian’s solution to the problem can be seen to 
connect with the idea of gesture as ‘visible thought’. He proposes in Book Six (2.29-33) that 
the orator can call forth emotions by accessing phantasia (imagination or visions). In Book 
Eleven (3.62), he advises the orator to work with these visualization techniques if one is 
unable to summon up the feelings.  
 
Quintilian divides up the expressive parts of the body and treats them separately. Thus we 
find sentences on the head, the eyes and brows, the nostrils, the lips, the neck, the arms, the 
hands and the fingers. In contrast to Cicero, specific finger gestures are given considerable 
detail (11.3.92-106). If the text seems overly fussy, the finger positions he describes are 
nonetheless ‘closely related to those regularly used in conversational contexts’ (Hall 149). A 
number of them are variations of the Precision Grip family. Quintilian also refers to pointing 
movements. The gestures he describes create an impression of a mind working with fine 
detail, seeking an intellectual subtlety and an orderliness that avoids aggression.  
 
Quintilian was centrally concerned with the impression of decorum: ‘Gesture and movement 
are productive of grace’ (Institutio Oratoria 11.68). What decorum meant in practice was that 
the fingers should not be extended too much, and that the movements of the hand, as with the 
whole body, should be measured in order to convey self-control without strain. At the same 
time, as the orator heats up, gestures will naturally become more rapid and more frequent 
(11.111). However, for parts of the speech requiring great impact, it is best to adhere to the 
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principle set by tragic actors of slowing down one’s movements (11.111-12). In addition, 
there are larger movements of posture and gait that Quintilian warns against on grounds of 
inelegance. Most of these are understandable as what modern theorists call adaptors - 
nervous mannerisms made by young orators suffering from lack of confidence. Common 
faults include splaying the feet, swaying from side to side, meaningless pacing up and down, 
and pulling up the folds of the toga to thigh-level with the right hand while walking and 
gesturing with the left during the speech (11.3.121-131).  
 
Summary of the Classical precepts 
From the prescriptions of Cicero and Quintilian some general principles can be inferred: 
 
1. The overall stance must be upright. 
2. The repertoire of gestures should be drawn from everyday usage. 
3. The orator should be economical in his movements.  
4. Hand and arm gestures should not seem isolated from the position or motion of the 
rest of the upper body, including the head.  
5. Movements should be slightly slower than in everyday use.  
6. Movements should be slightly more articulated than in everyday use.  
7. Movements should convey an impression of masculine power combined with ease 
and intellectual subtlety.  
8. The orator should not use pantomimic illustration.  
9. Movements should be connected to the thoughts behind the speech.  
10. Movements should demonstrate enargeia, a vivid, expressive clarity which comes 
from making the subject appear present to the mind’s eye of the spectator. In service 
to this, the orator should where possible actually feel the emotion he is displaying, 
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using visualization techniques if necessary. The concept of energeia – in which 
something from the past is made to seem vividly present - became crucial in the early 
modern period, as Heinrich Plett has shown in a brilliant study (Plett 2012). In this 
book I speak of a new degree, or a new intensity, of realism in art at this time; the 
‘enargetic’ technique of creating a vivid visual impression through detailed 
description was a key aesthetic procedure for achieving this.  
 
These simple precepts would go on to define a Western European acting style for many 
centuries, and in some respects have yet to be superseded. The difference between Cicero and 
Quintilian is summed up by Edwin Ramage in an essay on urbanitas. For Cicero, this was a 
quality of wittiness belonging to privileged Romans. It was non-transferable: uneducated 
rustics could not learn it. Quintilian, a product of the 1st century Empire, took a different 
view, seeing urbanitas as the ‘whole aim of education as it is outlined in the Institutio 
Oratoria’ (Ramage 410). For him it was a kind of cultured speaking achievable in principle 
by anyone:  
 
The exclusiveness of former times has all but disappeared. It [urbanitas] used to be 
inherited from the past and bestowed only upon the most Roman of the Romans. But 
according to Quintilian anyone can attain it now by combining a natural ability and 
alertness with a well-balanced education. As such it is a sure sign of times far different 
from the later years of the Republic. (ibid 414)      
 
The idea that rhetoric was able to provide anyone who could learn to read with the tools to 
advance in life spurred many young men and women in Tudor England to climb the social 
ladder - Shakespeare being one of them. In his instructions to the Players, Hamlet says: 
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Nor do not saw the air too much with your hand, thus, but use all gently; for in the very 
torrent, tempest, and, as I may say, whirlwind of your passion, you must acquire and 
beget a temperance that may give it smoothness. (3.2.4-8) 
When Hamlet says ‘you must acquire and beget a temperance that may give [your passion] 
smoothness’ (3.2.7-8), the suggestion is that decorous behaviour (‘temperance’, 
‘smoothness’) is not the birthright of the elite. It can be acquired and passed on: say, from the 
master to the apprentice actor. If Shakespeare took his cue from Cicero and Quintilian, then 
he would have felt keenly the tensions between Cicero’s conception of decorum as innate, 
and a training in pronunciatio which bestowed the individual with the qualities needed to 
become a professional actor in a new marketplace: decere, energeia and a good memory. 
 
Shakespeare’s use of Classical rhetoric 
Did Shakespeare know these Roman works? There is considerable agreement among scholars 
that he would have gone to his local grammar school at about fourteen. At school, 
Shakespeare’s day would have been spent translating, parsing and imitating classical Latin 
texts. Textbooks such as Rhetorica Ad Herennium, thought to have been by Cicero, were 
used as a basis for catalogues of ‘tropes’ (devices for altering the usual meaning of a word or 
phrase) and ‘schemes’ (devices for altering the usual order or pattern of words). The pupils 
would identify the figures of speech and then construct their own versions of them. They 
would learn how to compose and present stories, sayings, descriptions, speeches, arguments 
and conversations in prose and verse.  
 
A significant part of the curriculum was devoted to what was called delivery or pronunciation 
(actio/pronunciatio). This refers to the vocal and physical techniques needed for 
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performance. It may well have required the boys (the schools were boys-only) to recite 
passages from Roman authors such as Horace, Virgil, Cicero, Ovid, Seneca, Plautus, 
Terence, Caesar, Sallust and Livy in front of the schoolmaster. The capacity to remember a 
speech fell under the separate rubric of memoria. 
 
Looking through the plays as a whole, one can locate from the beginning traces of 
progymnasmata - rhetorical composition exercises. They are, not surprisingly, very 
noticeable in his Roman plays. Here is the opening of Titus Andronicus, in which Saturninus 
lays out his claim to be made emperor: 
Noble patricians, patrons of my right, 
Defend the justice of my cause with arms.  
And countrymen, my loving followers,  
Plead my successive title with your swords.   (1.1.1-4) 
 
The verbs ‘defend’ and ‘plead’ key us in to the rhetorical impulse that motivates this speech. 
Its method is taken from deliberative oratory – the art of political persuasion, designed to get 
someone to take a course of action. It invites an emotional response in the listener: it asks for 
righteous anger. It is followed by another rhetorical plea for support from Saturninus’s 
political opponent, his younger brother Bassianus. Then the tribune Marcus makes another, 
lengthy rhetorical entreaty, urging the opposing brothers to plead their respective cases in a 
civilized fashion. Marcus’s own brother Titus is about to return to Rome in triumph from the 
war against the Goths. When Titus enters twenty lines later, he begins with a lengthy 
encomium. An encomium is a type of epideictic (or demonstrative) oratory – a speech of 
praise or blame. In the 3rd or 4th century CE text known as the Peri Epideiktikon – a manual 
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which was widely read in the Renaissance (Vickers 61) - there is a list of functions of 
encomium. This includes consolatory speeches that may be delivered at funerals and 
speeches given on arrival in a city. Titus’s opening speech encompasses both, since he is 
bringing back to his beloved Rome the bodies of his sons who died in combat: 
Hail, Rome, victorious in thy mourning weeds! 
Lo, as the bark that hath discharged his freight 
Returns with precious lading to the bay 
From whence at first she weighed her anchorage, 
Cometh Andronicus, bound with laurel boughs, 
To resalute his country with his tears,  
Tears of true joy for his return to Rome. (1.1.73-9) 
 
Thus, when he came to writing plays, Shakespeare did not abandon his rhetorical training. 
This goes further than the use of tropes and schemes, as Brian Vickers suggests: ‘Medieval 
and Renaissance writers seldom regard their subject-matter neutrally, but usually express a 
clearly positive or negative evaluation which attempts to change the reader’s views’ (Vickers 
61). Shakespeare’s writing constantly reveals this strategic eliciting of affiliation. It is 
achieved not through the ‘clenched fist’ of logic but through the ‘open palm’ of rhetorical 
appeal. Shakespeare’s characters attempt to persuade each other, themselves or the spectator 
to think, feel, believe, say or do things using emotionally charged arguments. One of the 
problems for the modern audience (and perhaps a Tudor one also) is that we can easily take 
something said by one of his characters to be representative of Shakespeare’s views. That is 
partly because it is often hard for people to grasp a viewpoint they do not already share; when 
asked to argue the opposite of their own morality in a recent study, participants failed to show 
the most basic understanding of values different to their own, resorting instead to arguments 
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based on their own beliefs (Feinberg and Willer 2015). Rhetoric was partly instituted to help 
public figures overcome such difficulties. The dialogic features of Shakespeare’s writing 
prevent us from reading it as didactic. The real danger of propaganda is that we might believe 
it to be reasonable. Reasonableness, though, is not easily attributed to many of Shakespeare’s 
characters, least of all his political representatives, as Titus Andronicus abundantly reveals. 
Far more often we are shown how passion leads a character towards a distorted judgement.  
 
Passions and humours 
As Hamlet’s instructions show, the actor was expected to deliver a ‘whirlwind of passion’ in 
the performance – and yet to do it ‘gently’. The word ‘passion’ is derived from the Latin 
passio and is linked to Aristotle’s term pathos. It connotes a body that is being acted upon 
rather than an agent that is intentionally acting. The individual is being affected. He is 
behaving under the influence of either external forces or internal imbalances. Reason is the 
default mode of being; passion is a deviation from it.  
 
There is a small set of primary passions identified by Plato and further developed by the Stoic 
philosophers and by Cicero in the Tusculan Disputations. These four are (on the positive 
side) joy and desire and (on the negative) grief or sorrow and fear. Joy and grief were held to 
relate to the present, whereas desire and fear refer to an anticipated future. While this four-
fold classification system was upheld by St Augustine, Thomas Aquinas divided it further 
into two essential appetites, known as concupiscible and irascible. The concupiscible 
passions are those that relate to relatively easy things to obtain, and include love, desire, joy, 
hatred, aversion (i.e. disgust or contempt) and grief. The irascible passions are those that 
relate to things more difficult to obtain, and include hope, courage, anger, despair and fear.  
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In Shakespeare’s England, these two ways of classifying the passions – the Graeco-Roman 
and the Thomist – were largely followed. The four passions identified by the Stoics form the 
basis of the theories of Timothy Bright’s Treatise of Melancholy (1586), La Primaudaye’s 
The French Academy (translated into English in 1586), John Davies’ Nosce Teipsum (1599) 
and John Davies of Hereford’s Microcosmos (1603). Thomas Wright in The Passions of the 
Mind (1601) defines six primary passions, which correspond to the concupiscible passions in 
the Thomist catalogue. In addition, Wright follows the Stoics in separating present passions 
from anticipated ones. Shakespeare probably read at least some of these English texts.  
 
Interlinked with this attempt to label the passions, many writers of the era made use of 
Galen’s theory of humours to describe patterns of behaviour. People were described as 
having an affinity with certain temperaments due to an excess of particular substances in the 
body, which then were held to correspond to the seasons of the year, the matter out of which 
everything was made - and so on. In Wits Trenchmour (1597) Nicholas Breton wrote:  
I find by my reading that man was compounded of the four Elements of Fire, Water, 
Earth and Air. I thus understand the four Elements, choler, phlegm, blood and 
melancholy. (in Joseph 1971: 250) 
This interlocking system of correspondences for patterns of human behaviour within the 
cosmic order was so all-embracing, and had been promoted by scholars for so many hundreds 
of years, it was difficult for early modern thinkers to imagine what could be put in its place.  
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Did Shakespeare conceive of human personality along the lines of this theory? Gail Kern 
Paster (1993) has argued for the influence of humoral theory, with its insistence on the 
fluidity and leakiness of the human body, over the drama of this period. As well, there is an 
argument to be made for the use of humours by Shakespeare’s actors at times. One example 
would be Hamlet, where gestures that represent the melancholic humour might be applied. 
The archetypal gesture of melancholy (really a posture), sitting with the chin resting on one 
hand, was portrayed by Albrecht Dürer in his woodcut Melancholia. This was of course later 
redefined as a gesture for thinking, most famously by the sculptor Auguste Rodin. Again, 
what is evident is how a physical position signalling a fixed temperament (in this case, 
melancholy) could then be reconceptualised from the perspective of social morality as a more 
general figure for an individual’s private thought processes. In fact this reading is already 
available in Hamlet, as when the hero defines his own problem as ‘thinking too precisely on 
th’event’ (4.4.41). In the play, the word ‘conscience’ has at least two meanings – the 
conventional moral one and, more generally, ‘consciousness’ itself. The very fact that the two 
could be separated at all is revealing of a shift in social morality.  
 
Shakespeare could be flexible in his attitude towards the theory of humours. Some recent 
scholars, such as Lynn Enterline, remind us that he had a way of dramatizing a character’s 
self-conscious reflection upon their own emotional experience, a self-consciousness which 
was partly a result of his rhetorical training in imitatio, where emotional experiences were a 
matter of experimenting with feelings by performing different identities in the schoolroom 
(for example, experimenting with grief by writing and acting out speeches for tragic heroines 
of Classical mythology). There were times when he treated humoral theory as a joke, such as 
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in the character of Corporal Nim, whose riffing on the word ‘humour’ in Henry V and The 
Merry Wives of Windsor is extended ad nauseam: 
NIM. And this is true, I like not the humour of lying. He hath wronged me in some 
humours. I should have borne the humoured letter to her, but I have a sword, and it 
shall bite upon my necessity…Adieu. I love not the humour of bread and cheese. 
Adieu. 
PAGE. The humour of it, quoth ‘a! Here’s a fellow frights English out of his wits. 
(2.1.116-125) 
 
In Twelfth Night Sir Andrew Aguecheek’s misunderstanding affords Shakespeare an 
opportunity for a sly dig at the theory:  
SIR TOBY: Does not our life consist of the four elements? 
SIR ANDREW: Faith, so they say, but I think it rather consists of eating and drinking.  
SIR TOBY: Th’art a scholar; let us therefore eat and drink. (2.3.9-13) 
 
Whatever he made of it, it is clear that the battle to get control over the passions was played 
out on Shakespeare’s stage. And behind much of the argument within his culture there was a 
moral assumption that people should not succumb to the temptations of the body. Raymond 
Gibbs puts it succinctly: ‘Separation of the mind and body and the hierarchical ordering of 
mind over body haunt the history of Western philosophical accounts of knowledge from 
Plato, Aristotle and Augustine through to Descartes and Kant’ (Gibbs 3).  
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Hamlet cautions the players that they must apply to their passion ‘a temperance’ (3.2.4).  
Shakespeare relates passion to uncontrollable forces like the weather. The idea of a temperate 
climate is used for instance in ‘Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day?/Thou art more lovely 
and more temperate’ (‘Sonnet 18’).  Its opposite ‘intemperate’ is related to the concupiscible 
passions by Isabella (Angelo’s ‘concupiscible intemperate lust’, Measure for Measure 
5.1.98). The related ‘temperament’, meaning ‘temperature’, brings us back to the theory of 
humours, since that was one of the words used to describe the blend of choler, phlegm, blood 
and melancholy within the individual (the other word was ‘complexion’). The Latin 
temperare means ‘to restrain, moderate, adjust or mix’. 
 
When Gertrude accuses Hamlet of suffering from the ‘ecstasy’ of madness he replies: ‘My 
pulse as yours doth temperately keep time/And makes as healthful music’ (3.4.141-2).  The 
text here recalls the etymological connection of temperance with tempus, ‘time’. To keep 
time with the body is to display health. Being out of time – missing the beat – is a symptom 
of mental sickness or ‘distemper’ - a word used four times in reference to Hamlet’s own 
behaviour.  
 
Christian contexts 
Christian culture evolved out of a Graeco-Roman heritage. A framework for the revaluation 
of Classicism was provided by St Augustine in De Doctrina Christiana (written sometime 
between 396 and 426 C.E.). Augustine made a distinction between signa naturalia – signs 
from nature, such as smoke that signals the presence of fire, or involuntary emotional 
expressions – and signa data – symbols that are created intentionally in order to communicate 
something. Augustine considered the sign (signum) as a basis for making inferences from 
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something that is not immediately visible. He wrote that a sign was ‘a thing which, in 
addition to what it is perceived to be by the senses also brings something else to mind’ (De 
Doctrina Christiana 2.1.1, quoted in Markus 71).    
 
This ‘something else’ was God’s truth, a truth that was once known to Adam, and that had 
since the Fall been lost. Being signa of a corrupt human nature, gestures were hieroglyphics 
of the divine purpose. As Peter Harrison says, it is ‘this hieroglyphic conception of nature 
which undergirded the medieval belief that there were two books – the book of nature and the 
book of scripture’ (Harrison 1998:3). The business of allegorical interpretation – ubiquitous 
from the time of Augustine to the Reformation – was to join the words of the Bible with 
natural objects. The motive, for writers such as Origen and Hugh of St Victor, was to produce 
a hermeneutics that secured the truth of scripture (ibid 268).  
 
One theatrical offshoot of this motive had been ritualistic drama whose purpose was to 
remind the spectators of their original sin. The tableaux that characterize the drama of the 
later Middle Ages were thought to hold the power of salvation. Robert Scribner suggests this 
is due to what he calls the ‘sacramental gaze’ – the act of viewing through the image to a 
deeper sacred reality behind it (Scribner 459). The image – and the gesture in the image - is 
an Augustinian signum. That is why its iconography lacks individuality. It is designed to lead 
the viewer away from the object itself towards the spiritual meaning it contains. Only by 
disregarding ‘the sensory images of the material world’ can the post-lapsarian mind ‘discover 
within itself an image of the divine’ (Harrison 2007: 38).  
 
 51 | P a g e  
 
Another mode in which this iconography found expression is through the almost ubiquitous 
use of personification. It can come as a surprise to turn from Shakespeare’s characters, who 
usually have proper names, to medieval dramas such as Everyman featuring figures called 
Death, Good Deeds, Beauty, Five Wits and so on. But, as Helen Cooper has shown, there are 
significant continuities between the allegorical drama, with its original locus in the scene of 
Catholic confession, and Shakespeare’s work. Leaving aside such obvious examples as the 
occasional symbolic figure like Time in The Winter’s Tale, there are frequent idiomatic uses 
of personification within the text itself that remind us of Shakespeare’s debt to the medieval 
past. These verbal idioms often create the drama of an inner psychic conflict in which the self 
is a kind of warzone between apparently external influences – reason or patience versus 
passion or lust, the eye versus the heart, revenge versus conscience.  
 
Seen in these terms, the subject becomes a passive victim of powerful forces rather than an 
active agent (note the etymological connection between ‘passive’ and ‘passion’ in the Latin 
pati ‘to suffer’). Linguistically, this way of thinking produces a structure organized around 
nouns and verbs rather than, as is often the case in modern idiomatic speech, adjectival and 
adverbial phrases that flow out from the egocentric subject. Theatrically, the result is, as 
Cooper says, ‘an intense visual and imaginative drama that requires to be taken seriously, and 
that occasionally steps across from the language or the imagination to actual performance’ (in 
Morse, Cooper and Holland, eds.: 141). To my mind, this suggests that actors who inherited a 
tendency to personify would make full use of imagistic gestures that bring out the iconic  
properties of the nouns and the force of the verbs felt to be acting upon them.     
 
By contrast, the ‘theological gaze’ of Protestantism (Scribner 464) made use of spatial 
antithesis and deixis – reference to the here and now of an event. This limited the range of 
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interpretations available to the viewer, as Glenn Erstine argues (Erstine 219). Protestants 
reinvigorated the Augustinian notions of the Fall and original sin. But they denied the validity 
of allegory. This position became more pronounced after around 1560, which saw the 
emergence of a Protestant defence of the Bible as being literally true (this had not been the 
stance of Luther or Calvin). By insisting that the scriptures were to be taken in their literal 
sense they gave priority to words over things, which were then stripped of their status as 
signa. One of the greatest casualties of this ‘narrowing of church ceremony’, as John H. 
Coldewey has noted, was the religious drama, now seen as ‘ideologically suspect’, and within 
a few decades doomed by political decree to become ‘no more than a curious memory’ 
(Coldewey 64-5).    
 
It was now the duty of Christians, according to both Luther and Calvin, to pursue an earthly 
vocation directed towards restoring the perfection of Eden before the Fall, even if the task 
was impossible. For Protestants such as Francis Bacon, this legitimized the domination of 
nature (since originally nature had been created for the use of man) and the pursuit of natural 
knowledge – that is, science (for a full discussion see Harrison 2007). Thus, while 
Augustinian Catholicism had tended to consider nature as a sacred book in need of allegorical 
interpretation, from around 1500 nature in all its material manifestations had begun to be 
treated as an object worthy of attention and study in its own right. One clear example of this 
is the emergence of the practice of dissection of the human body by Andreas Vesalius. An 
important consequence of the shift in English culture from the Catholic allegorizing impulse 
to the Protestant literalizing one is that the way was paved for what would later be recognized 
as a new degree of realism in art. As I suggested in the section on Classical rhetoric, the 
concept of enargeia was a key tool for achieving it. The essence of this realism is an attention 
upon the surface appearance of material life, coupled with a concern for capturing the 
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momentary and transitional as opposed to the eternal. It was not until the mid-nineteenth 
century that this de-allegorizing move finally came to full fruition with the arrival of 
Darwinist naturalism (for a seminal account as exemplified in French painting see Nochlin). 
But the impulse to direct one’s attention away from transcendental values and towards the 
surface minutiae of everyday affairs was seeded in the Reformation. Catherine Belsey in her 
influential book The Subject of Tragedy explored how playwrights such as Shakespeare 
reconfigured the human self as if in response to this socio-cultural shift towards what we 
might cautiously define as mimetic or realistic modes of representation (Belsey 1985). I 
would further suggest that, as with the shift from the sacramental to the theological gaze, so 
performance after the Reformation began to shift from ritualistic and iconographic actions 
towards mimetic and interactional gestures-for-speaking. Such gestures might have 
accompanied scenes of gossipy conversation in prose that are relatively rare in Shakespeare’s 
early plays (there are none in Titus Andronicus), but increasingly frequent in later ones 
including the tragedies (such scenes can be found for example in Coriolanus 1.3; 2.1; 2.2; 
2.3; 4.3; 4.4; 5.4).   
 
In his perceptive essay, John Coldewey reminds us that in place of the medieval religious 
drama there rose up a new tradition drawn from humanist sources – a tradition of ‘interludes’ 
that in England dates as far as back as the 1490s. It was this drama that ‘ultimately provided a 
professional alternative to popular communal and festive plays’ (ibid 65). An important 
outcome of this, as John Parker observes, was that the language of faith was appropriated by 
the apologists for the theatre. The figure of the Prologue to Henry VIII says that those 
spectators who ‘give/Their money out of hope they may believe/May here find truth, too’. 
Truth here refers to the ‘presence and power of [theatre’s] fictional representations’ which 
‘had been superimposed on a repudiated faith’ (Parker 2004: 644). Successful actors like 
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Richard Burbage were liable to be seen as having the power to call up in the spectator the 
kind of devotion previously bestowed on images of Christ or the Saints. This is indicated by 
John Weever in his tribute to the performer(s) who first acted Romeo and Richard III:  
 
Their sugar’d tongues and pure attractive beauty 
Say they are Saints (although that Saints they show not) 
For thousands vow to them their subjective duty. (quoted in Parker 2004: 645).  
 
Any spiritual authority the drama previously possessed had rested on its power to evoke the 
mystery of God through iconic depictions. But in banishing iconic imagery from the stage, 
Protestantism failed to diffuse the power of theatrical representation to appeal to quasi-
religious feelings in spectators. If anything, that appeal was fortified. Iconicity did not 
disappear altogether – some of it was given a mimetic spin. I will give some examples of this 
complex relationship between allegorical and literal uses of gesture in Shakespeare’s own 
practice in the next chapter.  
 
Smoothness 
Audiences in late Tudor London craved new forms of amusement. For this they turned to the 
theatre companies, run by actors or impresarios who commissioned playwrights to produce a 
wide range of material with a high turnover. Actors and playwrights had become 
professionals with an obligation to provide entertainment on a daily basis to a paying public.  
Did this professional obligation affect performance styles? There is a passage about acting 
which has attracted a great deal of comment since it may have been written by John Webster: 
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Whatsoever is commendable in the grave Orator, is most exquisitly perfect in him; for 
by a full and significant action of body, he charmes our attention: sit in a full Theater, 
and you will thinke you see so many lines drawne from the circumference of so many 
eares, whiles the Actor is the Center.  (Webster 483).  
The actor, says Webster, is like a sober and serious orator – except that the actor goes one 
better, by bringing to a form of perfection what the orator does commendably. This is 
achieved through the actor’s focussed use of his body, which draws the visual attention of the 
spectator in order that the spectator will listen better.  
 
Such texts as these are indicators of a concerted effort by professional players to gain a new 
status for the art of acting. Actors would from this moment on begin to claim a special place 
in the cultural life of the nation. By the mid-eighteenth century, I suggest, this claim was 
substantially secured. I will furnish examples of how this claim related to gestural practice in 
the chapter dealing with David Garrick and Sarah Siddons. But it was with Shakespeare’s 
company of players, and their rivals under Philip Henslowe and Edward Alleyn, that the 
claim was first staked out.   
 
It was partly achieved through pinning the practice of acting to Classical traditions of 
rhetoric, partly through the transfer by audiences of feelings previously held towards icons 
such as saints onto actors. But another very important method by which it was achieved was 
through gestural displays of what was called passing – in the sense of ‘passing yourself off as 
someone else’. It was symptomatic of an era in which so much wealth and power was in the 
hands of less than five per cent of the populace that anyone seeking to climb the ladder would 
have to adopt the behaviour and attitudes of the nobility. In practice, actors took things one 
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step further: they imitated the bodily comportment and gestural behaviour of their social 
superiors, and did it so persuasively that they threw into question the foundation upon which 
this superiority was based – the notion that the status of an elite person was somehow 
ordained from above. If Richard Burbage, the son of a carpenter, could in a literal sense 
appear to be ‘the man himself’ when he played Prince Hamlet, how did he achieve that 
apparently mesmerizing effect? To answer this, we need to see how Italian humanists 
exported to England an idea of behaviour known as sprezzatura.  
 
In 1506 the Italian diplomat Castiglione visited the court of Henry VII, where he found 
himself the object of much deferential attention by the King’s ministers and dignitaries keen 
to learn more of his home Urbino, at that time considered the most cultured of Italian courts. 
As political power had begun to rapidly centralize around the figure of the absolutist monarch 
at court, the existing warrior class had to learn to adjust their behaviour (see Elias). 
Castiglione presented himself as one of a new kind of Western humanist courtier for whom 
the soft power of diplomacy at court was increasingly important. He set forth his approach to 
the problem of how the new courtier should behave in a four-volume work that was later 
translated by Sir Thomas Hoby as The Book of the Courtier. This was far from being the only 
conduct manual produced at that time, but it was among the most influential (Burke 1995).  
 
The model for courtly behaviour promoted by the humanists was based on a combination of 
self-discipline, elegant and witty politeness and a quality Castiglione calls sprezzatura. This 
translates as a sense of effortlessness in comportment, speech and manner that is only 
achieved after great effort. For the humanist courtier, much of the effort was devoted to 
mastering pastimes such as dancing, fencing and wrestling – three activities that 
Shakespeare’s actors would have needed competence in, and that offered opportunities for 
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them to display their own sprezzatura. Castiglione did not advocate a weird set of 
behavioural codes. His advice often comes across as rather obvious - but that is part of his 
persuasive power. He did not offer a new repertoire that had to be learned but a refinement of 
practices that recalled the advice of Classical authorities like Cicero and Quintilian - practices 
centred upon the cultivation of precision, and upon an economy in the use of force. The aim 
was not to show off one’s acquired social skills but in fact to make them transparent through 
a kind of studied negligence, which nonetheless revealed a sophisticated attunement to the 
behaviour that is appropriate in the situation.     
 
The idea of an economy of force can be seen as the embodiment of a shift in moral values. 
The feudal honour code rested upon an idea that an elite person had the right to defend his 
superior status by violence. But for a Tudor courtier, it was no longer as necessary to show 
that you were willing to defend your honour quickly, and that you were committed to keeping 
your word, upon any threat to your status (although many English courtiers continued to 
behave as though that were not the case). Instead, you had to learn a behavioural style that 
would allow you to plan for your own preferment by the monarch. The courtier had to hold 
his desire for retaliation in check, to conceal his true motives and to play the new social game 
of soft power. Hence the need to display in posture, gesture and action an economy of force: 
a refined physical tact blended with bodily signs of power in potential.   
 
A key image for understanding this economy of force is in the motto festina lente – ‘make 
haste slowly’. As Edgar Wind points out, this motto, coined by the Emperor Augustus, blends 
‘speed with patience, daring abandon with prudent restraint’, often in some curious image 
like a dolphin tied to a tortoise (Wind 98). Erasmus devoted no less than six folio pages of his 
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Adagia to explicating this motto, while woodcuts of the Hypnerotomachia feature as many as 
eighty variations on it.  
 
In Love’s Labour’s Lost, Moth and Armado dispute over whether lead can be quick:  
ARMADO. I say, lead is slow. 
MOTH. You are too swift, sir, to say so. Is that lead slow which is fir’d from a gun?  
ARMADO. Sweet smoke of rhetoric! He reputes me a cannon. (3.1) 
 
A cannon holds in potential the mysterious forces of nature, ‘forces which man carries also in 
his own breast’, then releases them to dramatically explosive effect (Wind 109). Energy-in-
potential was a quality of behaviour held up for imitation – and also open to ‘counterfeiting’, 
i.e. Machiavellian deception. ‘Elasticity of conduct’, wrote Edgar Wind, ‘was a Renaissance 
ideal and, what is more, a Renaissance habit, a strategy of life sustained and sanctioned by 
the classical motto festina lente’ (100-1).  
 
Festina lente is a good description of what Hamlet means when he asks for smoothness in the 
Players. It is a paradoxical quality of movement conveyed by the tempering of force. Force is 
the sum of the product of mass and acceleration. Smoothness is achieved through the control 
of mass (in particular, at the centre of gravity) while the body speeds up or slows down. The 
excursion of a smooth gesture, like the movement of a projectile from a cannon, embodies the 
principle of festina lente. It is a paradoxical quality of movement, but there is nothing 
inherently bizarre about it. The actors were responding to the Classical ideal of decorum and 
the Christian idea of grace in the same way as the humanist courtiers were supposed to. The 
motives were different, of course; the actor’s intention was not to accomplish soft diplomacy 
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but to create a memorable impression upon the spectator. In so doing, they cemented their 
reputations as professionals whose unique selling point was a behavioural display that 
separated them from the amateur players of the medieval guilds.    
 
After Shakespeare: the Neoclassical language of gesture 
In the year of Shakespeare’s death (1616), Giovanni Bonifacio published in Vicenza L’Arte 
de’ Cenni: ‘The Art of Signs’. This was a bold attempt to describe all of the signs that could 
be produced by the body (as well as by other semiotic systems like clothing). His claim – 
there was nothing new in it - was that from the movements of the body one can read the 
movements of the soul.  
 
In a strategy reminiscent of Quintilian, Bonifacio begins with the head and the face, and 
works his way down, body part by body part, to the feet. Not only does he detach the body as 
a whole from its context, he detaches the individual parts from each other. Gesture from 
Bonifacio’s period on would increasingly become a subject of this kind of minute analysis. In 
effect, Bonifacio was groping towards a science of non-verbal communication. 
 
Bonifacio’s work was symptomatic of a general anxiety arising from the collapse in Western 
Europe of a shared religious framework. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation did not 
lead to the weakening of Christianity in itself – arguably the reverse. But Bonifacio lamented 
the loss of faith that had afflicted Europe, which he felt had led to doctrinal tribalism. Europe 
was failing to have a rational conversation with itself because it did not have a common 
language. The analogy that Bonifacio made was with the Tower of Babel. It is an 
understandable analogy to make given the explosion of printed material in the period, much 
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of which was in a vernacular rather than the lingua franca of Latin. Bonifacio saw the answer 
to the problem in uncovering the categories of a common language of gesture which could 
return humanity to its prelapsarian state.  
 
The imagined solution of a common language led to a set of principles by which non-verbal 
behaviour could be understood. Thus, the discourse around performance from around 1650 to 
1750 became crystallized into principles that can be called Neoclassical, since they ultimately 
derived from the traditional rhetorical sources as well as paintings and sculpture influenced 
by Classicism. These principles were set out in manuals of oratory for the consumption of 
amateur speakers as well as professionals. In giving the essence of the principles here, I owe 
a large debt, as do all students of the subject, to the opera scholar Dene Barnett (Barnett 
1987): 
 
1. The weight is placed over one foot to ensure an elegant curve of the body. The feet are 
never set in parallel or ‘ten to two’. If the weight is over the front foot, the rear leg is 
relaxed with a slight knee-bend, and the two feet can form right angles with the toes 
turned out to display the calves as in ballet. So in essence the front foot points towards 
the scene partner and the back foot towards the auditorium using ballet positions two 
and four. This opens the body out to the audience.   
2. There are two basic resting hand positions. These are artistically elegant variations of 
Precision grip (with the middle fingers touching the thumb) and Power grip (with the 
index finger extended slightly) gestures and are found in Quintilian.  
3. Most gestures are made with the right hand. Charles Gildon in his Life of Thomas 
Betterton (1710) writes, ‘If an Action comes to be used by only one Hand, that must 
be the Right, it being indecent to make a Gesture with the Left alone’ (Gildon 74).  
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The left foot would in this case be set forward to create a curve in the body. An 
exception was made for aversive gestures, that is, expressive gestures of contempt, 
scorn, disgust, rejection, horror and repulsion. For these, the actor was permitted to 
use the left hand as the dominant hand. The eighteenth-century manuals all stressed 
the appropriate use of the right and left hand in oratory and acting. For example, 
Péchantrés around 1700 wrote: ‘In pleasure and delight it is the right hand which must 
act, in anger and hatred it is the left hand – come to me, it is the right hand – go away 
from me, it is the left hand’ (in Barnett 63). The idea that the right side (dexter) is 
good and the left (sinister) is evil was further translated into general practice 
regarding stage compositions, so that socially or morally superior characters would 
tend to occupy stage right (i.e. on the right from the perspective of the actor looking 
out at the audience) and inferior ones stage left.  
4. Gestures should be made using graceful curving lines. Lessing (1755) argued that 
straight lines were only appropriate for portraying rustic characters or characters in 
the grip of certain violent passions. He gives the example of a gesture of proud 
dismissal, which he says is performed better in an oblique straight line (as if sweeping 
something away). The wrist was usually turned upward (unlike the prone hand 
position of the ballet dancer).  
5. The gesturing hands should not travel above the eyes or below the waist, since that 
looks unrestrained. Gilbert Austin (1805) suggested this is not true for ‘epic’ 
passages, where a sense of largeness is required. By the time Austin was writing, 
theatre auditoria had grown in size, and gestures needed to be scaled up.  
6. The upper arms should be lifted slightly away from the torso, using the bend of the 
elbow, rather than touching it. This raises the centre of mass of the body towards the 
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upper chest, and creates an impression that the performer is in a state of anticipation 
or preparation to move.  
7. The performer should take care not to cross the arms over the trunk where possible, 
since this action blurs the outline of the performer for the audience. The hands should 
not be at the same height since that could also blur the picture. 
 
The aim was to create an aesthetically pleasing body according to the Neoclassical 
prescription – a body akin in some ways to that of a ballet dancer, with turned-out feet and 
calves, a feeling of lift in the torso, and elegantly curving extended arms and hands.  
 
Dene Barnett, whose 1987 publication The Art of Gesture remains a crucial reference, moved 
beyond these general principles to outline a set of eight basic categories of gesture described 
in the manuals. Barnett’s work can be criticized for its restrictive over-reliance on gesture as 
semiotic system rather than as an adaptive tool for the revelation of individual thought and 
feeling. That said, it seems from the available evidence of illustrations and descriptions that 
during the ‘long eighteenth century’ (from around 1650 to around 1830), tragic actors and 
opera singers did at least sometimes make use of this repertoire of gestures in performance, 
even if their use of it was more flexible than Barnett’s typology might suggest. Thus, it is 
helpful to consider his typology of gesture at this point. The headings are Barnett’s; in each 
case, I offer the terminology from modern authorities on gesture like David McNeill, Adam 
Kendon and Ekman and Friesen.  
 
Indicative gestures  
These are gestures that point to something. David McNeill, the psycholinguist whose work 
informs this book and who is interviewed in the Appendix, calls them deictics. 
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Gildon writes: ‘Do they not in shewing of Places and Persons, supply the Place of Adverbs 
and Pronouns?’ (Gildon 47). Paul Hiffernan, in a book that he dedicated to the actor David 
Garrick, advised that the eyes should also be used for indication: ‘When heaven, the stars, 
sun, moon, etc. of elevated situation are mentioned, or addressed to, they are to be turned 
upwards: but when earth, hell, etc., downwards’ (Hiffernan 79).  
 
Gilbert Austin offered a bolder example from Sarah Siddons as Imogen: ‘Wert thou the son 
of Jupiter, and no more/But what thou art besides, thou wert too base/To be his groom’ 
(Cymbeline 2.3.121-4). On the words ‘the son of Jupiter’ Siddons is pictured raising her 
pointing hand up to the sky.   
 
Imitative gestures  
McNeill classifies these under the term iconics. These are gestures that make pictures of what 
is being described in the accompanying speech. They usually model some spatial or motor 
aspect of the topic, illustrating how fast something was moving, in what direction, what size 
or shape it was, how one is meant to do something, etc.  
 
Barnett’s category also includes what McNeill calls metaphorics. These are a special class of 
iconics that create a referent for an abstract idea. They usually derive from basic cognitive 
metaphors such as the container metaphor – where the hand(s) forms a container shape such 
as a bowl; and the conduit metaphor – where the hand(s) models a channel such as a pipe. In 
the opening paragraph of this book, I gave an example of the metaphoric Precision Grip 
gesture of imitating the holding of a needle, where the index finger is in contact with the 
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thumb. The great virtue of metaphoric gestures like this is that they can be used in subtle 
ways to communicate the idea that the speaker has about herself. The example I gave was 
that this gesture could be taken to mean the speaker wishes to draw attention to her own 
competence – her capacity to achieve her intention – by suggesting a degree of delicacy or 
difficulty inherent in the subject, which the speaker is nonetheless capable of handling. 
 
Given the warnings from Quintilian onward about the use of ‘pantomime’ – i.e. literal 
illustration with the hands - it was always thought necessary to proceed with caution with 
imitative gestures. Charles Gildon warned against putting oneself ‘into the Posture of one 
bending a Bow, presenting a Musquet or playing on any Musical instrument, as if you had it 
in your Hands’; as well, even when the actor is speaking of ‘the Debaucheries of the Age, or 
any thing of that Nature’ he or she must not ‘imitate any lewd, obscene or indecent Postures’ 
(Gildon 78). In practice, what such strictures also meant was that only the general features of 
an object would be outlined, such as its overall direction of movement, speed or shape. Thus 
the actor John Walker in his Elements of Elocution: ‘When anything sublime, lofty, or 
heavenly is expressed, the eye and the right hand may be properly elevated, and when 
anything low, inferior, or grovelling is referred to, the eye and hand may be directed 
downwards: when anything distant or extensive is mentioned, the hand may naturally 
describe the distance or extent’ (Walker 1781: vol. II, 266).  
 
Very often, iconics are used by a person when they are telling a story, and want to indicate 
features of an object within the story. They are only used as accompaniments to speech, and 
reveal something of the mental image that the speaker has about the event described. The 
gesture shows the perspective the speaker is taking of it, which could be from the character’s 
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point of view, the object’s point of view or an observer’s point of view. But there is a 
difficulty here: in passages of narration, at times Shakespeare seems to confuse the point of 
view of the speech. A good example is Gertrude’s passage describing the death of Ophelia, 
which is rich in the kind of detail that might make a spectator wonder how she remembers so 
much, since she was not actually there when Ophelia died (4.3.135-157). How does she know 
that Ophelia ‘chanted snatches of old tunes’ while she was floating along on the brook 
(l.149), for instance? If the actor made iconic gestures to lend concrete support to the material 
events of the narration, the spectators might well start wondering how she can be so sure of 
what she did not see for herself.  
 
One result of this is that the performer may well avoid iconic gestures, and instead try to draw 
the spectator’s attention to the speaker’s attitude to the other characters (or to the spectators 
themselves) rather than to the logical consistency of the narration. In a recent example, 
Robert Hapgood tells us that ‘Clare Higgins, in the Rylance/Daniels production comforted 
Laertes, he on his knees with his head at her breast, she stroking his head’ (Hapgood 248). 
The stroking gesture is figured in the 17th century self-styled chirosopher John Bulwer’s 
catalogue of gestures under the name of Foveo (Latin for ‘keep warm’):  ‘We use to stroke 
them gently with our Hand whom we make much of, cherish, humour or affectionately 
love…being a kinde of indulgent declaration of the minde, used to pacifie and please 
others…’ John Bulwer’s work is discussed in the next chapter.  
 
There is in Hamlet, though, a speech that seems to openly invite iconics. In 2.1, Ophelia 
describes how Hamlet came to her private closet in a disshevelled state and frightened her:   
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He took me by the wrist and held me hard,  
Then goes he to the length of all his arm 
And with his other hand thus o’er his brow 
He falls to such perusal of my face 
As ‘a would draw it. Long stayed he so; 
At last, a little shaking of mine arm 
And thrice his head thus waving up and down,  
He raised a sigh so piteous and profound 
As it did seem to shatter all his bulk 
And end his being. (2.1.84-93) 
 
The word ‘thus’ twice invites the actor to pantomime; first, as Hamlet stepped back he placed 
his hand ‘thus’ on his forehead, and then, after scrutinizing Ophelia’s face he nodded ‘thus’ 
three times before issuing forth a sigh of profound melancholy. Julia Marlowe, among the 
more forceful of pre-twentieth century Ophelias, acted out this entire scenario, casting herself 
as Hamlet and making her father stand in for her. Even here, though, the richer content of the 
gesture is not found in the features of the object described but in the intention of the speaker 
towards the listener. That is why the advice given in the eighteenth century manuals is that 
the speaker should be sparing in the use of literal representation while drawing more freely 
upon metaphoric gestures.  
 
Gestures of Address 
These are essentially pragmatic gestures (this term is taken from the influential gesture 
theorist Adam Kendon) that are deployed to focus the audience’s attention on the interaction 
partner on stage, to signal who is being spoken to.  
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In Gilbert Austin’s Chironomia (1806), which can be taken as a summation of the eighteenth 
century treatment of the subject rather than an original contribution, the equivalent term 
‘formal gestures’ is introduced and then broken down as follows: 
1. Commencing gestures – the speaker’s hand or eyes are lifted to get the listener’s 
attention and show that the speaker is about to begin talking. This corresponds to what 
gesture scholars refer to as the preparation phase of a co-verbal gesture.    
2. Discriminating gestures – these are the gestures of address to signal who is being 
spoken to.  
3. Auxiliary or alternate gestures – these are made with the non-dominant hand. They 
are in essence extra gestures made in the flow of speech as the topic is parsed or 
complicated further. 
4. Suspended or preparatory gestures – indicating a pause for thought or to increase 
feelings of anticipation in the interlocutor. 
5. Terminating gestures – the hand or eyes lowered to signal the end of the speech. 
These correspond to the rest phase of the gesture in modern theory. A terminating 
gesture should be carried out gently, with minimum jerk, ‘and then only little by little 
as the speech ends’ as Goethe says (in Barnett 82).    
 
Expressive gestures 
This group refers to bodily movements that are symptomatic of an emotional reaction: 
smiling, laughter, tears, sneering, teeth chattering, goosebumps, and so on. While not strictly 
speaking intentionally expressive gestures, they constitute an important category for this 
study. They were named affect displays in a classic paper by Paul Ekman and Wally Friesen 
(1969). Affect displays are thus the gestures that show temporary emotional reactions or 
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attitudes. Bridget Escolme has argued for the importance of affect displays (what she refers to 
as emotional ‘excess’) for the spectator of Shakespeare’s theatre: ‘…the expression of 
extreme emotion was something that people came to the theatre to see and hear – to take 
pleasure in, in fact  (Escolme 2013: xviii).  
 
Gestures of Emphasis 
These are gestures whose stroke is timed to lay stress on a particular word or syllable. They 
mark the accents of speech. We tend to use them to emphasize particular words. In David 
McNeill’s terminology, these are called beats.    
 
The gesture expresses ‘the predominant idea’ in that part of the speech (Austin 1806: 392). 
The word ‘stroke’ is used by Gilbert Austin (ibid 377). He writes that the ‘stroke of the 
gesture is to the eye, what the emphasis and inflexions of the voice are to the ear’ (ibid). It is 
these gestures, I suspect, that Hamlet cautions the players about when he says, ‘Nor do not 
saw the air too much with your hand thus, but use all gently’ (3.2.3-5). Austin noted that all 
gestures, whatever their function, should actually coincide with the relevant part of speech, 
so, as Barnett comments, all gestures should in a way be seen as gestures of emphasis 
(Barnett 86).  
 
There are two further categories of gesture in modern theory that are not treated in the 
manuals of oratory at any length, and so are not discussed by Dene Barnett. However, I refer 
to them elsewhere in this book so they need to be defined. They are: 
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1. Emblems. These are gestures that replace words: for example, the ‘OK’ gesture. They 
are for obvious reasons produced without accompanying speech.  McNeill argues that 
most of these gestures are metaphors codified by culture. Since many of them are 
quite ancient, they often have a ‘magical’ aura – as when one gives someone the 
finger with the intention not merely to insult but to inflict damage (McNeill 2014a).  
2. Adaptors. This is a class of involuntary movements (see Ekman and Friesen 1969). 
The class is subdivided into object adaptors – such as playing with a pen – and self-
adaptors – such as playing with one’s hair, scratching one’s nose, etc. Such 
movements might well be made by a person who is under stress, thinking through a 
problem, or bored. Some scholars do not treat these movements as gestures since they 
are not intentionally expressive, but for the purposes of this book they are important.   
The reasons why these two particular classes of gesture are not discussed in this period are 
open to debate, but I think in both cases they would not have been seen as beautiful, or as 
conducive to an artistic presentation, although they may well have been considered 
appropriate for vulgar comedy.  
 
The gestures of the passions 
In the eighteenth century the passions were given characteristic facial and bodily 
configurations. An important source of information on the forms taken by expressive gestures 
were the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century manuals of painters such as 
Charles Le Brun, Karel Mander and Gérard Lairesse. The following passions were usually 
illustrated: 
a. Grief: a weeping face, clasped hands and hanging head. Despair is indicated by the 
arms hanging down. Drooping hands were taken as a sign of unmanly weakness, a 
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sign still used in English culture at least into the 1970s for an effete or homosexual 
man. With either posture, as Lang notes, it was important that the actor held the hands 
away from the torso for the purposes of visual clarity. A hanging head also indicated 
shame. Austin also suggested a gesture for grief arising from suddenly hearing 
disastrous news: the actor ‘covers the eyes with one hand, advances forwards and 
throws back the other hand’ (Austin 489).  
b. Surprise: the eyes and mouth open wide and the arms are held away from the body 
with fingers opened out, while the actor takes a step back. Gildon said that ‘Nature by 
a sort of Mechanic Motion throws the Hands out as Guards to the Eyes on such an 
Occasion’ (Gildon 76). The use of the word ‘Mechanic’ here by Gildon is interesting. 
In The Players’ Passion, Joseph Roach argues that discourses on acting in the West 
have since the Renaissance been driven by two competing models of the body, one 
vitalist-organicist and one mechanistic. Here, the implication is that a ‘Mechanic 
Motion’ is one that is largely involuntary. The expressive form of Surprise is extended 
in Wonder and Amazement, and from thence enlarged into Astonishment and Terror, 
where the body draws back further and the legs are set further apart. Walker wrote 
that ‘the body seems shrinking from the danger, and putting itself in a posture for 
flight’ (Walker 1781: II, 329).  
c. Anger:  The forehead frowns, the eyelids are raised and the eyes blaze, the outer part 
of the eyebrows raises while the inner contracts, the teeth gnash or the jaw sets with 
the lower jaw protruding and the mouth firms up into a horizontal line; the fists clench 
and the elbows bend ‘in a straining manner to the body’ (ibid: II, 364), while the neck 
muscles extend. In Wrath, an extension of Anger, the actor walks up and down, and 
stamps his or her feet. The hair is also supposed to rise up.     
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d. Contempt: this is somewhat similar to the Anger face, but the corners of the mouth are 
pulled down. With respect to hand gestures, Contempt resembles Anger in that 
graceful curving lines were eschewed in favour of broken, violent movements.  
e. Jealousy: as Le Brun’s drawing indicates, the most important aspect of this is that the 
eyes are screwed together and look sideways. The mouth is closed and the lower lip 
protrudes (as if sulking), while the nostrils are turned up to create a strong line on the 
cheeks. The body, according to Jelgerhuis (1827), is made ‘tighter, the hands into 
fists, now and then breaking away’ (Jelgerhuis: 153). The problem with this 
representation is that the jealous person will usually try to mask their true feelings. As 
well, jealousy is not usually a temporary emotional reaction that can be visually 
articulated in a change of appearance. 
f. Aversion, Hatred or Refusal: the body draws back from the unwanted object, the 
hands are thrown out like a vertical barrier against the object and the head turns away. 
Austin prefaced this motion with an anticipatory one, in which at first ‘the hand held 
vertical is retracted towards the face, the eyes and head are for a moment directed 
eagerly towards the object, and the feet advance’ (Austin 1806: 487). The preparation 
move – going to look at what will disgust us – serves to intensify the drama of 
looking away. The extension of this gesture is in Horror. Following Quintilian, the 
general advice was to thrust the right hand to the left, turn the left shoulder towards 
the right and turn the head to the right.    
g. Scorn: this is expressed by a toss of the left hand.  
h. Shame: the head hangs down and the hands cover the face, or one hand covers the 
face while the other is held slightly away from the face in an elegant contrast. In 
extreme cases of Shame, the knees sink to the ground and both hands cover the eyes. 
Austin said ‘this is a feminine expression of it’ (Austin 1806: 489).  
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i. Welcome: Barnett includes the gesture of holding the arms out in welcome as among 
the expressive gestures. It indicates a spontaneous display of love, affection or 
benevolence. The foot takes a step back in surprise at the sight of one’s friend, and the 
body leans back a little before the person advances with spread out arms.    
 
There is a considerable amount of evidence from this period that these passionate gestures 
were a part of the visual vocabulary of an educated person. In the next chapter I look in more 
detail at how some of them were deployed by actors like David Garrick and Sarah Siddons.  
 
Charles Darwin and the modern era  
By the mid-nineteenth century, as the social morality of self-fulfilment began to take hold 
more fully, considerations of the appropriateness of a gesture for a ‘beautiful’ artistic 
presentation would begin to be set aside. From the point of view of affect displays and 
adaptors the major work of the next century is Charles Darwin’s The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). Darwin’s text should be positioned within the long 
history of discourse on the passions. It stands as a kind of bridge between the Neoclassical 
account of the passions and the modern understanding of emotion. Darwin used photographs 
of actors performing emotional reactions, images that can be seen to relate to the 
attitudinizing of Classical actors and to the illustrations of Le Brun and Descartes. 
Essentially, the same expressions are given more of a behavioural appearance, as if situated 
in a real-world context. Up to a point anyway - the actors in the photographs Darwin used 
look to me like they are faking it. That is partly due to historical distance of course: they are 
wearing Victorian clothes, and the man in the pictures has Victorian lambchop whiskers. 
Then again, Darwin knew they were faking it. He was well aware that people have differing 
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capacities to get control over their reflex emotionality, and that actors are able to do 
apparently extraordinary feats like ‘bring the grief muscles freely into play’ (Darwin 182).  
Darwin was being a touch naïve here: it is not hard to pull a believable sad face, and children 
who want sympathy are quite capable of it.  
 
At the same time, Darwin elaborated upon a rather more explosive idea: that there were 
analogues of human emotional displays in the behaviour of other animals. This is a logical 
extension of the basic ‘continuity principle’ of evolutionary theory (mentioned in the 
Introduction). Illustrations in The Expression of the Emotions show, for instance, an angry 
human face alongside an angry dog’s face and an angry swan’s face. Such images recall the 
physiognomic tradition of texts such as Giambattista Della Porta’s De human physiognomia 
(1586). The difference was that in the Renaissance and the eighteenth century the image of 
pantomimic ‘apishness’ was a moral judgment on uncivilized behaviour – it was meant to 
indicate what you were not supposed to be. Darwin’s message was that you already were 
what you were not supposed to be. In that respect, evolutionary theory was analogous to the 
medieval conception of original sin.  Yet its impact was nothing short of scandalous. The 
most revolutionary aspect of his theory was the idea that humans are not set apart from other 
species. Inevitably Darwin’s challenge led to parodies in the popular media of men and 
women – including, of course, the great man Darwin himself – as apish. But Darwin’s work 
on emotional reactions pushed forward the social morality of self-fulfilment because it 
divorced the emotions from moral judgments – they were seen instead as physiological 
manifestations of core instincts or as by-products of other evolved functions. And his 
proposition in The Descent of Man that the moral sense in humans is derived from the social 
instincts at once removed it still further from the domain of higher purposes such as salvation. 
As I will show in the discussion of Henry Irving, the influence of Darwin’s theory of the 
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emotions on acting can be seen in the development of behavioural gestures such as adaptors, 
tokens of an imagined spontaneity and authenticity, both on stage and in the cinema.  
 
Gesture theory in the twentieth century took on board a range of insights and models from 
other disciplines such as anthropology, dance, semiotics, cultural politics and 
psycholinguistics. It is impossible to tease out a master narrative that could account for the 
influence of these discourses upon Shakespearean performance since the advent of 
Modernism. Suffice to say here that the shadows of a few key figures, such as Michael 
Chekhov and Rudolf Laban, loom large in the arena of performance. In the bibliography I 
offer a few indicative pointers to further reading.  
 
How smoothness connects with social morality 
In the outline given above, I drew attention to a number of concepts: decorum (in Cicero), 
sprezzatura (in Castiglione), festina lente (in Erasmus), the aesthetically pleasing body (in the 
eighteenth-century manuals) and smoothness (in Hamlet). There is clearly a relationship 
between these concepts, since they all point to the importance of control over one’s bodily 
impulses. I want now to return to the argument I introduced at the beginning of the chapter, 
and connect these concepts to my central claim for gesture as a window onto social morality.   
 
Smoothness is a quality of movement that is often felt to signal an attractive, sociable, 
trustworthy or competent person – and this fact is crucial to an understanding of how gesture 
plays into questions of social cognition. As I suggested in the introduction, warmth and 
competence have been proposed in recent social psychology as core factors in the formation 
of social judgments. Warmth is seen as having a moral dimension in that it signifies 
trustworthiness and honesty, as well as associations with likability. Signs of warmth show 
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that the other person’s intentions are beneficial not harmful. Signs of competence show that 
the other person is actually capable of carrying out their intentions (see Cuddy et al).  
 
My proposition is that smoothness of movement tends to communicate that the other person 
wishes to be seen as both non-threatening (warmth dimension) and capable with respect to 
their intentions (competence dimension); in other words, it can cover both of the primary 
components in the formation of social judgments. Therein lies its power as a bodily display. I 
would argue that it is key to managing one’s social relationships, because it constitutes a set 
of discreet signals that people respond to when conferring status upon others. Thus, in a 
performance smoothness can be seen as an expression of the actor’s concern with managing 
the impression she makes on both the audience and her fellow actors.  
 
To talk of impression management is to invoke the spectre of the sociologist Erving 
Goffman, who studied the subject in depth. The impulse behind his work was to treat 
behaviour from the perspective of theatrum mundi – all the world’s a stage, therefore people 
are constantly engaged in acts of managing the face they show to each other. Face is an 
aspect of an individual’s social capital: it is a positive value which, if managed well, can 
bring meaningful benefits to the person, such as increased access to resources. Clearly, a 
person’s face is directly related to their social status. It is not difficult to see how his 
perspective can be seen to relate to the concept of ‘self-fashioning’ put forward by Stephen 
Greenblatt (see Introduction).  
 
Goffman was uncomfortable with stage acting because, as far as he was concerned, in their 
daily lives people were already performing. He held a prejudice against the theatre derived 
from a feeling of ontological queasiness about its purpose. For Goffman, theatre cannot hold 
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the mirror up to nature (as Hamlet proposes), because natural behaviour does not exist. The 
nearest thing to natural – i.e. ‘authentic’ - behaviour Goffman allowed were the dysphoric 
responses of inmates in the asylum where he worked for a while. But Goffman had failed to 
grasp the nature of the drama’s power. Everyone knows that the drama is make-believe, yet 
audiences still respond, at least to some extent, as if the events on stage or on screen were 
actually taking place in the world. They do not respond because they think that what is being 
portrayed is real. They react in spite of the fact that they know it is not real – perhaps even 
because they know it is not real - so they feel safe to react. From that point of view, the 
widely held notion that the audience must engage in a ‘suspension of disbelief’ is misplaced, 
because in my experience most audiences are usually very willing to suspend disbelief since 
the trade-off for them is a pleasurable experience. Part of the pleasure, I think, is the result of 
the smooth gestures that actors make, which can subtly cue the audience’s feelings of safety 
at being in a low-risk environment. The actor sends out a physical signal to the audience that 
the performance is under control, is not directly threatening to them, is simply a kind of 
playing; at the same time, this gives the actor the freedom to provide displays of amplified 
emotion, aggression or risk-taking behaviour if desired.  
 
To be sure, such displays can be quite complex with respect to the maintenance of self-
possession, conditioned as they are by cultural and historical contexts as well as by 
physiology. To argue for the importance of smoothness is not the same as simply promoting 
an aesthetic of restraint. Acting tends to involve displays of emotion, and all emotion 
necessitates the surrender of self-possession to some extent, in the sense that one is not fully 
able in emotional moments to get control over what one pays attention to. An extreme 
example would be grief at the loss of a loved one. It can be exceptionally difficult to put 
one’s attention on anything other than the person one has lost in such a situation, even though 
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one may be desperate to attend to other matters, so that normal functioning becomes a 
problem. However, while within a dramatic fiction the character may appear to lose self-
control, the actor for the most part cannot afford to, and the maintenance of this dynamic 
balance between emotion and self-possession is critical to the actor’s success. 
 
Smooth movement is characteristic of high status behaviour. On stage, it offers reassurance to 
the spectator that the actor is in control of her anxiety, that she is a trustworthy professional 
who will cause no harm and that she is a skilled artist concerned with providing a pleasurable 
emotional experience. In addition, an actor may attempt to convey an idea that the character 
she is playing – or that the actor herself - is in some way attractive, for example through a 
display of heroic energy directed towards overcoming a problem.  The actor might undertake 
to perform actions that are obviously hard to accomplish, such as dancing, fencing or 
gymnastics. And the actor might accomplish her tasks with apparent effortlessness. This 
feeling of effortlessness is conveyed by smoothness of movement, by virtue of which it 
seems that nothing is extraneous to the accomplishment of that task.  
 
Joseph Roach does a good job in his book It of explaining the effect that charismatic 
performers have upon us mere mortals. But he does not say anything about how they might 
achieve it. The implication is the conventional one - you either have it or you don’t. I suggest, 
though, that actors develop charisma through modelling the behaviour of high status people, 
or at least of common perceptions regarding such behaviour. Actors use charismatic display 
as a shield against the anti-theatrical prejudice: the widespread feeling, promulgated since 
antiquity, that acting is somehow a wrong thing to do (the word the Greeks used for actor was 
hupokrates - hypocrite), and that actors are socially untrustworthy individuals. It is through 
the manipulation of charismatic signals that some actors from Shakespeare’s time on were 
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able to claim a professional status and thus possess wealth and influence: they sold their stage 
presence to the public. My point is that presence - charisma - is not something one is simply 
born with, but is something that actors can cultivate and practise.  
 
I agree with Joseph Roach, however, that the effect of smoothness in a performance is 
mysterious: for all the passions on display, smooth behaviour suggests there is something 
hidden from the spectator, a sense that the actor is always keeping a secret from you the 
spectator. From the perspective of social morality, this secret is the idea of an individual self 
who does not exist to serve God, or the monarch, or even you, but to discover the source of 
their own fulfilment. Michael Clune, writing about Classicism, argues that the hero of 
antiquity did not need an audience to confirm his significance; his immortality was built into 
his name, which stood for his monumental deeds. Smoothness, a bodily technique co-opted 
from the Classical tradition, retains a vestige of that coolness in relation to the spectator. That 
is what Hamlet is alluding to when he says, ‘You would play upon me, you would seem to 
know my stops, you would pluck out the heart of my mystery…’Sblood, do you think I am 
easier to be played on than a pipe?’ (3.2.362-73)  
 
In this opening part of the book I have outlined some theoretical issues regarding gesture in 
Shakespearean performance. I have tried to define what a gesture is and how it has been 
understood in Western European discourses, which I have labelled Classical, Medieval, Early 
Modern, Neoclassical and Modern. My use of these labels is largely for the sake of 
convenience, since my interpretation of the issues is premised upon a sense of gesture as 
existing in a continuum, where socio-cultural shifts tend to happen slowly and quite 
imperceptibly rather than in distinct and separable movements. Thus, I have argued for the 
validity of social morality as a driver of both continuities and changes within gestural 
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behaviour over time, and we must recognize that social morality as it is manifested in 
behaviour, even in a time of great upheaval such as the Reformation, does not suddenly alter 
overnight. Historically-minded critics have worked tirelessly to dismantle the myth that 
Shakespeare was a singular phenomenon who somehow radically broke free from the past 
and invented everything from scratch; creativity such as his is less a matter of invention ex 
nihilo and more one of juxtaposition of already existing elements.  I have also advanced an 
idea of smoothness in performance, which I am arguing has both psycho-physiological and 
socio-cultural components, and thus can be seen as exemplifying how gestural behaviour 
embodies in one movement both continuity and difference. In what follows I will look in 
more detail at the practice of gesture, through an examination first of all of some of the 
performance conditions of Shakespeare’s own context, and then beyond, into exploring the 
work of some very influential actors.   
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2.1.4 
 
PART II: PRACTICE  
 
Three 
Shakespeare’s Practice 
  
Uses of the word ‘gesture’ in Shakespeare’s plays 
The word ‘gesture(s)’ is found ten times in Shakespeare’s plays. He only used it from 1599 – 
after his company had moved into the Globe. If there is a common thread in his deployment 
of the word, it is in the notion that gesture is revelatory: it presents things, yields things, 
imports things, it speaks, it expresses. For example, in As You Like It the use of the word 
suggests an involuntary emotional reaction: 
If you do love Rosalind so near the heart as your gesture cries it out… (5.2.61-2) 
By contrast, in Henry V it infers a postural attitude: 
…and their gesture sad,  
Investing lank-lean cheeks and war-torn coats,  
Presenteth them unto the gazing moon 
So many horrid ghosts… (4.0.25-8) 
 
In both cases it is assumed that gesture is expressive: it cries out, it invests, it presents things 
in terms of both a physical appearance (‘horrid ghosts’) and an abstraction (as ‘the heart’). 
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But where in Henry V the suggestion is of a static position, in the case of Orlando’s gesture 
the indication is of a quick movement betraying rapid emotional reactions and thought 
patterns.  
 
The sense of gesture as a sudden betrayal of a fleeting inner life is taken up by Shakespeare in 
Hamlet.  Here, the dialogue seems to describe what is sometimes called incongruence, where 
Ophelia’s speech is held to be disconnected from her body movement: 
 
Her speech is nothing,  
Yet the unshaped use of it doth move 
The hearers to collection. They aim at it,  
And botch the words up fit to their own thoughts, 
Which as her winks and nods and gestures yield them, 
Indeed would make one think there might be thought 
Though nothing sure, yet much unhappily.  (4.5.6-13) 
 
That gesture could represent the ‘nothing sure’ of thought, a secret that cannot be fully 
grasped by the observer, is something quite new in English drama. It is tempting to view it as 
an instance of a growing crisis within Elizabethan culture, whereby the Protestant regime 
struggled to maintain some kind of surveillance over the religious beliefs of individuals still 
wedded to the old faith. In any case, at the same time that it offers a window into rapid 
emotional thought processes, it seems that for Shakespeare a gesture requires an act of 
construal, of interpretation, to be fully understood. In Othello Shakespeare pursues this 
conception – of gesture as a clue in need of decoding - in three references within the same 
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key scene. To begin with, by directing our attention towards bodily behaviour, Iago 
determines (one might say over-determines) its significance: 
 
I say, but mark his gesture… (4.1.88) 
 
In the next example, Iago introduces the idea that gesture is subject to potentially dangerous 
misreading by those in thrall to their own passions: 
 
As he shall smile, Othello shall go mad.  
And his unbookish jealousy must construe 
Poor Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light behaviour 
Quite in the wrong.  (4.1.101-4) 
 
In the third, he lays claim for his own interpretation as authoritative:  
 
…his gesture imports it. (4.1.136) 
 
Thus, a tension is perceivable between the meaning conventionally attached to a gesture by 
virtue of its visible shape, and the hidden psychological attitude that may or may not be 
alluded to by the shape. This was, broadly speaking, the situation of gesture in performance 
in the aftermath of the Reformation. Like the walls of Shakespeare’s local church in 
Stratford-upon-Avon, where Protestants (administered by Shakespeare’s father) had 
whitewashed the Biblia pauperum painted on the walls, in its openness to (mis)reading 
gesture had become a site of contest over social meanings. Here, through his manipulation of 
the semantics of behaviour, Iago paves the way for a shift in social morality from a concern 
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with higher purposes to a focus on self-fulfilment. In the penultimate chapter to this book, I 
return to Iago as a pivotal figure in the history of gesture in performance.  
 
From around 1609, gesture in Shakespeare’s practice – so far as can be understood from his 
texts – seems to undergo its own further process of ‘whitewashing’, in the sense of a move 
from the specific bodily detail to the abstract concept. In the opening of Timon of Athens a 
Poet complements a Painter on a portrait shown to him. The figure in the portrait is pictured 
speaking, and the gesture – which could be facial – gives the impression of the thought 
behind the words. But Shakespeare does not say what that impression is: 
 
How big imagination 
Moves in this lip! To th’ dumbness of the gesture 
One might interpret. (1.1.33-4) 
 
In the later plays, Shakespeare enlarged his association of the word with dumbness, again 
without declaring what this dumb language of gesture is really saying: 
 
…there was speech in their dumbness, language in their very gesture… (The Winter’s 
Tale 5.2.14-15) 
 
Coming to The Tempest, the shift away from the specific towards the abstract is further 
suggested by the word ‘discourse’ here:   
 
Such shapes, such gesture and such sound, expressing 
(Although they want the use of tongue) a kind 
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Of excellent dumb discourse. (The Tempest 3.3.38-40) 
 
There is also a stage direction in The Tempest, perhaps not written by Shakespeare: 
 
Here enters Ariel before; then Alonso with a frantic gesture… (5.1.58) 
 
Alonso’s gesture is a conventional display of guilt. The play is reminiscent of a court masque, 
a form that required detailed choreography of its elaborate audio-visual effects, and the 
gesture would have taken its place within a larger image. It is almost as though gesture in 
Shakespearean performance underwent a crisis of representation at the close of the 1590s, 
before returning by the end of the next decade with its provocative ambiguity flattened out 
into a new kind of formality. This formal style of gesturing – Alonso’s archetypal ‘frantic 
gesture’ for instance – could be seen as presaging the cultural impulse that led to Giovanni 
Bonifacio’s call for a universal language of gesture.  
 
Having considered Shakespeare’s deployment of the word itself, I want to look in a little 
more detail at an important example of what could have been a ‘provocative’ gesture in the 
context of Shakespeare’s practice.  
 
Supplication 
In a supplication gesture, the hand was stretched out in an appeal either to the gods or to an 
individual who wields power. Frances A. Sullivan finds nineteen examples of this gesture in 
Virgil’s Aeneid as well as in Homer, Ovid, Sallust, Caesar, Livy, Ennius and Cicero (Sullivan 
359-61).  
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Returning to Titus Andronicus, after Titus finishes his funeral oration to Rome and his sons, 
as he prepares to sacrifice the eldest born boy of his captured enemy Tamora, she seizes the 
moment to launch her own oratorical performance: 
Stay, Roman brethren, gracious conqueror,  
Victorious Titus, rue the tears I shed, 
A mother’s tears in passion for her son!  
And if thy sons were ever dear to thee,  
O, think my son to be as dear to me. (1.1.107-11) 
 
Here is a highly emotional speech of supplication, apparently performed while kneeling 
going by the evidence of her later words, ‘I’ll find a day to massacre them all…And make 
them know what ‘tis to let a queen/Kneel in the streets and beg for grace in vain’ (1.1.455-
60). In Cicero’s eyes such a speech would call for physical accompaniment as well as a 
suitable vocal attitude for imploring pity. Shakespeare’s use of the word ‘passion’ here is the 
equivalent of a director’s instruction coded in the dialogue – as is the phrase ‘rue the tears I 
shed’.  
 
Supplicating was performed with the right arm extended either at an angle towards the 
addressee or vertically towards heaven, and with the palm up. Palm Up gestures are discussed 
by Adam Kendon (Kendon 2004 ch13), who treats them as one among a number of gesture 
families. Kendon shows that such gestures are widely used across many cultures with the 
same basic range of functions: ‘Open Hand Supine (or ‘palm up’) family gestures…are used 
in contexts where the speaker is offering, giving or showing something or requesting the 
reception of something’ (Kendon 2004: 248). The precise meaning of the gesture may shift in 
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specific contexts, but the basic hand shape on the whole does not. To offer yourself up to the 
other person by exposing vulnerable areas of the body (the heart, the wrists) is to show 
acceptance of their dominance over you and – since you have no other weapon to fight with 
in the situation – your emotional honesty.  
 
In extending her arm out towards the object of her pleading, Tamora would be making it 
obvious to Titus (and everyone else in the scene) that she expects to receive something 
specific from him. The gesture displays submission and request in equal measure. Edith Hall 
has shown how, in Classical culture, supplicating gestures were ignored by the powerful at 
their peril since they had a quasi-legal status. In Ancient Greece, failure to attend to the 
supplicant’s plea could bring on the wrath of Zeus. Shakespeare’s audience would have 
recognized the status relationship here as a representation of both the classical Roman 
conqueror and slave and the medieval Christian lord and vassal. Thus the gesture promotes a 
strong association between the legal and religious procedures of Ancient Rome, as far as 
Shakespeare would have understood them, and the feudal concept of noblesse oblige.  
 
 
Jan Bremmer gives another interpretation of the supplication gesture: he argues that the 
upturned hand would denote a man who had symbolically abdicated his weapons. He argues 
that the upturned hand was seen as womanish in Classical culture, and could even indicate 
homosexuality (Bremmer 22). He points out that ‘Spartan youths, like their Athenian 
contemporaries, were obliged to keep their hands within their garments. In Greece, the hand 
was considered the organ for action and therefore could only be shown by real males’ (ibid). 
It is interesting from this point of view to see how Tamora’s rhetorical demand is that she is 
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looked upon not merely as a queen who is willing to acknowledge her victor’s power, but as a 
mother who cannot bear to see her sons killed merely for acting honourably on the battlefield.  
 
Prayer 
The association between the Classical and the feudal in supplication is clarified further by 
considering the related gesture of praying.  For one thing, it was quite common in early 
modern England for Protestant commentators to divide the act of prayer into different parts, 
among which was sometimes ‘supplication’, which tended to mean petitions for mercy and 
for the remission of sins (see Ryrie 108). There is, though, a larger point to be made 
regarding the idea of sacrifice, among the most fiercely contested points of debate in the 
Reformation conflicts. Luther believed that to think of the Mass as a kind of sacrifice offered 
to God was to deny the real sacrifice of Christ (see Cavanaugh 2001). If the Mass is not 
something we can offer to God then neither can we offer it to others - such as the dead souls 
in purgatory. We can pray for them, but we cannot have a direct impact upon them through 
our participation in the Mass. Prayer is allowed as an action offered up to others, but the 
Mass is for the individual alone.  
 
The prayer gesture (known as Orans) in antiquity had two basic forms: with hands raised 
upwards to heaven, as described in 1 Timothy 2:8, and with hands spread out in an Open 
Palm shape, as mentioned in Isaiah 1:15. During the 12th century Carolingian Renaissance a 
new configuration of the gesture developed – the junctis manibus, or folded hands. By the 
13th century, this had become the dominant form of the gesture in Europe. Its shape relates it 
to a gesture in the feudal ritual of ‘commendation’, where the vassal put his joined hands in 
those of his lord to connote a surrendering of power (as if the vassal is stretching out his 
hands to be bound), as well as trust, fidelity and dependence (see Barasch 1987: 60). There 
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are representations of the gesture in this form in the Sachsenspiegel manuscripts, the key 
legal codebook of the German Middle Ages dating from around 1220.  
  
Because Protestantism was capable of conceiving of prayer as an act that serves the living not 
the dead, there was a place for it on Shakespeare’s stage. Besides, it would have been 
difficult to avoid representing it since, as Alec Ryrie demonstrates, private prayer was a 
ubiquitous feature of the lives of English Protestants; it was ‘the most fundamental and most 
mysterious feature of Protestant pious practice’, and what made it of special theatrical interest 
was that it was seen as ‘a business less of quiet contemplation than of struggle’ (Ryrie 3). 
One thinks of Claudius’s guilty failure to pray in Hamlet: 
 
CLAUDIUS. My words fly up, my thoughts remain below. 
Words without thoughts never to heaven go. (3.3.97-8) 
 
Claudius’s long speech is not a prayer, but a verbalized effort to find a form of prayer that 
will serve his turn. Ryrie reveals that there was a fascinating slippage between terms in 
religious texts of the period, where ‘prayer’ often blurred into ‘meditation’, a word which in 
turn had near-synonyms in ‘musing’, ‘cogitation’ - and, most tellingly, in ‘soliloquy’, a term 
‘applied to texts which were more affective and passionate, and less informative and didactic’ 
(ibid 110-111). Thus, a Protestant audience may well have looked upon the soliloquy of 
Claudius as a spin on the conventions of meditation or prayer.  
 
This gesture is also found in what may be one of the only existing illustrations of a 
contemporary Shakespearean performance. The Longleat manuscript depicts a scene, or 
possibly a composite of scenes, above a page of text from Titus Andronicus. On the left of the 
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drawing stands a figure who is probably Titus, holding a ceremonial spear that divides the 
image in half. He is opening out his body in what looks like a reaction of surprise. On the 
right, a woman wearing a crown kneels before him in a gesture of praying with folded hands. 
She is, in all likelihood, Tamora, and is on her knees before Titus to plead for her son’s life.  
 
Whoever made the drawing could have seen a performance of Titus sometime around 1594. 
So it is reasonable to say that this is a representation of how an act of supplication was staged 
in Shakespeare’s day. It is not a silent prayer moment, directed at God, or a communal act of 
worship. It is an intentional gesture accompanying a speech directed at a human character in a 
dominant position. It reveals the connection between supplication and prayer, both being 
social acts performed by an inferior.  
 
At the same time, the barbarian Tamora is depicted like a lady from a medieval Book of 
Hours. Furthermore, her face is not remotely expressive of anguish; in fact, she looks rather 
serene. Underneath the drawing is written the line: ‘Enter Tamora pleadinge for her sonnes 
going to execution’ – clearly Tamora is supposed to be pleading. So why doesn’t she look 
upset?  Was the artist incompetent at facial expressions? Perhaps – the drawing hardly stands 
up alongside portraits made by such contemporaries as Nicholas Hilliard. But if the artist was 
Henry Peacham (who is named on the manuscript), then we are dealing with a man who 
wrote a treatise called The Art of Drawing. And in other respects the drawing is not 
incompetent but rather a cartoon. What Peacham has attempted to do is show the character’s 
decorum. The face is held poised, because that way it suggests the performer’s charisma. 
Furthermore, if this is an image of a performance, this Tamora was a young man.  
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It was not only the gesture of supplication that was subject to semantic shift as social 
morality, in its everyday expression, began very slowly to relax its ties both to the culture of 
honour and to the higher purposes of religion, and to move towards an ethos of self-
fulfilment. A further example can be found in the gesture of benediction. This gesture recurs 
in the Bible, as when John baptizes Christ; the basic move involves laying the right hand on a 
person’s head. The Gospels of Matthew (19:13 ff) and Mark (10:16) both refer to the placing 
of hands on the blessed. Thus for example the ‘well-known Byzantine images representing 
the emperor’s right to rule through the laying of a hand on the emperor’s head by Christ or a 
saint are in imitation of the baptism of Christ’ (Kalavrezou 73).  
 
During the Medieval period, the baptism gesture became important to the liturgy, marking as 
it did a ceremonial transition from one state to another.  But by the time Shakespeare wrote 
The Merchant of Venice, the gesture had evolved to communicate the more quotidian 
intention of bestowing favour upon a social inferior:  
 
LAUNCELOT. Well, old man, I will tell you news of your son. (He kneels.) Give me 
your blessing. Truth will come to light; murder cannot be hid long – a man’s son may, 
but in the end truth will out.  
GOBBO. Pray you, sir, stand up. I am sure you are not Launcelot my boy.  
LAUNCELOT. Pray you let’s have no more fooling about it, but give me your 
blessing. I am Launcelot, your boy that was, your son that is, your child that shall be.  
GOBBO. I cannot think you are my son.  (2.2.74-83) 
 
After having made fun of his blind father, Launcelot, locked in an essentially feudal mindset 
of salvation, now seems to panic at the possibility that Old Gobbo will not actually give him a 
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benediction. He lapses into a pseudo-Biblical language – ‘your boy that was, your son that is, 
your child that shall be’ – in a scene whose physical comedy relies upon the audience’s sense 
that a formerly sacred ritualistic act can be reduced to a family farce.   
 
Both of these gestures have clear Christian overtones. Yet there is very little specifically 
Christian ritual to be found in Shakespeare’s plays. John Russell Brown argues instead for 
‘the lesser rituals of ceremony’ (Brown 1999: 53). By ceremony he means ‘the repetition of 
actions and forms of speech which have general rather than individual or personal meaning 
and acknowledge power or authority’ (ibid).  Tudor social life was saturated with displays of 
status and of affiliation to a particular group identity. The basic displays of obedience are 
listed by David Bevington as kissing hands, offcapping, bowing and kneeling. By contrast 
handclasping and embracing ‘connote a harmony and reconciliation’ (Bevington 162). Brown 
sees such ceremonies as crucial to the efficient use of minimal rehearsal time, since all of the 
actors would have been able to slip into the performance of them without instruction. For 
instance, it would have been quite obvious to the whole playing company when to enter, 
where to stand and how to behave in a scene involving a monarch or a noble.  
 
Cue-taking – interaction gestures 
Shakespeare’s actors had ‘roles’ with their lines and minimal cues written on them rather than 
a full script. While certain scenes and actions, usually involving many characters, would have 
needed choreographing for reasons of safety, it seems that actors were left alone to learn their 
lines and the few words preceding them by way of cue, and devise their own physical 
movements, probably in conversation with each other. This argument has been made in detail 
by Tiffany Stern. Her system accounts for the phenomenal workload of Elizabethan actors.   
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However, even if this is how the actors worked, it does not imply there was a mishmash of 
acting styles on Shakespeare’s stage. M.M. Mahood writes that nothing ‘in the theatrical 
documents implies that minimal roles in Shakespeare’s plays were acted otherwise than with 
conviction and intelligence’ (Mahood 15). A leading actor such as Richard Burbage would 
not have tolerated performances out of line with the impression he wished the production to 
convey. The ethos of the company was likely modelled on the Elizabethan household, 
demanding loyalty and obedience to the authority figures. There was no shortage of would-be 
actors hungry for work in London, and Shakespeare, Burbage and their colleagues could no 
doubt hire and fire as they saw fit. And while the spectators may have felt they had 
permission to talk, eat, move about, react loudly to the play and so on, this would serve only 
to strengthen the need to produce a coherent group message.  
 
For the cue part system to work, actors would have needed to display behaviour that 
guaranteed the cue would be passed on as they arrived at the end of a speech. It makes sense 
in this system to write speeches that climax with a sense of import or a certain punch, for 
example in a phrase dominated by Anglo-Saxon, monosyllabic words, or with an expression 
that somehow sums up everything you have just said. Shakespeare appears to have deployed 
such a writing strategy often. The point has been well made by Simon Palfrey: ‘We can see in 
this how the cue-exchange, or what we can call the cue-space, has the potential equally to 
embody connection (sharing, coordination, continuity) and competition (rivalry, jealousy, 
resistance). This makes it a classically dramatic form, a hinge-point where decisions are 
made, relationships tested, and identities forged’ (Palfrey 135).    
 
It is likely also that interaction gestures would be made in the cue-spaces. It is well-
established among gesture scholars that spontaneous gestures are usually launched slightly in 
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advance of the speech they relate to. We prepare the gesture so that the stroke phase times 
with the syllable(s) we wish to emphasize (see chapter 10 of McNeill 1992). The actors could 
signal using their eyes or their hands and the timing of the speech to pass the cue smoothly. 
The actor in this way reduced the cue-space to a minimum, or filled it with a movement like 
the preparation phase of a gesture, to give the impression of flow. Palfrey says the cue-space 
‘can be conceived of as a very real space, shared or fought between two players, one that is 
neither owned by nor identical to either’ (ibid: 136). With experienced performers who know 
each other well, the opportunities for playing with timing in the cue-space were manifold.  
 
What did an interaction gesture look like? It probably resembled what was called adlocutio, a 
gesture that originated in antiquity (Dodwell 35). Originally it referred to an emperor’s 
address to his soldiers or the people. One of the most characteristic gestures of Roman art, it 
is found on many coins and statues. In the most famous depictions, such as the statue known 
as the Prima Porta Augustus, the right arm is raised in Open Hand Vertical Palm position. It 
is a familiar gesture, one that a leader would use to acknowledge a crowd or to demand their 
silence so that he can talk.  
 
Richard Brilliant argues that the gesturing hand remained empty (i.e. open) in order to signal 
‘the intangibles of power’ (Brilliant 1963: 69). Perhaps, but the idea needs unpacking a little 
further. With the vertical palm turned out towards the addressee, it creates a metaphoric 
barrier indicating the intention of the speaker: to stop, or interrupt, the addressee’s action. 
The distance of the arm from the body is significant. Fully extended (like a traffic 
policeperson), the arm signals ‘you stop’, as opposed to the half-extended arm that means ‘let 
us stop’, and the arm closer to the body, meaning ‘I stop’.  
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Shakespeare’s actors may well have deployed interaction gestures of adlocutio in both their 
conventional, ‘imperial’ form – say, when a ruler spoke to the crowd - and in smaller, more 
sophisticated ways to indicate ‘stop talking’, or ‘my/your turn to speak’, or ‘I am (or I’m not) 
finished’. They would serve to maintain mimetic credibility as well as interactional flow, 
since when people talk they tend to produce these gestures; it would also have helped to 
create a group style.  
 
In a survey of the gestures depicted in medieval manuscripts of the plays of Terence, Charles 
Dodwell refers to a variation of the adlocutio - the ‘two-finger point’. There are many 
instances of this gesture in the different manuscripts, some of which date back to the 
Carolingian period. Two-finger and thumb horizontal pointing (as depicted in the Terentian 
manuscripts) was used to suggest that the speaker is in mid-speech. However, a two-finger 
Vertical Palm gesture would still have been linked to the iconographic tradition – as in 
countless Byzantine images of Christ Pantocrator – so its use in the theatre of Protestant 
England may have been circumscribed. In the tradition, the gesture also connoted teaching 
and blessing.  
 
Face acting  
The question of face acting on Shakespeare’s stage leads us to an interesting philosophical 
problem. Hamlet tells his mother that he will show her true self in a mirror: ‘You go not till I 
set you up a glass/Where you may see the inmost part of you’ (3.4.20-1). Moments later, after 
uncovering the body of Polonius, instead of using a mirror Hamlet shows her two 
‘pictures…The counterfeit presentment of two brothers’ (3.4.54-5). Why doesn’t Hamlet 
show his mother her own face?  
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People were unable to see themselves properly in mirrors before the Venetians invented clear 
‘crystal’ glass in 1507. Before that, one saw through brass or green glass, darkly.  But the 
arrival of clear mirrors did not instantly alter the way that people were represented. The 
object seen in the mirror was not usually oneself (Shuger 22). Instead, the image was of an 
exemplary figure such as Death, or Christ, or some other paradigm for human conduct – the 
mirror essentially revealed the invisible behind the visible, a reflection of theological 
commonplaces (ibid 26). The word mirror was interchangeable with image – it was a device 
with literary or pictorial uses. This way of representing the human face – as a mask that the 
mirror sees through – is a product of a social morality of higher purposes: what matters is the 
condition of the soul beyond the face, which the mirror reveals.   
 
Faced with a real mirror as opposed to a ‘theological’ one, the inward self may be eclipsed. In 
Richard II (4.1.275-291) the king smashes a mirror on the ground after looking at himself in 
it and finding insufficient physical evidence of his inward sorrow. Perhaps this is also why 
Hamlet – consciously or otherwise – does not show Gertrude her face in a mirror: there is no 
point, since it will reveal not her soul but only her face. And Hamlet has already learned that 
‘one may smile and smile and be a villain’ (1.5.108). Hamlet’s conception of the face as a 
lying mask (a commonplace in the age of Machiavellianism) is put to the test with 
Rosencrantz:  
HAMLET. Man delights not me – no, nor woman neither, though by your smiling you 
seem to say so.    
ROSENCRANTZ. My lord, there was no such stuff in my thoughts.  
HAMLET. Why did you laugh then when I said man delights not me? (2.3.307-13) 
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Like Hamlet, the spectator cannot know what is in Rosencrantz’s mind from the evidence of 
his face, because Rosencrantz is both attempting to control the passions acting upon him and 
probably lying about what he was smiling about. Admit the existence of Machiavellianism, 
and there is no reliable art to finding the mind’s construction on the face. Rosencranz’s 
impulse in the situation is to save or protect his face in the more sociological sense of the 
word. Hamlet may have been his chum at university, but he certainly isn’t anymore, and his 
status as a ‘mad prince’ is basically contradictory and therefore unsettling. The appropriate 
response for Rosencrantz is to put on a lying face that helps him maintain his own status.  
 
There is good reason to think that the actors on Shakespeare’s stage would have kept their 
faces relatively still while performing. Deceptiveness of behaviour could still be considered 
the territory of the Devil, but the Reformation had taught many English people the necessity 
to control one’s behavioural output. This is forcefully expressed in Sonnet 94, where those 
who maintain control over their emotions and the temptations that assail them are praised as 
‘the lords and owners of their faces’ (l.7). Eye movements would be more significant. If the 
spectator could see his eyes, the actor could suggest who or what he was interested in, or 
whether he was supposed to be introspecting at that moment. This was known to Cicero, who 
wrote that ‘all depends on the countenance; and even in that the eyes bear sovereign sway’ (in 
Cole and Chinoy 24). As well, stillness in the face offers the actor the possibility of 
temporary emotional reactions whilst maintaining an overall impression of poise, of the 
‘well-graced’ actor (Richard II 5.2.24). The presentation of these involuntary reactions – 
smiling, laughing, bursting into tears, displaying an angry or disgusted face, opening the face 
wide in surprise or fear – is in the great majority of cases a matter of a few seconds in 
everyday life. This is why it can be so difficult to read a person’s emotions from an unposed 
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expression in a photo: emotional expressions are mobile. If the actor held his face in an 
emotional reaction for much longer he would be accused of looking unnatural. In addition, an 
open face (i.e. a face that is not held in an emotional expression) is more relatable, because 
the spectator can project onto the actor her own fantasy of the character’s feelings, rather than 
having to interpret the actor’s feelings – feelings the spectator may in any case not share.  
 
Obviously, we are unable to see for ourselves what natural behaviour on stage was supposed 
to look like. But there is no doubt mimetic skill was highly prized. Thomas Heywood in his 
An Apology for Actors advises the actor ‘not to use any impudent or forced motion in any part 
of the body, no rough or other violent gesture; nor on the contrary to stand like a stiffe starcht 
man, but to qualifie every thing according to the nature of the person personated’ (Heywood 
29).  Heywood, whose advice echoes Hamlet’s to the Players, stresses the need ‘to keep a 
decorum’ in the face, and not to merely ‘stand in his place like a livelesse image, demurely 
plodding, and without any smooth and formal motion’ (ibid) in his pursuit of mimesis. 
Without a ‘comely and elegant gesture, a gratious and a bewitching kinde of action, a natural 
and a familiar motion of the head, the hand, the body, and a moderate and fit countenance 
sutable to all the rest, I hold all the rest as nothing’ (ibid). It is worth recalling that Heywood 
was not writing purely for the elite; he collaborated on plays for the popular theatre such as 
the domestic middle-class tragedy A Woman Killed with Kindness and the pot-boiler The Late 
Lancashire Witches. Yet his pamphlet, in staking a claim for the status of acting as an art, 
reads like Cicero seen through Hamlet. So: realism in the matter of ‘personation’, yes, but the 
influence of Classicism was never far away from the early modern discourse on acting.  
 
 
 98 | P a g e  
 
 
After Shakespeare: John Bulwer 
In 1644 the English physician and philosopher John Bulwer (1606-56) published his 
Chirologia and Chironomia.  Bulwer’s interest in how the body communicates meaning is 
evident in all of his writing; he even styled himself ‘The Chirosopher’. He was especially 
interested in the problem of a language of and for the deaf – in fact he seems to have been the 
first person to devise a finger alphabet as a pedagogical method, as outlined in Philocopus: 
Or the Deaf and Dumb Man’s Friend (1648).  Bulwer was attempting to provide a road map 
for communication on behalf of the deaf sons of landowners, who had an obligation to 
administer their estates. His fascination with bodily communication was also personally 
motivated as he had a deaf daughter.  
 
In Chirologia Bulwer built a map of natural hand movements. In Chironomia he attempted to 
list what he called the canons of rhetoricians – that is, the artificial gestures deployed by 
orators; so this second book can be read as an elaboration of the first (see Fudge). The 
essential distinction between Chirologia and Chironomia is that in the first Bulwer describes 
gestures that people make quite naturally while they are talking, and in the second he 
describes gestures that a person can prepare in advance and then add on to a persuasive 
speech. Perhaps as a consequence of this, the description of gestures in Chironomia are more 
specific, often involving details of finger positions, rather as one finds in Quintilian.    
 
In Chirologia he describes the gesture of wringing one’s hands. He calls this gesture Ploro 
and takes it as a sign of grief. He suggests that in grief the brain is compressed, which forces 
tears into the eyes: ‘from which compression of the Braine proceeds the HARD WRINGING 
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OF THE HANDS, which is a Gesture of expression of moysture’ (Bulwer 28). Bulwer 
probably derived the idea of brain compression inducing tears and handwringing from 
Francis Bacon. It seems a little odd to suggest the brain is compressed by grief. But of course 
a person may well experience migraine-style headaches when depressed, and that may feel as 
though the brain is being compressed.  
 
Hamlet tells his mother to ‘Leave wringing of your hands’ (3.4.34), a conventional gesture of 
grief in Renaissance culture. Nowadays it would be understood not as a formal sign of grief 
but as an affect display (Ekman and Friesen 1969). Again, the form of the gesture has not 
changed, but as social morality has moved from an attention upon higher purposes to self-
fulfilment, the meaning of the gesture has been reconfigured accordingly. Hand-wringing is 
now seen as the kind of gesture that shows a person is very anxious. Stress often leads to a 
feeling of sweaty palms, because when the autonomic nervous system is aroused there is 
greater activity in the sweat glands. At the same time, the skin’s capacity to conduct 
electricity goes up when one is aroused by a challenging event – this is known as the 
electrodermal response. Seeing such a gesture often arouses a mimetic response in the 
spectator. (Even thinking about situations in which one is aroused increases the conductivity 
of the skin.) The more intense and surprising the performance of the gesture, the more 
aroused the spectator may feel.  
 
In the domestic context of the scene in practice, both social moralities are afforded space by 
Shakespeare. More than an implied stage direction to the actor - which it surely is - the line 
‘Leave wringing of your hands’ draws attention to the moment of performance. The gesture 
is not just conventionally indicative of the need for salvation: it is also grounded in a bodily 
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experience that produces the metaphor of wringing, an experience that is both intensely 
personal and shared – it is both Gertrude’s and ours.   
 
If you hold out your hand palm up, then you are performing a frequently used Open Hand 
Supine (Kendon 2004) gesture labelled Profero by Bulwer. What does it mean without any 
speech to accompany it? Clearly it looks like you want to offer, present or receive something. 
There are actually some quite specific ways in which this gesture tends to be used. If the hand 
does not move and the palm is presented, then it is often used to introduce, comment, explain 
or clarify your words.  If the palm is addressed – the hand is directed to something as if it 
were a flat surface – then it is more likely you are acknowledging me, offering me something 
with your words, or showing me your readiness to receive something. In this form it can 
function as an interactional turn-taking gesture.  
 
According to Bulwer the gesture of Profero was ‘the first expression that ere appeared in the 
Hand, and was used by Eve in the fatall profer of the forbidden fruit to the first man’ (Bulwer 
71). It was also ‘the second gesture of any signification that is recorded to have appeared in 
the Hand, and the first that shewed itself in the Hand of the first man Adam, when hee 
accepted of that forbidden fruit…From this unhappy gesture the Hand may be well called 
Manus a manando [‘flowing hand’] because all evill proceeded from this action’ (ibid). This 
assertion may strike the modern reader as surprising, but it is typical of the era, as Peter 
Harrison shows (Harrison 2007). For Bulwer, the primal scene, and thus the origin of all 
gesture, is the error committed at the Fall. Before Eve’s Profero, Eden was a kind of 
communal paradise premised upon sharing resources according to basic needs rather than 
merit or claims to dominance, always excepting the absolute superiority of God. Afterwards, 
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Man was turned into a slave of Death and Nature, and Woman was made subordinate to Man, 
while beasts like the serpent had to crawl on the ground.   
 
Where did Bulwer get his gestures from? In the 1950s the theatre scholar Bertram Joseph 
published a series of books in which he speculated upon Elizabethan acting. His contention 
was that John Bulwer’s taxonomy could be related to the acting style of tragedians that 
survived at least up to the closing of the Globe in 1642. He showed how certain gestures on 
Bulwer’s list could be applied - and in his view were applied - by Shakespeare’s actors to the 
text.  
 
Joseph places Renaissance rhetoric alongside evidence of testimonies from the period that 
suggests audiences reacted to good actors like Burbage ‘as if the personator were the man 
personated’ (Thomas Heywood, quoted in Joseph 92). For Joseph, the only difference 
between the actor and the orator is that the actor speaks in the person of another rather than as 
him or herself. This was also the opinion, he tells us, of Thomas Wright (ibid 95). It is true 
that Wright says ‘in the substance of external action for most part orators and actors agree’. 
But where Wright argues that the actors ‘act feignedly’ whereas orators ‘act really’, Joseph is 
suggesting that ‘in each case the emotion is truly felt’ (ibid). He needs to say this to shore up 
his belief that it was ‘the orators who used the techniques of the actors’ rather than the other 
way around, because that allows him to use texts like Chironomia as evidence for actors’ 
behaviour on stage (ibid 94). In the absence of hard evidence he privileges the actor over the 
orator.  
 
There is no way of knowing whether John Bulwer took some of his ideas from actors. He 
used the usual repertoire of source material – Classical literature and the Bible. He was 
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interested in developing a sign language, so he regarded gestures as being like a natural 
language. In this, as has been noted by scholars (Kendon 2004: 28), what has seemed from 
the viewpoint of historicism as a blind spot in his thinking – that he falls into an unwarranted 
universalism – can be seen from another angle as surprisingly astute. Bulwer, being a 
physician, developed an idea of a universal language that was not purely arbitrary; rather, it 
was psycho-physiological.   
 
Whether or not you choose to accept that Bulwer had some kind of access to Shakespeare’s 
practice, even if second-hand through actors such as Burbage’s apprentice Joseph Taylor, it is 
clear that Bulwer had his own agenda. His attempt to create a taxonomy reflected a wider 
cultural impulse that would lead to a reconfiguration of Shakespearean performance in 
England over the next hundred years, and that is the subject of the next chapter.  
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2.1.5 
Four 
Eighteenth-Century Gesture 
 
In this chapter I will outline a number of themes that emerge from reflecting upon gesture in 
Shakespearean performance during the eighteenth century. I begin with the domineering 
figure of Thomas Betterton, whose presence threw a shadow over the theatre in England for 
several decades.  
 
Thomas Betterton 
The fact that it was rather difficult, as I suggested in the previous chapter, to flesh out an 
entire dictionary of a common language of the deaf did not stop other writers from asserting 
the universality of gesture - such as Charles Gildon, the author of The Life of Mr Thomas 
Betterton (1710). Borrowing at length from a translation of a French treatise by Le Faucheur, 
Gildon’s Betterton advises against uncivilized hand and facial gestures, such as using the left 
arm (more of that in a moment) and licking or biting one’s lips while performing, seen by 
Betterton (who in large part is simply a mouthpiece for Le Faucheur’s plagiarized 
prescriptions) as ‘ungenteel and unmannerly Actions’ (Gildon 72). Licking or biting the lips 
here during speechmaking on stage are self-adaptors that might be seen as a symptom of 
anxiety in the actor, hence ‘unmannerly’. To correct or prevent such lapses, Gildon’s 
Betterton suggests the use of a mirror, or, failing that, get a friend ‘who is a Master in all the 
Beauties of Gesture and Motion’ to help out (ibid 55).  
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It is with Thomas Betterton that the myth of a Shakespearean tradition of influence gathers 
steam. This myth declares that actors pass on their knowledge to each succeeding generation, 
and that therefore a line can be traced back to Shakespeare’s original intentions. Right from 
the outset, though, this line is questionable. It begins with the claim of William Davenant, a 
key figure of the Restoration theatre. Davenant had, it was claimed, seen Joseph Taylor’s 
Hamlet before the Interregnum, and was thus able to give Betterton instructions on playing 
the role, which he first did at the age of twenty-six in August 1661. Furthermore, Taylor 
probably modelled his performance upon his master Richard Burbage, and may even have 
received direction from Shakespeare himself. Since Taylor joined the company three years 
after Shakespeare’s death, though, the claim that Shakespeare taught him is on shaky ground. 
British actors and acting companies have frequently used the idea of a tradition harking back 
to Shakespeare to enhance their own reputations. It ties in with the rise of the actor as 
celebrity, which, having begun with actors like Richard Burbage, took off in this period. The 
actor’s interpretive self from this moment was foregrounded and tested in relation to 
Shakespeare’s putative textual intentions. And as Shakespearean actors gained in status, so 
did Shakespeare.   
 
We do not have a lot of information about Thomas Betterton’s physical style. He was a well-
built man, who probably did not throw himself around on stage; he was known more for his 
declamatory vocal skills than for his movement. However, Anthony Aston recorded his 
impressions of seeing the actor when the great man was sixty-three years old. He tells us that 
Betterton had ‘short fat Arms, which he rarely lifted higher than his Stomach. – His left Hand 
frequently lodg’d in his Breast, between his Coat and Waistcoat, while, with his Right, he 
prepar’d his Speech’. In this posture he would declaim his speeches in a ‘low and grumbling 
Tone’ that yet could rise to ‘an artful Climax’. At this late stage in his career, being 
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‘corpulent’ and thick-legged, Betterton did not move very much: ‘His Actions were few, but 
just’. Aston suggests that his ‘Aspect’ in his ‘latter time’ was ‘a little Paralytic’ (Watson 75). 
He did not dance on the stage anymore, and Aston rather wishes that he had resigned the role 
of Hamlet to a younger actor ‘who might have Personated, though not have Acted, it better’ 
(ibid 76) since, when Betterton’s Hamlet threw himself at Ophelia’s feet (which would 
probably have been around 3.2.95-100 when Hamlet chooses to sit with his head on 
Ophelia’s lap rather than next to his mother), he came across as ‘a little too grave for a young 
Student’ (ibid).  
 
One gets a sense from the passage of the old veteran who does not quite cut the mustard 
physically anymore, but who still commands respect, borne along on a wave of nostalgia, 
from his audience. Betterton can still ‘act’, in the oratorical sense of delivering a passage of 
text in an aurally charming manner, but he does not persuade Aston that he presents a 
credible image of Hamlet.  
 
The Restoration theatres 
William Davenant and his friend Thomas Killigrew were granted patents by Charles II to 
organize two playing companies, the Duke of York’s company and the King’s Men. 
Charles’s taste had been decisively shaped by his time spent at the French court under Louis 
XIV. Betterton was sent on an official trip to Paris in 1662 to take a look for himself at the 
staging practices of the French (and the Italians). He made two more trips later, and the 
results of his visits and subsequent efforts were innovations in theatrical presentation. The 
Restoration theatres in London were indoor spaces, with basically picture frame stages, 
although an apron protruded from the proscenium arch into the auditorium and boxes were 
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placed at the sides of the stage where fashionable people would sit. These spaces were lit by 
girandoles (chandeliers) hanging over the stage, and perhaps in the wings or at the back of the 
stage.  The girandoles could be raised or lowered to alter the amount of light on the acting 
area. There were also candles on sconces in the auditorium, and these were kept lit 
throughout the performances. This meant the fashionable set could display themselves to 
each other during the entire evening. Playgoing was a social affair, a matter of being seen as 
well as seeing.  
 
The Restoration theatres also introduced changeable scenery. From available visual evidence, 
it seems that flats were painted with perspective scenes. The actors tended to position 
themselves on the apron for soliloquies, and to perform dialogue scenes in a lateral corridor 
of space along the front of the stage near to the proscenium arch. In this way visual 
distortions to the perspective of the backdrop were avoided and the actors could find their 
best positions in the available light (Palmer 51). In effect, the actors were playing most of the 
time in a kind of flattened, almost two-dimensional space, separated from a backdrop that 
was purely decorative. At the sides of the apron were the so-called Doors of Entrance, which 
meant the actor did not have to appear upstage of the proscenium arch if desired.  
 
From the point of view of gesture, such a staging model would demand a kind of flattened 
silhouetting of the body into vivid shapes. The gesture would play out in width not depth and 
would require a strong sense of figural separation of the backdrop and darker upstage areas 
from the ground.  
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The rise of the actress 
Betterton took over from William Davenant the training of young performers – especially the 
actresses. There had been English women performers as far back as the fifteenth century, and 
it seems that in 1626 Queen Henrietta Maria may have received acting instruction for a court 
entertainment in which she appeared from Burbage’s successor Joseph Taylor. The first 
performance of a professional British actress in a female Shakespearean role was probably in 
Thomas Killigrew’s revival of Othello on December 8th 1660. The occasion was marked by a 
prologue that declared: ‘The Woman plays today, mistake me not,/No Man in Gown, or Page 
in Petty-Coat’ (quoted by Shaughnessy in Richie and Sabor 181).  
 
Overnight, a revolution in English theatre had taken place. It is impossible to give precise 
assessments of general influence, but the physical presence of actresses in the theatres 
decisively altered the playgoing public’s taste. The private Caroline theatres (as the 
Blackfriars became) had been by no means merely an extension of court life; their principal 
audiences were ‘drawn from those same parliamentary classes from which the political 
challenge to Charles in 1640 would come’ – that is, the gentry, including some Puritan 
gentry. And this was the same audience that remained hostile to female players, such as when 
French actresses performed at the Blackfriars in 1629 (Howe 22). In reality, there was a 
marked distinction between the court entertainments that featured women performers like the 
Queen and her ladies-in-waiting and the commercial theatres before the Civil War. When 
Charles II was installed on the throne, this distinction no longer pertained, because Charles 
took an interest in how the commercial theatres were organized.  
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In effect, in the early days of the Restoration the court around Charles commandeered what 
had been a broader, more gentry-based theatre culture. And women were accepted as a 
natural part of that Royalist theatre culture. A royal patent of 1662 to Thomas Killigrew made 
it a matter of law that women should play women, giving the reason that in former days it 
was considered offensive to some that men should dress up and act female roles – 
presumably this expression in the patent was a dig at the Puritans. The patent was a legalizing 
justification of the king’s own preferences; once it was signed, there was no going back.  
 
Some actresses became known for their breeches roles. These were popular because the men 
got to look at the actresses’ legs. Sometimes the actresses would take young male roles, but 
more often would play young women disguised as men in comedies. Apart from the obvious 
possibilities for pleasing the audience in a play like As You Like It, other Shakespearean plays 
were altered so that breeches roles could be inserted into them, as in John Crowne’s 
adaptation of Henry VI 1 and 2 (1680), which provides Henry’s son with a mistress who 
dresses up so she can follow him onto the battlefield. The sexual cynicism of these staging 
ploys is reflected in William Davenant and John Dryden’s version of The Tempest (1667). In 
the play, Prospero, dispensing advice to Dorinda (Miranda’s sister, a character thrown into 
the play to add females to the story – as is Caliban’s sister) warns her not to touch the bare 
hand of Hippolito – ‘It is the way to make him love you more’ (3.1.136). The non-verbal 
teasing and flirting that must have been going on during these performances is encouraged by 
the dramatic representation.  
 
The sexual appeal of beautiful actresses carried over into their tragic performances. 
‘Actresses were frequently required to do no more than pose, like pictures or statues, to be 
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gazed upon and desired by male characters in the play and, presumably, by male spectators’ 
(Howe 39). Violence performed upon the female body, sometimes carried out by themselves 
in a fetching state of helpless insanity, added value to the entertainment. In Nahum Tate’s 
adaptation of Coriolanus (1681), the hero’s wife Virgilia begs for mercy at the feet of his 
enemy Aufidius, which serves only to make her still more sexually appealing to him. She is 
later brought in wounded (presumably, raped offstage) before her husband. Thomas Durfey’s 
version of Cymbeline (1682) similarly sets up the exciting prospect of a rape taking place 
under the loved one’s eyes. The actress would have been expected to deliver an alabaster-
white portrayal of chaste virtue traumatized by male lust. Her job was to supply images of 
masculine wish-fulfilment. The fact that the rapes were not actually staged is a sleight of 
hand, a trick of flattery to the rakes in the audience who would presumably ally themselves 
with the heroic rescuer, and thus feel more justified than ever in their pursuit of the actresses.  
 
As Elizabeth Howe shows, the widely-held assumption at this time was that actresses were 
basically prostitutes. Some, like Mary Betterton, were in a position to marry a man who 
could, to a degree, offer some protection; otherwise, they were considered fair game to the 
rakes and gallants. The word ‘whore’, though, may not have implied a professional sex 
worker: Kirsten Pullen argues that ‘Traditionally, power and privilege were the rights of 
those who had earned them by birth, rather than labor, or especially sex. Labelling actresses 
as whores and publicizing their sexual peccadilloes was an attempt to limit the threat to class 
hierarchy their position as aristocratic mistresses indicated as well as downplay their entry 
into the public sphere’ (Pullen 25). Furthermore, the audience was lit almost as brightly as the 
performers on stage. It could be argued that such lighting conditions complicated the 
relationship between actor and spectator, such that it is too simple to talk of a unidirectional 
‘male gaze’, a view articulated persuasively by Tracy Davis. Indeed, the granting to women 
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of the right to perform on stage can be seen as another cultural milestone in the gradual 
transformation of social morality in England that underpins this book.  
 
Whatever the (no doubt complex) reality was – and it certainly included significant numbers 
of women of different social groups in the audience as well as onstage - it is unfortunate for 
us that very little in the way of serious documentation of their performances, especially in 
Shakespearean roles, was undertaken compared to the influential male actors. We read a lot 
about the ‘charms’ of individual women, and we can learn from scholars like Howe a 
significant amount about the kinds of lives they led and the influence they may have wielded 
- but little about what they actually did on stage by way of gestural behaviour. As Howe says, 
‘Even if an actress’s life private life seemed exemplary, writers focused on her sexuality 
rather than on her acting ability’ (Howe 35).  
 
It is curiously apposite then that the first recorded instance of a professional actress is in the 
role of Desdemona. Desdemona is usually conceived of as an innocent victim of male 
Machiavellianism and jealousy. Accused of whoredom, she is insulted, slapped across the 
face, then smothered to death with a pillow in her nightdress while she is in bed. The 
possibility of titillating a voyeuristic male audience with this play is already suggested in an 
illustration that accompanied the text of the play in Nicholas Rowe’s celebrated 1709 edition 
of Shakespeare’s works. Desdemona lies still asleep, the ‘whiter skin of hers than snow/And 
smooth as monumental alabaster’ of her bosom exposed, while Othello stands over her, his 
right hand clutching a pillow, his left held in the air in an oratorical gesture indicating that he 
is speaking his great soliloquy and that he is tragically conflicted. He wears the uniform of a 
British army officer, perhaps bringing back memories for some readers of the Civil War, and 
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thus affiliating him with the royalist cause. His blackness set against her whiteness, of course, 
may well also have contributed to the audience’s erotic interest in the play. Rowe’s images 
are a key moment in the history of gesture in Shakespearean performance: at last, a visual 
record begins to emerge, however ‘staged’ his illustrations were (and it is impossible to be 
certain on this point).  
 
 
Aaron Hill and the rules of gesture 
As I have indicated in chapter two, out of the conditions for playing there developed a 
number of rules. These rules were codified through repetition in a large number of manuals 
for orators, opera singers and actors over the course of a hundred years. The first instruction 
manuals, as we might call them, emerged in mid-seventeenth century France. In England, we 
can date a serious interest in acting considered as a set of techniques that needed to be learnt 
and practised from around the time of Aaron Hill. For two years from 1734 Hill published a 
magazine called The Prompter. Here, he expounded his views on the current state of acting in 
England, which he saw as having declined since the restoration. He argued for the creation of 
a training academy for actors modelled on the Royal Academy. The Royal Academy of Arts 
was founded in 1768, and the Royal Academy of Music in 1822, so although Hill did not see 
an acting academy built in his own lifetime, he was nonetheless prescient in his wish to 
reform actor training in Britain.  
 
Hill’s attempted reforms centred upon the basic issue of intentionality. What he was trying to 
do was separate the personality of the actor from the character. For Hill what this meant in 
practice was that the actor needed to ‘get into’ the character more, since that meant the actor 
would ‘get out of’ his or her own personality in the process. Hill’s argument that actors 
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needed to stay in character recalls a remark of Richard Flecknoe’s concerning Richard 
Burbage: 
[We] may say that he was a delightful Proteus, so wholly transforming himself into 
his part, and putting off himself with his clothes, as he never (not so much as in the 
tiring-house) assum’d himself again until the play was done…his auditors [were] 
never more delighted than when he spoke, nor more sorry than when he held his 
peace; yet even then he was an excellent actor still, never falling in his part when he 
had done speaking, but with his looks and gestures maintaining it still unto the 
heighth, he imagining age quod agis only spoke to him… (in Chambers IV, 370).  
The likelihood is that Flecknoe did not see Burbage in action. Flecknoe is possibly thinking 
of Thomas Betterton; if so, his description sits within the emerging myth of an acting 
tradition – as if Betterton was ‘channelling’ Burbage. That the actor should sustain the 
character while on stage became an imperative for the profession over the course of the next 
fifty years or so. The essence of it was that, at least to begin with, one was supposed to feel 
what the character feels. Aaron Hill argued for this; he said that, in order to act a passion 
well, ‘the actor must never attempt its imitation, until his fancy has conceived so strong an 
image, or idea, of it, as to move the same impressive springs within his mind, which form that 
passion, when it is undesigned, and natural’ (in Cole and Chinoy 117). The idea of acting as 
emotional transformation is thus premised upon the preparatory work of the imagination 
(‘fancy’).  
 
Dr. Johnson famously said that what survives in art are just representations of general nature. 
After the Bloodless Revolution of 1688, it was the urban middle class who eventually made 
up the majority of the playgoing public, not the rakes and gallants of the restoration. What the 
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new audiences craved were just representations of their own general nature. They wanted to 
see themselves as a social group depicted on stage. Aaron Hill’s complaint was at root a call 
for a theatre that would do a better job at giving them representations of their own nature than 
did the existing companies who had arisen to serve the Francophone taste of Charles’s court. 
Classicism had to be reshaped to look like the behaviour of the middle classes.   
 
Partly, it was a matter of textual editing.  Partly, it was a matter of writing new plays, or of 
dressing up the characters of old plays in fashionable modern clothes. And, partly, it meant 
acting was reformed so that the audience was invited to take an empathic position with 
respect to socially superior characters. As well, the increasing emphasis on visual display, 
related as this was to patterns of consumption fed by the importation of artistic objects from 
China and from the Grand Tours to Italy, spoke to the need for the newly rising class to assert 
its independence in the marketplace. In accord with the taste for visual tokens of this 
independence, the individual gestures of actors and actresses began to assume a greater 
prominence within public conversations about theatre, partly because a vocabulary of 
expressive action was taught in schools ‘and so became common knowledge in the eighteenth 
century’ (Kendon 2004: 86).  
 
At the same time, costume created a set of physical constraints that led actors to make greater 
use of their hands and upper arms. For actresses, this was particularly the case, since their 
legs were hidden underneath petticoats, hoops and skirts, and their upper bodies were 
squeezed into tightly-fitting corsets. Their spines were kept straight, and their pelvic 
movements were largely invisible. The audience’s attention was drawn to the elaborate wig, 
the face, the décolletage and the movements of the arms and hands.  
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Sensibility 
Gestural displays now incorporated an idea of sensibility. What mattered about sensibility 
was that it involved ‘empathising with the feelings of another when one’s own interests are 
not directly involved’ (Taylor 32). This necessitated a high level of mimetic skill. If you 
could get the audience to feel what it must be like to be your character, which you did by 
calling upon a common stock of socio-moral emotional attitudes, you were an artist, and you 
had a better chance of accruing status as a social player. The evidence for the actor’s 
sensibility was seen in how she handled the presentation of the basic passions. It was 
essential that, in the words of John Hill (1750), the actor displayed a ‘pliantness of 
disposition by means of which the different passions are made easily to succeed to one 
another in the soul’ (ibid 33). The actor became a kind of emotional lightning rod, and the 
articulation of transitions between passions was critical to the effect. As Taylor says, 
audiences wanted to see actors perceiving (ibid 31).  
 
In the previous chapter I discussed the crucial function of gesture as part of the turn-taking 
process on Shakespeare’s stage. I said that if we accept the validity of the argument for cue 
parts, then it becomes essential for the actors to control the flow of the dialogue with their 
bodies, and this control becomes a sign of their professional skill, as opposed to something 
that could be left to chance. Turn-taking moves would need to be accomplished discreetly, 
without obvious signalling that one is condescending to hand over power. This could be a 
highly sophisticated game within a social circle involving a number of individuals playing for 
reputational high stakes. An elegantly curving Open Hand Supine gesture as one transfers 
responsibility for maintaining the social relations to someone else in the room disguises the 
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game better than the force implied in a straight line. It makes the handover look like an 
invitation rather than an obligation: in John Bulwer’s terminology, a Profero.  
 
It is important to note that, as part of this sophisticated social game, the actor had to address 
the audience as well as the interlocutor. This was done by what is still known as cheating: 
angling the face and body somewhat towards the audience, and directing the eye gaze and 
gestures towards the interlocutor. The main reason for cheating is to give the audience a clear 
vantage point on what was a relatively flat stage composition. More than that, though, the 
technique aimed to make the audience feel included in the social act of the performance. In a 
duologue, if the actor’s torso is facing the audience it creates the impression that a triangular 
interaction is taking place. A configuration of the dialogue in which the audience is 
positioned as an uninvited eavesdropper would be uncivilized. The Jesuit acting teacher 
Franciscus Lang (1727) wrote:  
For if the Actors talk among themselves, as if no-one else were present, and listening, 
and so turn their faces and words reciprocally towards each other, then half the 
audience is deprived of the Actor’s appearance, and see him only from the side or 
entirely from the back, and that is opposed to propriety and natural decency and 
especially to the honour of the Audience itself. (Lang 1727: 43)   
Similarly, John Walker argued that if the actor does not figure the audience within his point 
of view with respect to the stage composition he places himself in positions ‘as would be 
highly ungraceful and disgusting’ (Walker 1789: X). As Lang and Walker revealed, the 
question of positioning oneself in relation to the audience was moral as much as it was 
practical.  
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The writers of the period were concerned to represent behaviour in an artistic form. They 
were profoundly aware that theatre was not a transparent, ethically neutral mirror. It was, 
rather, a created picture.  Gildon says, ‘I have shewn you how Art improves these Gestures, 
and on what occasions they are proper, and how to make them graceful’ (Gildon 138).  Art, 
or grace, was to be seen not in marks of effort but in an elegant abstraction from natural 
behaviour, a complexity and abundance of detail in invention, and a self-conscious savoir-
faire.  
 
In acting, it meant the capacity to perform actions that are physically difficult while making 
them look easy, along with a sense of restraint that is conveyed by the idea that one could 
display more emotion or force, but one is choosing not to. Georg Lichtenberg wrote of David 
Garrick, ‘I fear that many years and much grilling went toward the exercising of his body, 
before it attained at length to this effortless ease, which, enhanced by perpetual observation of 
handsome men, admired and envied by persons of both sexes, now looks as though it came to 
him naturally’ (quoted in Sechelski 371). Here again, what Hamlet calls ‘smoothness’ can be 
seen to operate as a controlling idea over the style of the performance.  
 
Actors believed that they were improving upon nature through stylization. Standing 
(according to Colley Cibber) on the apron of the stage for the most part, Thomas Betterton 
was able to modify his passions because he was relatively close to the audience in what were 
relatively small theatres. Perhaps under the influence of new developments in physiognomy, 
evidenced in Descartes’ Treatise on the Passions (1649), and Charles le Brun’s artistic 
portraits of faces displaying these passions, it is possible that Betterton and his colleagues 
traced the contours of emotions in their faces (Downer 1006). But the tragic actor had to 
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sustain the character’s nobility in adversity, and nobility was identified with poise and 
restraint.  
 
The same held true for gesture. Often the tragic actor’s gestures were described as actions, 
and the comedian’s gestures were called gesticulations. Anthony Aston, a stage comedian 
amongst many other things, wrote that Mr. Doggett is ‘the best Face-player and Gesticulator’ 
(Nicholson 88). There is the suggestion of apish behaviour in the word ‘gesticulator’, which 
links the pantomimic style of the low comedians with the fashionable satiric representations 
of monkeys mimicking people, as in the portraits of ‘The Monkey Painter’ by Jean Siméon 
Chardin or in ‘A Monkey Smoking and Drinking with an Owl’ by Ferdinand van Kessel. In 
the Middle Ages monkeys tended to be taken as symbols for concupiscent desire, which is 
why they were often represented either in chains (as in keeping one’s desires in check) or 
eating an apple (as in Adam and Eve). From 1650, artists began to reimagine monkey 
behaviour in relation to new modes of behaviour such as the conspicuous consumption of 
luxury goods; again, the emerging social morality of self-fulfilment altered the parameters 
within which shared referents could be understood. The newly-moneyed and increasingly 
powerful classes would not tolerate being told what they were and were not allowed to wear, 
what to buy, what places to visit, and how to behave in public by Parliament or the monarch. 
Instead, they would make their own social rules, called ‘fashion’, and regulate them through 
the systems of gossip and publishing. This was a social class that wanted to run its own 
system of social policing, and satirical representations of monkey-like behaviour were one 
way it did that.  
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Points and Starts 
Celestine Woo argues that the primary activity of Betterton’s audience was listening rather 
than looking (Woo 35). Perhaps, but after Betterton, the visual would gradually begin to 
assume a more equal role in performance. The period style, for example, demanded that 
actors developed skill in what were called points and starts. A point was the embodiment of a 
dramatic moment. As George Taylor puts it, ‘by making a gesture, striking an attitude, or 
changing the tone of his voice, [the actor] created the impression of a new passion’ (Taylor 
34). A position is held in a suspended moment. It is a ‘breakpoint’ – a visible motion 
boundary (as discussed in chapter one) – at which the body is dynamically poised rather than 
merely posed. In effect, it marks the end of the motion segment, where the meaning of the 
segment is gathered up. It is more of a pause than a stop (see Rubin and Richards) because it 
carries within itself the preparation for the launch of the next motion event. Poise implies 
readiness for action, and is related to the Renaissance adage festina lente. The actor was 
meant to look as though she is a kind of coiled spring.  
 
This also implies physical imbalance, among the most important signals of spontaneity in 
performance. The impression that the actor is about to lose his or her balance was created by 
a trick borrowed from Neoclassical painting and sculpture known as contrapposto. Hogarth, 
in an influential treatise on art, argued that the line of beauty was a curve. There was nothing 
new in this, since it underpinned the representations of human form in much Graeco-Roman 
and Renaissance art, and was taken to extremes in late sixteenth-century Mannerism. The 
basic premise behind Hogarth’s argument is that there are no absolutely straight lines in 
nature. In representations of the moving body, elegant curves along one line would be 
contrasted with suggested motion in an opposing direction. The upper body, the head or the 
hands will seem to move in one direction, the trunk and legs in another. In performance, the 
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underlying feeling of movement in the point is related to the need for the actor to prepare for 
the next moment. The actor paused in order to make the point, as if underlining that moment 
with a pencil or adding a punctuation mark.  
 
A start was a moment of sudden emotional reaction – in other words, an affect display. 
Again, it is a visible motion boundary – but, as the term indicates, it marks the beginning of a 
motion segment rather than the end. In the previous chapter, in discussing the closet scene in 
Hamlet I said that electrodermal conductance is increased during emotional arousal. A start is 
in essence a startle reflex due to quick activation of the sympathetic nervous system, and is 
also marked by a spike in electrodermal activity. Francis Bacon’s description of the 
phenomenon anticipates how it would come to be understood in the eighteenth century: 
The Passions of the Minde work upon the Body the impressions following. Fear, 
causeth Paleness, Trembling, the Standing of the Hair upright, Starting, and 
Scrieching…Starting is both an apprehension of the thing feared, (and in that kinde it 
is a motion of shrinking;) and likewise an Inquisition in the beginning what the matter 
should be, (and in that kinde it is a motion of Erection;) and therefore when a Man 
would listen suddenly to anything, he starteth; for the starting is an Erection of the 
Spirits to attend… (Bacon 149-150).  
The body responds to a sudden noise, or a sharp movement, or some other surprising change, 
such as a person suddenly appearing next to you. The dorsal neck muscles stiffen, the eyes 
tighten and blink and the limbs and torso stiffen and bend in preparation to defend from 
attack. Although there are variations between individuals in the capacity to inhibit this 
response, it is largely involuntary, and is correlated with fear and threat anxiety.  
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The example of David Garrick, discussed in the next chapter, shows that the capacity to 
produce compelling points and starts could secure a Shakespearean actor’s reputation.  
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2.1.6 
 
Five 
 
Gestural Landmarks from Garrick to Irving 
  
 
This chapter will discuss the gestural behaviour of some influential Shakespearean actors 
from around 1750 to around 1900. My intention is not to establish a canon of gesture – for 
one thing, my evidence base is too Anglocentric for that. Rather, I mean to situate the 
illustrations I offer within the larger framework of my argument for a historical shift in social 
morality. The chapter will move through some key moments when the paradigms of gesture 
in Shakespearean performance (and by implication, within the wider culture) were subject to 
redefinition. I begin with David Garrick and move, via some other influential actors, towards 
Henry Irving; in the process, I hope to show that there are instructive comparisons and 
contrasts to be made between those two influential figures with respect to the motives for 
gestural style. Although I pin familiar labels to my paradigms – Neoclassicism, Romanticism, 
Realism, Naturalism – I want to stress that the aspects of the performances I describe should 
be understood as existing on a continuum of non-verbal behaviour. Thus, gesture in 
Shakespearean performance is not a matter of ‘either/or’ but is rather a blend of ‘more or 
less’.  
David Garrick 
On November 14th, 1746 James Quin, whose fortunes were already beginning to decline, 
found himself out-acted by David Garrick during a performance of Nicholas Rowe’s play The 
 122 | P a g e  
 
Fair Penitent. Afterwards, Richard Cumberland wrote, ‘It seemed as if a whole century had 
been stepped over in the transition of a single scene’ (quoted in Stone 187).  
 
Quin’s was an imposingly large physical presence. His style was described as manly and 
declamatory, and he accompanied his sonorities with ‘a sawing kind of action, which had 
more of the senate than the stage in it’ (ibid). The word ‘sawing’ of course references 
Hamlet’s advice to the Players, and reveals the writer’s personal bias. Garrick, by contrast, 
‘young and light and alive in every muscle and in every feature, came bounding on the stage, 
and pointing at the wittol Altamont and the heavy-paced Horatio, - heavens what a 
transition!’ (ibid). The heavy-paced Horatio was Quin who, for all his notorious vanity, had 
the perceptiveness to see that if Garrick was right, ‘I and the rest of the players must have 
been all wrong’ (ibid 188).  
 
Garrick’s pointing gesture speaks of a desire to level the social distances between him and 
Quin. Garrick was a paradox: the respectable Harlequin, the artistic gesticulator, the dignified 
self-mocker. He wrote a self-satirizing anonymous verse pamphlet in which he features as 
Pug ‘The Sick Monkey’, chastised by his fellow animals (i.e. his envious critics) for his 
shameless pantomimic imitations of the styles of others (Woods 132). Not cut out for the kind 
of postural demonstrations of manly seriousness that characterized the titanic performances 
of Betterton and Quin, he chose the contrary path: he turned himself into what we now call a 
character actor.  
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His style was marked by a close attention to the psychology of the passions. He found a way 
of creating the impression that he was utterly absorbed by the role he was playing. In other 
words, he had a gift for a new mode of social behaviour that was gaining rapid currency, one 
that was described at the time as sensibility but in modern parlance would be called empathy. 
Sensibility was defined by John Hill as ‘a disposition to be affected by the passions, which 
are the subjects of dramatic writing’ (Downer 1027). It was not expected of an actor 
performing Herod in a Tudor play that he would be skilled at imaginatively stepping into the 
shoes of his character. It is a measure of how far the profession of acting had moved that this 
was exactly what Garrick was praised for. He backed up this impression of imaginative 
sympathy with the roles he took on by making significant changes in his relationship to his 
public.  
 
The net result of these changes was manifold. First, the audience was banished into the 
auditorium. There would be no more fops messing around on the stage, flirting with the 
actors and distracting the audience from the intense emotional experience that Garrick had 
rehearsed for them – for Garrick did rehearse, and insisted that his acting company rehearsed 
along with him (Woo 40). The pictorial illusion of the stage was then enhanced by Garrick’s 
preferred scene designer Philippe de Loutherbourg, as well as by the carefully atmospheric 
use of onstage and side-stage lighting in preference to girandoles hanging down from the 
proscenium arch. It was essential to Garrick’s influence over his audience that he used every 
technical means available to control their emotional responses. However, there were still 
stage boxes at Garrick’s Drury Lane theatre at the sides of the forestage, as there were in the 
provincial theatres modelled upon the London buildings, and the people sitting in them were 
close enough for the actors to touch. The developments inaugurated by Garrick had to wait 
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until the next century before they were fully realized in the proscenium arch stage facing a 
darkened auditorium.  
 
Garrick appropriated Shakespeare as an English genius who, like Garrick himself, excelled in 
range and variety of characterization. In claiming Shakespeare for a newly-confident Britain, 
Garrick claimed Shakespeare as his own property, then proved it by extensive 
correspondence with his admirers and critics and by mounting productions of plays that 
included more of the actual words written by Shakespeare than anyone had bothered to 
include since 1642, when the Globe Theatre closed down. His apotheosis of Shakespeare in 
turn served his own reputation extremely well, helping to make a celebrity of the media-
savvy and visually-educated Garrick.  
 
From the existing portraits of Garrick ‘in character’ we can get a cautious sense of his 
movement style. He bent his knees so that he could shift his balance quickly. He was a 
pioneer in this, an approach to movement on the stage that recalls the commedia dell’ arte, 
and Harlequin in particular. A resultant lower centre of gravity meant he was able to effect 
rapid transitions between points of focus and emotional responses. Of course, it was not very 
manly or heroic to suddenly swerve from one attitude to the next with your knees bent. 
Garrick was after something else: the impression of a keen sensibility.  
 
Garrick often gave the feeling that he was in the grip of involuntary passion, of one fleeting 
emotional perception after another. He would then ally this idea of emotional sensitivity to 
his own masculine agency as a performer by conveying an impression of decisiveness. If 
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Garrick’s Hamlet went weak at the knees, he didn’t just wobble a bit: he intensified it into the 
‘start – the heave – the stagger – the stare’ (Kelley, quoted in Hapgood 15). And he 
counterbalanced this with displays of adventurous heroism. In so doing, he modelled a new 
kind of masculine behaviour to a newly important social group: the middle class that was 
driving forward the wealth-creating activities of the British Empire with ever increasing 
confidence. The gravitas of the Grand Manner was replaced by agility in action and 
flexibility in reaction.  
 
Garrick’s first major Shakespearean outing was as Richard III in 1741, where his 
performance was ‘sandwiched between two portions of a musical concert’ (Cole and Chinoy 
131). This role was perhaps well-chosen to fit with his physical attributes such as his 
diminutive stature. He ‘played Richard the Third to the surprise of everybody’, as he told his 
brother in a letter the next day (ibid). It was this performance that prompted Quin’s remark 
about the old-guard perhaps having been wrong in their approach. A much-reproduced 
painting by Hogarth (1745) shows him having just woken up from his nightmare before the 
Battle of Bosworth: ‘Richard starteth up out of a dream’ (Richard III 5.5.130). The image 
shows the end-point of a start – a sudden sitting-up in bed in fright, his face a picture of fear, 
his right arm raised up to show shock, his left hand reaching for his sword on the bed behind. 
Again, it was essential to Garrick’s appeal that he showed both the startle response and the 
decisive heroic action. He is sitting in a contrapposto pose, what Hogarth referred to in The 
Analysis of Beauty (1753) as the serpentine (s-shaped) line (see Paulson’s introduction to that 
work).  
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The picture – the first important Shakespearean painting, as well as the first in a line of 
publicity images of Garrick – binds Garrick’s own destiny to the performance history of 
Shakespeare, as well as creating a new genre of the theatrical portrait. How much of the pose 
can be taken to represent what Garrick actually did at that moment on stage is a matter of 
conjecture. For one thing, Hogarth used Charles Le Brun’s Tent of Darius (1660-1) as a 
compositional model, while Garrick’s head was painted separately later. The attitude of 
Garrick in the picture is not, though, drawn from Le Brun. It is reasonable to infer that 
Garrick, since he approved of the portrait, felt that it was the kind of image of his acting that 
he wanted people to see. In his actual performance, according to Roger Pickering, he grabbed 
the sword as he sat up in bed suddenly on ‘Give me another horse’, paused in the middle of 
the line, then rushed forward with a look of dismay on ‘Bind up my wounds’, before 
dropping to his knees on ‘Have mercy, Heaven’ – using Cibber’s rewrite of ‘Have mercy, 
Jesu’ in the process (5.3.177-9). This seems quite characteristic of Garrick in showing his 
skill in the detailed creation of vivid actions and responses at the level of each phrase.  
 
His destiny as the Shakespearean supremo was further cemented by the descriptions of his 
performance of Hamlet. In particular, it was his acting of Hamlet’s start at seeing his father’s 
ghost that provoked response. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg was a visitor to London from 
Germany and, although his account is not the only one, it is the most detailed. He wrote:   
Suddenly, as Hamlet moves towards the back of the stage slightly to the left, and turns 
his back on the audience, Horatio starts, and saying: ‘Look, my lord, it comes,’ points 
to the right, where the ghost has already appeared and stands motionless, before any 
one is aware of him. At these words Garrick turns sharply and at the same moment 
staggers back two or three paces with his knees giving way under him; his hat falls to 
the ground and both his arms, especially the left, are stretched out nearly to their full 
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length, with the hands as high as the head, the right arm more bent and the hand 
lower, and the fingers apart; his mouth is open: thus he stands rooted to the spot, with 
legs apart, but no loss of dignity, supported by his friends, who are better acquainted 
with the apparition and fear lest he should collapse. His whole demeanour is so 
expressive of terror that it made my flesh creep even before he began to speak. The 
almost terror-struck silence of the audience, which preceded this appearance and filled 
one with a sense of insecurity, probably did much to enhance this effect. At last he 
speaks, not at the beginning, but at the end of a breath, with a trembling voice: 
‘Angels and ministers of grace defend us!’  (Lichtenberg 9-10) 
 
Garrick positioned his Hamlet within a tradition. Thomas Betterton, according to his admirer 
Colley Cibber, in the presence of his father’s ghost displayed a ‘passion’ that never rose 
‘beyond an almost breathless astonishment, or an impatience, limited by filial reverence’ (in 
Cole and Chinoy 104). Opening with ‘a pause of mute amazement’ Betterton rose ‘slowly to 
a solemn, trembling voice’ in which ‘he made the Ghost equally terrible to the spectator as 
himself…his voice never rising into that seeming outrage, or wild defiance of what he 
naturally revered’ (ibid). The key note of Cibber’s description is that Betterton evoked terror 
while maintaining his customary sense of restraint. Cibber is attentive to Betterton’s vocal 
technique, while hardly mentioning that the man had a body (and a rather large one at that).  
 
Garrick, by contrast, made the audience attend to his physicality. In this respect, 
Lichtenberg’s passage rewards study. The opening word ‘suddenly’ keys us in to the tenor of 
the performance. Garrick was keenly aware of the value, in terms of both controlling the 
audience’s attention and of creating an aura – a sense of stage presence - around oneself, of 
springing surprises on the audience by changes of rhythm. Garrick at a number of moments 
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seems to upset the audience’s expectations through the defying of Neoclassical conventions. 
He turned his back to the audience – because he knew it would get a shock reaction when he 
turned back sharply again and showed a dramatic change on his face at seeing the ghost. The 
ghost had meanwhile already entered, rather than having its entrance prepared for by 
Horatio’s cue and the cast composing themselves in anticipation. Garrick’s knees then bent in 
a decidedly unheroic way; his hat fell off unceremoniously; he stretched his arms right out, 
both of them above his head, the left higher than the right; he opened his stance; he appeared 
to be about to faint so that his friends must rush to support him and, after a pause whose 
length we can only guess at, he spoke pathetically, on an outbreath. Every one of these ten 
performance decisions could be read as calculated to upset the audience’s sense of decorum 
as laid down in the acting manuals.  
 
Garrick’s brilliance lay in deviating from tradition in the details rather than in breaking with 
it altogether. At the same time, he nudged his audience into a new attentiveness to the visual 
image. As a result, the image of his reaction to the ghost lodged itself very clearly in the 
minds of his audience. It was a vividly different response from his predecessors, but by 
drawing upon a shared knowledge about how the passions could be perceived to work 
through the body, it remained objectively coherent. Thus, the shock of Garrick’s first 
performances was rapidly replaced by a common belief that his acting was more realistic than 
that of Quin’s generation.  
 
A legend grew up around this moment of Garrick’s Hamlet. It was that Garrick’s dresser 
Perkins had created for him a hydraulically inflatable wig. Whether the story is true or not – 
and for Joseph Roach it is true, since it helps to bolster his argument about the influence of 
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Cartesian mechanistic conceptions of the body on actors such as Garrick (Roach 1982: 431) – 
is less important than the reason why such a legend would emerge at all. In his satirical essay 
on acting of 1744, written to anticipate and disarm criticism of his performance of Macbeth in 
advance, Garrick reveals his anxiety about being the victim of the sort of pedantic and class-
based snobbery that would not accept a character actor, an expert in low-status comic roles 
like Abel Drugger, to play a warrior like Macbeth. Garrick noted that tragedy traditionally 
‘fixes her empire on the passions’ while comedy ‘holds her rule over the less ennobled 
qualities and districts of human nature, which are called the humors’ (Cole and Chinoy 134).  
But then he argued that a common haberdasher may feel passion as well as Alexander the 
Great, for example in his desire for revenge over a competitor in business. The object of the 
desire may be rather more local than in Alexander’s subversion of an entire kingdom to 
satisfy his passion, ‘yet, still it is revenge’ and ‘the mind of one is equally affected in 
proportion to the other, and all the difference lies in the different ways of satisfying their 
common passion’ (ibid). There’s the key phrase: common passion. Abel Drugger displays his 
passion in a certain manner that recalls ‘the completest low picture of grotesque terror that 
can be imagined by a Dutch painter’ when he breaks a urinal; while Macbeth, horrified by the 
thought of having murdered Duncan, behaves like ‘a moving statue, or indeed a petrified 
man’ with ‘quick and permanent’ attitudes, and should seem to ‘tread on air’, for which the 
wearing of a pair of cork heels is advised (ibid 135).  
 
For Joseph Roach (Roach 1982: 438), Garrick’s description of Macbeth’s reaction at seeing 
the air-drawn dagger is to be taken as evidence that the actor had at least a working 
knowledge of Descartes, perhaps through the letters he had received from Aaron Hill. I am 
much less inclined to take anything that Garrick says in this essay at face value. While I agree 
that it was in Garrick’s professional interest to promote acting as having the status of a 
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science, the prevailing discourse on acting was tied to rhetoric much more than to 
Cartesianism - which, after all, would demote the actor to the status of an automaton devoid 
of agency. Indeed, it was Georg Lichtenberg, whose letters are used as evidence by Roach, 
who said of Garrick, ‘he moves to and fro among players like a man among 
marionettes…where other players in the movements of their arms and legs allow themselves 
six inches or more scope in every direction farther than the canons of beauty would permit, 
he hits the mark with admirable certainty and firmness’ (quoted in Bertelsen 315). That is 
self-possession; in other words, sprezzatura. Garrick may have borrowed some of the 
fashionable Cartesian terminology to serve his agenda of self-promotion, but he was too 
much of a pragmatist – and an egoist – to imagine himself as an automaton.  
 
The originality of Garrick’s approach to acting can be clarified. Natural acting was being 
redefined as democratic acting, i.e. as an expression of the sameness of humanity rather than 
its difference, and the action of the sympathetic imagination was the key to the redefinition. 
As was written in one of Garrick’s obituaries, ‘If he was angry, so was you: if he was 
distressed, so was you: if he was terrified, so was you: if he was merry, so was you: if he was 
mad, so was you’ (in Taylor 33). Clearly, we should not forget that the idea of sameness 
didn’t apply to all social groups – it applied to the middle classes. I think it was this empathic 
skill that fed into the legend of the wig. Garrick’s hat fell off, and, coupled with the other 
features of his start, the result was a kind of priming effect. Because the audience’s hair stood 
on end, they believed that Garrick’s did. Then they looked for an explanation of how that 
could be, since a person cannot actually make their hand stand on end.  
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David Garrick did not want you the audience to be in awe of him. He wanted to be your 
friend, so that you would care about him as one of you. Thomas Davies records how he 
replaced Colley Cibber’s ‘bombast’ with ‘nature, ease, simplicity, and genuine humour’ 
(Davies 45). Thomas Wilkes felt able to ‘share in his calamities’ as Lear, ‘feel the dark 
drifting rain, and the sharp tempest, with his Blow winds – ‘till you have burst your cheeks’ 
(ibid 234), while of his ‘mad’ scenes Wilkes writes, ‘I never see him coming down from one 
corner of the Stage, with his old grey hair standing, as it were, erect upon his head, his face 
filled with horror and attention, his hands expanded, and his whole frame accentuated by a 
dreadful solemnity, but I am astounded, and share in all his distresses’ (ibid). For Garrick, it 
makes sense to focus upon the character as an old man, like other old men, frail and 
vulnerable in the storm.  
 
Garrick’s Lear no doubt seems sentimental. If it seems that way, it is partly because Western 
culture has since undermined the idea of obligation to authority figures in the interests of 
assertions of the individual’s right to freedom, and has lost its understanding of what the 
eighteenth century meant by sentiment. The period had asserted the human personality as 
‘natural character’, that is, as underwritten by general principles of nature. The actor was 
praised for gestural behaviour that aligned the performance with the general principles – the 
question was not how unique your acting was, but how well you imitated the passions.  
 
Garrick’s debt to Charles Macklin 
In the latter part of Garrick’s essay on Macbeth, the word ‘passion’ is put to one side in 
favour of ‘humour’. To perform the humours is to be a character actor. Garrick was probably 
thinking here about his precursor Charles Macklin. To be a great actor, suggests Garrick, it is 
necessary to ‘be introduced to the world’, to ‘be conversant with humors of every kind’ (ibid 
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135). Garrick put the theory into practice himself by visiting asylums as part of his 
preparation to play Lear. His performance, by contrast with his Hamlet, featured ‘no sudden 
starts, no violent gesticulations; his movements were slow and feeble, misery was depicted in 
his countenance; he moved his head in the most deliberate manner; his eyes were fixed; or if 
they turned to anyone near him, he made a pause, and fixed his look on the person after much 
delay; his features at the same time telling what he was going to say before he uttered a word’ 
(Genest IV, 468).  
 
Studying human behaviour in everyday contexts in the service of a role would seem quite a 
revolutionary thing to do in that period, but Garrick got the idea from Macklin, who had spent 
time in the Jewish quarter of London in preparation for his performance as Shylock. Macklin 
brought onto the stage pieces of business that he copied from his observations. Without 
mentioning his mentor, Garrick pays homage to Macklin here:  
Another comedian now living…has been observed constantly to attend the exchange 
for weeks together, before he exhibited one of Shakespeare’s most inimitable and 
difficult characters, and so far succeeded by his great attention and observation of the 
manner, dress, and behavior of a particular tribe of people, that the judgment, 
application, and extraordinary pains he took to divert the public rationally, was amply 
returned with crowded theatres, and unequalled applause’ (ibid).  
Macklin’s Shylock was performed at Drury Lane on February 14th 1741, a year that seems 
significant in the history of Shakespearean acting given that Garrick’s Richard III took to the 
stage at Goodman’s Fields on October 19th. In ‘The Art and Duty of an Actor’, which was 
copied out verbatim by his biographer James Thomas Kirkman, Macklin insisted that the 
actor needs to be able to distinguish, as he claimed that Shakespeare himself did in his 
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writing, the ‘habits and characteristics’ of the entire range of social groups. He focused on the 
behaviour of the professional middle classes – attorneys, barristers, judges, clerks, merchants 
and so on – as well as on the military, ecclesiastical and agricultural communities and what 
we might call the leisure and service industries – musicians, hairdressers, and the like. He 
ignored ideas about inherited social status and fixed instead on occupation as the marker of 
affiliation.  
 
In addition, the actor ‘must restrict all his powers, and convert them to the purposes of 
imitating the looks, tones, and gestures, that can best describe the characteristic that the poet 
has drawn’ (ibid). The passions and humours of each individual character can be defined 
within this behavioural taxonomy, and the actor’s job is to ‘mould and suit his looks, tones, 
gestures, and manners to the character’ rather than ‘suiting the character to the powers of the 
actor’ (ibid 122). The individual characteristic he refers to is the display of a specific passion 
or humour – a ‘genus’, for example of avarice (surely he was thinking of Shylock). The 
intention seems to be to give dignity to character acting, in this case by associating it with 
social groups who liked to see themselves as educated, respectable producers and consumers 
of British culture.   
 
Macklin appears to have taught Garrick about ‘breaking the tones’ of speech, that is, 
disrupting the musical rhythm of utterance at unexpected places. Admitting that he never was 
able to speak ‘in the hoity-toity tone of the Tragedy of the day’ (Parry 1891: 21), he seems to 
have specialized instead on underplaying, as when he gave the impression of suppressing his 
violent feelings of rage as Shylock until the third act, where ‘a forcible and terrifying 
ferocity’ emerged as he reacted to his daughter’s elopement with a Christian (ibid 67). Where 
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the opportunity arose for him to display ‘alternate passions’ (ibid), principally between ‘joy at 
the merchant’s losses, and grief for the elopement of Jessica’ (ibid 64), he ‘varied his 
countenance admirably’ (ibid 67). The results were judged to be an advance in natural acting. 
Lacking in Garrick’s self-conscious sense of his own physical artistry, Macklin instead 
worked at getting the audience to take all of his characters seriously: ‘he seemed,’ wrote John 
Taylor, ‘to be more in earnest in the character [of Macbeth] than any actor I have 
consequently seen’ (ibid 161), an effect enhanced in this case by his innovative adoption of 
(as far as was possible) historically authentic costume.  
  
Critics have sometimes mistakenly used the word ‘pantomimic’ when describing David 
Garrick’s gestural behaviour. He had played Harlequin in pantomime in Ipswich and was to 
play it again in a burlesque way as a celebrity. But not a single one of the ninety-six existing 
images of Garrick ‘in character’ show him using pantomime gestures. Stylization is not 
pantomime. His was not an art of mime but of physical characterization, and it involved a 
sense of composing himself into precise emotional attitudes. Garrick’s blended physical style 
– emotional dynamism plus sinuous elegance - was a visual enthymeme for a sense of 
respectability that was coming to replace the old ideal of nobility. He taught his audience by 
re-contextualizing smoothness.  
 
Equally, we must be careful not to take the mezzotints of Garrick’s attitudes as evidence of 
static posing on stage. The Classical statue fixed on a pedestal was undoubtedly an 
inspiration for actors in their search for attitudes. What appealed about these images was not 
only their contrapposto elegance but their declaration of a heroic, defiant individualism. But 
their relationship to the viewer is hierarchical: they tower over you, as if they do not care you 
exist; your reaction is meant to be a kind of passive awe in the presence of their greatness 
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(see Stallybrass and White 21-22). They are exceptional figures, not symbols of a socially 
agreed norm.  By standing outside of the ethical affiliations of their audience, they claim to 
stand outside of time itself. That is, as Michael Clune argues, the essence of the Classical – 
the immortal reputation of the hero does not require you to authenticate it according to your 
own moral valuations, merely to witness it. It embodies its own authority (Clune 7-8).  
 
The attitudes of Garrick, by contrast, betray his orientation towards a new community driven 
by a morality of self-fulfilment. He mobilized statuesque postures and combined them with 
startling gestures in order to make his audience feel that they too could be heroes like him – 
bourgeois British heroes, in effect. It is the Renaissance trick of passing given a new, secular, 
mercantile, democratizing twist. In this, he had many competitors but few, if any, serious 
rivals – until the emergence of Sarah Siddons, who dominated the theatrical discourse of the 
late eighteenth century in England like no one else.  
 
Sarah Siddons - Neoclassical authority and Romantic melancholy 
Siddons excelled as Lady Macbeth. Her challenge was to elicit the audience’s sympathetic 
imagination on behalf of a character who tells her husband she would kill her own child to 
further his personal ambition. Her strategy was to embody two sets of behavioural signals.  
 
The first was founded upon the Neoclassical presumption of authority over the audience, 
which generated a feeling of the sublime – in Edmund Burke’s sense, as mixed awe and 
dread in the face of an object against which the viewer senses his own insignificance. For 
this, she needed to get across that ‘quality of abstraction’ that she saw as ‘so necessary in the 
art of acting’ (Campbell 117). As with Garrick and Macklin, she was playing to her strengths, 
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since there was about her ‘a native stiffness of gesture’ (Downer 1017). It seems that more 
than Garrick, Sarah Siddons and her brother John Philip Kemble modelled their acting style 
on fine art, and statuary in particular. As Shearer West shows, the terms in which their 
performances were discussed were usually taken from art theory and criticism (West 112).  
Siddons’s biographer James Boaden wrote, ‘Conspiring with the larger stage to produce some 
change in her style, was her delight in statuary, which directed her attention to the antique, 
and made a remarkable impression upon her, as to simplicity of attire and severity of attitude’ 
(Boaden 334).  Boaden was thinking of the period after Garrick’s original Drury Lane 
building had been condemned in 1792, and Siddons was performing in an Italianate opera 
house. Bigger theatres demanded more physically expansive attitudes, and fine art provided a 
model for the composition of such attitudes. Thus, Siddons extended her upper arm gestures 
to the limit of what the twentieth-century choreographer Rudolf Laban called the kinesphere 
of the actor – that area beyond which the body cannot reach without taking a step. The idea of 
a kinesphere was not alien to the period: in Gilbert Austin’s manual Chironomia there are 
diagrams (reminiscent of Leonardo’s da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man) illustrating the circular 
trajectories of the actor’s limb extensions.  
 
As she entered middle age, Sarah Siddons was spoken of more and more as, in the words of 
Shearer West, ‘an immobile piece of sculpture, the living embodiment of the tragic muse’ (in 
Asleson 162).  This was more than simply down to the enlargement of the patent theatres. 
Joseph Roach notes how attentive she was to the condition of her skin. Her admirers 
‘deferred to her as the conservator of whiteness, the visible icon of its putative timelessness’ 
(ibid 197). He sees her cultural iconicity as quasi-religious, as here in William Hazlitt’s piece 
for The Examiner in 1816: ‘she was regarded less with admiration than with wonder, as if a 
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being of a superior order had dropped from another sphere to awe the world with the majesty 
of her appearance’ (quoted in ibid 202).   
 
Boaden noted how the sculptural influence played itself out in her gestures:  
‘I have said that her deportment varied considerably; and I have no doubt of the fact. 
In a small space the turns are quick and short. Where the area is considerable the step 
is wider, the figure more erect, and the whole progress more grand and powerful, the 
action is more from the shoulder; and we now first began to hear of the perfect form 
of Mrs. Siddons’s arm’ (Boaden 334).   
Siddons’s appropriation of Classical imagery was not unique, though, so does not fully 
explain her astonishing appeal. There was clearly something else going on.  
 
The second set of behavioural signals drew upon Romanticism. Heather McPherson has noted 
how the representations of Sarah Siddons conflate tragedy and melancholy. Thomas Beach in 
1782 painted her as Melancholy in the Character of Milton’s ‘Il Penseroso’, standing beneath 
an archway with her hands interlaced in front of her, the conventional gesture of melancholy 
found in Bulwer.  
 
Joshua Reynolds’s portrait of Mrs. Siddons as the Tragic Muse was turned by Siddons into a 
tableau vivant as part of a revival of David Garrick’s Jubilee at Drury Lane in the 1785-6 
season. Reynolds’s painting encapsulates Siddons’s blend of Classical and Gothic-Romantic. 
She seems to have thrown herself into a chair, and somehow has ended up in a decorously 
languid posture. The fact that Siddons begged Reynolds not to add more colour to her 
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complexion associates her with both statuary (as Joseph Roach argues) and with the 
melancholy whiteness of the Romantic Agony. On stage, she would look stark, her dark eyes 
and hair set off by her skin.  
 
This mask-like quality is rather crudely rendered by the painter George Romney in his three-
faced portrait of her, Siddonian Recollections (1785-90). He represents her as if he were 
trying to sell us a box set of Sarah Siddons Tragedy masks. He misses the point of her 
paleness, which was that it was readable not only as Classical but brooding Gothic 
melancholy. It was a kind of Georgian English equivalent of ‘heroin chic’, designed to make 
a woman look pale and interesting. In the background of Reynolds’s painting, Pity and Terror 
are glimpsed as dark, vague, mysterious, emotionally overwrought ghosts – the face of Terror 
perhaps being modelled by Reynolds on himself. Her own face, seen in profile, is ambiguous, 
perhaps hovering between different passions, or even a composite of emotions, such as Le 
Brun had offered models of in his booklet. As Frederick Burwick writes, ‘The shift from 
emotional reserve to emotional excess in her performances was a significant source of 
Siddons’s power. The more stoic strength and reserve she exhibited, the more affecting were 
her scenes of emotional crisis’ (in Asleson 129).  
 
Three apocryphal stories arose of how the painting came to be composed. Differing as they 
do in their details, they nonetheless all draw upon the Romantic idea of spontaneous creation, 
of the individual genius and ‘the myth of artistic creation as inspired accident’ at the same 
time as ‘discounting the collaborative nature and performative aspects of portrait painting 
entailed by the act of posing’ (ibid 410). Frequently, Siddons would talk about acting as if she 
were possessed by it. She would ‘get into character’ and remain so for the entire 
performance, including when she was offstage. During those periods, she would be intently 
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listening to the performance continuing in her absence. ‘In short,’ as she wrote about herself, 
‘the spirit of the whole drama took possession of my mind and frame, by my attention being 
incessantly riveted to the passing scenes’ (in Cole and Chinoy 141). A significant part of the 
Siddons mystique – or ‘Siddonmania’ as it was known – was the belief that her acting cost 
her personally. She would go home in tears after a show, and cry for hours, we are told. Or 
she would appear to be in a trance, still under the demonic spell of Lady Macbeth long after 
she had finished playing the role onstage. Many of her admirers, too, appeared to have been 
possessed through a kind of emotional contagion in her presence, and behaved in suitably 
ecstatic ways, weeping, fainting, madly applauding her every move, and so on.   
 
Boaden picked up on an innovative syncopation in her acting:  
The amazing self-possession of Mrs. Siddons rendered distance only the means of 
displaying a system of graceful and considerate dignity, or weighty and lingering 
affliction, as the case might demand. In the hurry of distraction, she could stop, and in 
some frenzied attitude speak wonders to the eye, till a second rush forward brought 
her to the proper ground on which her utterance might be trusted. (Boaden 333) 
 
Like Garrick, Siddons was expert in such rapid emotional transitions and surprising changes 
of rhythm. For example, during Macbeth’s short speech beginning ‘We will proceed no 
further in this business’, her reaction changed from ‘animated hope and surprise to 
disappointment, depression, contempt, and rekindling resentment’ (G.J. Bell in Fleeming 
Jenkin 46). On the challenging lines a few moments later in which she claims that she would 
be prepared to murder her baby to achieve her ambition, she had been ‘at a distant part of the 
stage. She now comes close to him – an entire change of manner, looks for some time in his 
face, and speaks’ (ibid 47). On ‘We fail’ she showed not ‘surprise’ but gave the words a 
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‘strong downward inflection, bowing with her hands down, the palm upward’ (ibid 48) – the 
ambiguous hand gesture perhaps recalling Eve’s Profero to Adam.  In the murder of Duncan 
scene, she performed ‘Alack, I am afraid they have awaked’ with, according to the critic Bell, 
the ‘finest agony; tossing of the arms’ (ibid 52). On Macbeth’s ‘There’s one did laugh in’s 
sleep, and one cried, “Murder!”’ she performed a self-touching (‘adaptor’) gesture: ‘As if her 
inhuman strength of spirit overcome by the contagion of his remorse and terror. Her arms 
about her neck and bosom, shuddering’ (ibid 53).   
 
What was new here was her capacity to counterpoint body and voice in an ingeniously 
suggestive manner. The demarcation line between posture and gesture – a boundary visually 
articulated in the bodies of earlier eighteenth-century actresses who wore conical stays that 
discouraged bending from the waist – was now fully merged into a forceful physical image, 
then combined with a voice that, while ranging through a large gamut of tragic effects, held 
fast to a conception of voice as elocution. Her voice signalled her affiliation to the Classical 
tradition of restraint and decorum even as her body seemed hardly able to suppress its 
symptoms of melancholy and trauma. The blend was irresistible to her hordes of fans: her 
body was intense, and her voice classy. By choosing to combine her passionate gestures with 
a dignified eloquence, she suggested a mind moving beyond the confines of the given stage 
action. She did this not by presenting a unified impression of a single passion with body and 
voice but by driving a wedge between them. She embodied a contradiction: she was Classical 
and Romantic at the same time.  
 
Her performance of Lady Macbeth appears, if Boaden is to be believed, to have been 
calculated to silence critical voices that were suggesting she was only capable of embodying 
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pure virtue. Her first scene with Macbeth certainly seems to have presented a magnificently 
varied display of dominance behaviour: 
His lady, bending steadily to her purpose, is equal to all occasions, and now breaks in 
upon her husband’s fearful rumination…She assails him with sophistry, and 
contempt, and female resolution, seemingly superior to all manly daring…There was 
no qualifying with our humanity in the tone or gesture. This really beautiful and 
interesting actress did not at all shrink from standing before us the true and perfect 
image of the greatest of all natural and moral deprivations a fiend-like woman. 
(Boaden 258-9). 
  
She dominated the audience too, it seems, and it paid off in terms of audience reaction: 
 “Give ME the daggers,” excited a general start from those around me. Upon her 
return from the chamber of slaughter, after gilding the faces of the grooms, from the 
peculiar character of her lip she gave an expression of contempt more striking than 
any she had hitherto displayed.  (ibid 259) 
As she exited with the daggers, ‘stealing out she turns towards him stooping, and with the 
finger pointed to him with malignant energy says, “If he do bleed,” &c.’ (Bell in Fleeming 
Jenkin 55). And, as in her previous scene with Macbeth, she asserted her authority over him 
on the exit; clapping him on the shoulder in congratulation at having regained his manhood in 
the earlier scene, here she strikes him ‘on the shoulder, pulls him from his fixed posture, 
forces him away, he talking as he goes’ (ibid 57). In the banquet scene, after ‘rapidly cutting 
down the question from Rosse  – “What sights, my lord?”…[her] address displayed here 
drew down a thunder of applause’ (Boaden 261).  She deviated from convention by 
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dominating Macbeth onstage until the text no longer gave her the opportunity to take an 
active role.  
 
Sarah Siddons portrayed herself as a modest respectable married woman in her private life, 
but onstage her physical dominance of the stage, as well as of her male scene partners, was 
enthralling. It is arguable that it was Siddons who largely created the paradigmatic image of 
Lady Macbeth that has become a measure of performances since. ‘The character of Lady 
Macbeth,’ wrote Boaden, ‘became a sort of exclusive possession of Mrs Siddons. There was 
a mystery about it, which she alone seemed to have penetrated’ (Boaden 264-5).   
 
It was perhaps her sleepwalking scene that most powerfully displayed her originality. Boaden 
wrote that before her performance, actresses would tend to glide around the stage during this 
scene, and came across as feebler than when awake (ibid 262). In all likelihood, he was 
thinking of Hannah Pritchard, who partnered David Garrick in the play. By contrast, ‘Mrs 
Siddons seemed to conceive the fancy as having equal power over the whole frame, and all 
her actions had the wakeful vigour; she ladled the water from her imaginary ewer over her 
hands – bent her body to listen to the sounds presented by her fancy, and hurried to resume 
the taper where she had left it, that she might with all speed drag her pallid husband to the 
chamber’ (ibid). To the modern reader this perhaps sounds quite familiar. If it does seem like 
a familiar reading of the character, then that is because Sarah Siddons made it so, just as 
Garrick permanently altered the image of Hamlet confronting his father’s ghost.  
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Even her biggest fan G.J. Bell expressed a qualm about her flouting of convention in the 
scene: ‘I should like her to enter less suddenly. A slower and more interrupted step more 
natural. She advances rapidly to the table, sets down the light and rubs her hand, making the 
action of lifting up water in one hand at intervals’ (in Fleeming Jenkin 66-7). Boaden 
answered the criticism that she put down her candle shortly after entering: ‘People cant about 
originality, and yet dote upon precedent’ (Boaden 262). The criticism seems to have been that 
Siddons put down the candle for practical reasons – she needed her hands free to perform her 
gesture of washing. Again, the hidden agenda here was to compare Siddons favourably with 
her predecessor Hannah Pritchard, who held onto her candle during the scene. Boaden 
countered that a real somnambulist would simply put the candle down quite mechanically 
(ibid).  
 
His account of Siddons as Lady Macbeth was far from impartial. It is interesting to see how 
he framed his comparison of her performance with predecessors in terms of how they 
presented the passions – anger, indignation, contempt, astonishment, dismay, terror. It is also 
significant that he referred the reader to a mezzotint of David Garrick and Hannah Pritchard 
with the daggers. His objection to the image was that it showed the actors in fashionable 
modern clothes; for Boaden the problem was not that the image is unhistorical, but that it is 
‘unpicturesque’ (ibid 263). What he meant is that it lacks atmosphere: it does not produce the 
feelings of awe and dread that were associated with the sublime, feelings that he thought we 
ought to have in the presence of the Macbeths.  
 
In an important essay on the Graeco-Roman sculpture of Laocoon written in 1766, Gotthold 
Lessing described the ‘frozen moment’ when the movement of the figure is just at the point 
of climax – the apex – so that the viewer can see the ‘before and after, the inception and 
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consequence of a depicted action’ (Burwick in Asleson 141). The gesture is held in 
suspension – at the boundary of the movement segment - as in Siddons’s gesture of Reproach 
as Queen Katharine in Henry VIII, preserved in an illustration by her son Henry (Siddons 
Plate 51). This gesture seems to have been a favourite of hers – one hand across the bosom, 
the other raised to Heaven with the index finger pointing. It was enormously influential: it 
was still being imitated at the end of the nineteenth century by Ellen Terry.  As well as 
indicating sincerity, the hand across the bosom may sometimes have been practically 
motivated, since she is pictured holding up folds of her copious skirt in Thomas Cook’s Mrs. 
Siddons in the Character of the Tragic Muse (1783), in a posture that recalls Cicero’s advice 
to orators on using the left hand to hold up the toga.    
 
Her left arm position may also have referred for some to the idealized image of her private 
life as a caring mother. The gesture was used by George Henry Harlow in his painting The 
Court for the Trial of Queen Katharine, a painting that features several of the Kembles in 
action. It is possible that Harlow saw the Siddons/Kemble 1806 production, although the 
painting was made eleven years later. The gesture is one of the few that is mentioned by G.J. 
Bell in his notes on her performance: ‘When Campeius comes to her she turns from him 
impatiently; then makes a sweet bow of apology, but dignified. Then to Wolsey, turned and 
looking from him, with her hand pointing back at him, in a voice of thunder, “to you I speak”’ 
(in Fleeming Jenkin 89).  
 
Henry Siddons published plates of his mother in the role performing Supplication (Plate 52) 
and Sickness (Plate 54). Here again, especially in the gesture of Supplication, can be 
observed a visual correlative for Lessing’s idea of the ‘before and after’, as Burwick shows 
(in Asleson 143-5). The key is in this feeling of suspension, crucial to the sense of 
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smoothness and thus to the perception of dominant status. That seems to have been exactly 
the impression that Siddons was capable of conveying in gesture.   
 
Sarah Siddons played Hamlet numerous times over three decades until the age of fifty. By so 
doing, she opened up a new possibility for Shakespearean performance – and for the art of 
impression management, since roleplaying as the opposite sex usually serves to intensify ‘the 
uncanny allure of It’ (Roach 2007: 11). By ‘It’, Roach is referring to ‘presence’ or charisma, 
which in chapter two I associate with sprezzatura.  
 
Perhaps out of a sense of rivalry with Dorothy Jordan, who was famous for her breeches 
roles, Siddons chose not to wear breeches for the part. Instead, she wore the kind of loose, 
swirling Neoclassical coverings that lent her a more mysterious air of androgyny. Mary 
Sackville Hamilton, a fan, created watercolour illustrations of her in various costumes and 
performing a range of gestures from the play. Interestingly, she omits Siddons’s face from the 
pictures and represents the hands only crudely. Instead, she depicts ‘in careful and even 
affectionate detail the fall of fabric folds, the effect of a darker fabric seen through lace, and 
the lines and angles formed by fingers, arms, and hems’ (Woo 2007: 579). Hamilton does 
attempt to record specific moments from the performance, such as Siddons folding her arms 
in defiance of Gertrude on ‘Aye, madam, it is common’ (1.2.74). But the illustrations, while 
offering a few instances of postures and gestures, communicate more about her costume than 
they do about Siddons herself.  
 
True and false gestures 
Sarah Siddons’s eldest son Henry compiled his Practical Illustrations of Rhetorical Gesture 
and Action in 1807. While the book bears a clear relation to antecedent gesture manuals of 
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the eighteenth century, at the same time it seems to point towards something new. The book 
was actually an adapted translation of Johann Jakob Engel’s 1785 Ideen zu einer Mimik. 
Engel’s text is a justification of a system for universalizing gestural expressions. Engel 
showed some appreciation of cultural differences, and argued that the actor must study the 
variations ‘as they operate in various climates’ (Siddons 10).  But he was attempting to root 
out ‘the truly natural and essential part of the sentiment’ (ibid 7), the prototypical form of 
movement that remained after the variations in cultural expression were taken into account. 
He gave the example of how people express pride and shame, asserting that he knows no 
single person on earth who expresses the feeling of shame by lifting up the head and 
straightening the back – if they did so, we would instinctively realize that the person was 
masking feelings of shame by a physical display of pride or contempt (ibid). The book 
describes thirty-five passions or ‘sentiments’. Where Engel had taken his examples from the 
performances of the German actors August Wilhelm Iffland and Friedrich Ludwig Schröder, 
Henry Siddons’s text contains sixty-nine engravings of his mother and her brother posing in 
costumes showing the current fashions in London theatres. The text moves from 
‘picturesque’ (i.e. representational) gestures to ‘expressive’ gestures, which are divided into 
‘analogous’ (having both pragmatic and representational functions) and ‘physiological’ 
(basically adaptors and affect displays). In his taxonomy, Engel does not especially 
distinguish his ideas from his predecessors.  
 
However, in his introduction to the second edition of the book in 1822, Siddons also 
acknowledges the influence of a lecture called ‘An Essay on Gesture’ given at the Norwich 
branch of the Philosophical Society by the painter Michael William Sharp two years earlier. 
Sharp was known for his executions of theatrical group portraits featuring performers of the 
day, including of Sarah Siddons’s younger rival Eliza O’Neill as Queen Constance in King 
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John (1819). As Frederick Burwick writes, Sharp’s lecture ‘makes the case that gestures not 
only reveal emotions, they reveal even those emotions that a person might strive to conceal’ 
(in Asleson 130).  
 
Here then is a notion that is not found in previous manuals: that a gesture may signal not only 
an individual’s conscious intention but something else that the individual did not mean to 
signal. Sharp’s suggestion links in with a basic distinction made by Engel between true and 
false gestures. The first he calls ‘expression’, and the second ‘painting’. True gestures are 
spontaneous, he claims, while false gestures are composed performances intended to deceive. 
Engel objected to so-called pantomimic acting because what is being modelled by the hands 
appears to be the word itself rather than the character’s thoughts and feelings. Gestures that 
depicted features of an object were felt by Engel to be an unnecessary addition to poetic 
drama, since linguistic metaphor already carried this representational function.  
 
Of great interest to Engel is mimetic representation – the character’s bodily responses to 
external stimuli. Most important, though, is what he calls mimismetic representation. The 
term signifies the effort to put the moment of cognitive realization into flesh. It is manifested 
in the pace and style of the walk. The play of the hands ‘is modified in the same manner as 
the walk – it is free, unconstrained, easy, and mobile, while the ideas develop themselves 
without any difficulty, and follow each other in a natural succession: It is inquiet and 
irregular, the hands are agitated, and move themselves without design, now towards the 
bosom, now towards the head, the arms fold and loosen, as the thought is arrested during his 
walk, or hurried into uncertain or strange tracks’ (Siddons 60).  
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The example given is Hamlet transitioning from doubt to apprehension. In the accompanying 
illustration (Plate X), Hamlet stands facing the audience in ballet third position, his left leg 
forward, his left arm across his waist holding a book, while his right arm, with bent elbow, 
points to his mind - or is it heaven? - with his index finger. This marks the ‘change of 
sentiment’ when ‘the unhappy Prince has discovered the reasons which make self destruction 
so criminal a step – he exclaims, “ay, there’s the rub,” and at the same moment should give 
the exterior sign of that which his interior penetration alone has enabled him to discover’ 
(ibid 60-61).   
 
In Engel’s original text, the index finger does not point upwards to heaven, or towards the 
brain, but instead ‘forward, as if his eye has perceived without, what his intellect told him 
within’ (in Barnett 308).  In both cases, the problem is the same: to make a change of thought 
visible, the actor has to place it outside, or on the surface of, the body, and articulate it by a 
change of physical rhythm. The change of rhythm in Kemble’s performance of Hamlet 
cannot be gleaned from the picture or the text alone, but according to James Boaden, he 
‘prolonged the word dream meditatingly’ (Boaden 80), perhaps in that way giving a feeling 
of suspension before launching the gesture. Kemble was described as an academic or 
philosophical actor, inclined to a reflective approach, and Boaden amongst others drew 
attention to his pauses as the key signal of his thoughtfulness to the audience.   
     
Sharp’s lecture and Engel’s mimismetic gestures are signposts towards a new emphasis in 
acting upon how the body reveals what the mind is incapable of concealing: what later would 
come to be codified under the theatrical rubric of ‘subtext’, the psychological rubric of ‘non-
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verbal behaviour’ and the aesthetic rubric of ‘realism’. Here again, it is possible to discern 
how Shakespearean performance paralleled the movement of social morality away from the 
concern with one’s sense of obligation to a higher purpose and towards an agenda of 
individual self-fulfilment.  
 
Edmund Kean 
No one exemplified the shock of the new at this time better than Edmund Kean. On the eve of 
battle, his Richard III ‘stood fixed, drawing figures on the sand with the point of his sword, 
before retiring to his tent, and his sudden recovery of himself with a ‘Good night’’ (Leigh 
Hunt quoted in Hawkins 165). Always conscious of his own celebrity and of his relationship 
to his predecessors, Kean toyed with the audience at such moments, and (when it worked, as 
here) he was rewarded with ‘earnest applause’ followed by ‘uncontrollable enthusiasm’ (ibid 
166-7). Those who described his acting, such as William Hazlitt, drew upon metaphors from 
the new science of electromagnetism to describe his style – not always flatteringly, since to 
witness a performance that illuminated Shakespeare in lightning flashes would be to miss a 
lot when it was dark. But this was to belie the preparation he underwent for each role, as he 
said himself to Garrick’s widow: ‘These people don’t understand their business; they give me 
credit where I don’t deserve it, and pass over passages on which I have bestowed the utmost 
care and attention. Because my style is easy and natural they think I don’t study, and talk 
about the ‘sudden impulse of genius’. There is no such thing as impulsive acting; all is 
premeditated and studied beforehand’ (Cole and Chinoy 327-8). His protest hardly made a 
dent in the public perception of him as impetuous. Keats, an admirer of his acting, wrote that 
he ‘delivers himself up to the instant feeling without a shadow of a thought about anything 
else. He feels his being as deeply as Wordsworth’ (quoted by Jackson in Marshall 2012: 151).  
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Kean was seen as an upstart and an outsider. Jeffrey Kahan writes of how high society barred 
its doors to this sordid, flamboyant provincial actor even when he had found fame. 
‘Embarrassed by this turn of events, the actor created a heroic narrative in which he turned 
his back on the nobility’ (Kahan 80). William Robson said of him, ‘Kean’s person was mean’ 
and added, ‘no man, on the stage, was more ungraceful’ (quoted in ibid 67). In a politically 
volatile era, his performances, onstage and off, took on something of the quality of class 
warfare against the Tory aristocracy. He moved in fits and starts, unexpectedly, like a 
disturbed reptile. Like a reptile, his Hamlet crawled across the floor in a highly indecorous 
manner: 
[Kean] forgot that inalienable delicacy, which should eternally characterize a 
gentleman in his deportment before the ladies, that he not only exposed his derrière to 
his mistress, but positively crawled upon his belly towards the King like a wounded 
snake in a meadow, rather than a Prince’ (‘The London Herald’ quoted in Mills 83).   
Twenty-two years later, William Macready was painted preparing himself for exactly the 
same belly crawl across the stage by Daniel Maclise in The Play-scene in Hamlet. Macready 
was in essence domesticated Kean.  
 
Another example is among Kean’s most famous points. The audience was expecting the usual 
ranting and raving in Hamlet’s closet scene with Ophelia. Instead, he played the scene quietly 
and sombrely, then screamed ‘To a nunnery, go’ before rushing to the edge of the stage, 
stopping, turning, and returning ‘with an almost gliding step’, bending down gently and 
pressing his lips to her hand (Ludwig Tieck in Mills 81-2). This was then imitated by 
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Victorian actors, including Herbert Beerbohm-Tree in 1892 who returned to kiss Ophelia’s 
hair after she had collapsed in grief on a couch (Dawson 47).  
 
‘Betterton’, an American critic for the Philadelphia National Gazette, wrote at length on Kean 
in 1821. He recognized that English critics (especially the ‘cockney critics’ like Hazlitt and 
Leigh Hunt) had observed a certain lack of elegance in Kean’s style while at the same time 
forgiving him because he offered them instead ‘masterstrokes of art and nature, and the 
energies of passion and action’ (Cole and Chinoy 331). For this critic, the masterstrokes were 
few and far between, however, and, while it is appropriate in his opinion that Shylock should 
lack physical grace, ‘in Richard and Othello, you find unremittingly an utter want of physical 
adaptation and patrician demeanor’ (ibid). He went further in a paragraph that in its 
disapproval sheds light on Kean’s gestural style:  
Mr. Kean would seem to apply literally to his art, the lesson of Demosthenes with 
regard to oratory – action, action, action. His limbs have no repose or steadiness in 
scenes of agitated feeling; his hands are kept in unremitting and the most rapid 
convulsive movement; seeking, as it were, a resting place in some part of his upper 
dress, and occasionally pressed together on the crown of his head…Quick and 
irregular motion, vehement and perturbed gesture, are occasionally apposite; but there 
is a discipline and temperament even for disorder, whether as to action or to utterance, 
on the stage…It has been said that dignity has no arms…The energetic use of the 
limbs spoils the true and effectual expression. (ibid)  
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Kean spoke and moved fast. He made frequent use of self-adaptor gestures, touching his own 
body, his crown, his neck, his face as if highly agitated. His pauses were unnaturally long, 
and he strained his voice to hoarseness by alternating between low monotones and sudden 
outbursts. As the exemplary Romantic actor, he was deeply self-conscious to the point of 
self-loathing. Richard Sennett notes that in the nineteenth century, while the individual’s 
class status was steadily being subjected to democratic beliefs about sameness, the 
personality was judged in terms of uniqueness. It is as though, in devaluing the conventional 
categories that made up one’s ‘natural character’, a new approach to the problem of 
describing the person had to be found. It was found in the notion that ‘people with different 
appearances are different persons’ (Sennett 152). This aligns the period with the increasingly 
dominant social morality of individual self-fulfilment that had gained significant momentum 
from the American and French Revolutions. One manifestation of it in the wider culture was 
in the revival of physiognomy and the invention of phrenology, which purported to reveal 
personality from the bumps on the skull. Variations in personality, linked to the physical 
appearance of the individual, reflect the very instability of the idea of personality itself. Kean 
epitomized this new conception of personality. ‘Betterton’ wrote: ‘His studied play of 
physiognomy borders on grimace; his animation of manner becomes incoherent bustle; what 
is spirited savours of turbulence; what is passionate, of frenzy’ (Cole and Chinoy 330).  
 
Kean’s physical style smacked of resentful, low-status pathological attempts at dominance 
behaviour. He seemed obliged to no social code, which was why he was so well-suited to 
play destructive outsiders like Richard, Iago and Shylock and sadistic villains in the popular 
melodrama. Unlike with Sarah Siddons, there was no coherent blend of opposites in his 
acting: what you saw was what you got, and he bullied you into submission by administering 
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one shock after the next. Only in his drawn-out moments of silence were the spectators 
invited to fill out in their own imaginations what he was really thinking.  
 
Sennett argues that ‘freedom of feeling at a given moment seems like a violation of ‘normal’ 
conventional feeling’ (Sennett 152). This is important because it suggests how actors like 
Kean created a boundary line between themselves and the public. More than ever, the 
performer was separated from the spectator, who looked on in occasionally horrified 
fascination. The relationship between the two has very little to do with the polite ideals of a 
civil society such as the early eighteenth century had promoted. The needs of the group had, 
until this point, still been prioritized over the autonomy of the individual, whose impulse to 
design her own personal life would have been seen as threatening to the social fabric: 
‘civilizations arise when culture willingly serves society, when artists, artisans and warriors 
willingly subject themselves to a social and political order’ (Jaeger 271).  
 
Kean was ‘sensational’ not only in his rapid success, but also in the startling intensity of 
focus he placed upon the present moment of sensation itself. Furthermore, he was sensational 
in impetuously overturning the audience’s prior expectations of a role - in upsetting the apple 
cart of Classical decorum. He was only able to maintain this kind of reputation management 
in fits and starts, and quickly burned himself out through alcoholism. In this, as well as in his 
reckless sexual behaviour and his pugnacious self-aggrandizement masking a deep anxiety 
about his legitimacy, he feels quite like a modern celebrity.  As C. Stephen Jaeger puts it, 
‘The role of the artist in romanticism generally is not a civilizing one; just the opposite. It is 
to emancipate the Promethean, and the subversion of a tyrannical or perverse or outdated 
political order can appear as a devout goal’ (ibid). Kean’s revisions of the acting paradigms 
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of Richard, Shylock, Hamlet and Iago exerted a stranglehold over the next generation – of 
male actors, at least.  
 
Victorian actors inherited the system of attitudinal points that showed one’s relationship to 
the acting tradition. This was encouraged also by the rehearsal method, in which one tended 
to do most of the preparation work on one’s role alone.  The resulting style was further 
supported by inherited staging conventions such as the use of discovery scenes revealed by 
mobile flats that could be opened and closed in front of an acting space, and the bringing 
down of the curtain at the end of the act, both of which devices lent themselves to the 
creation of attitudinal tableaux. 
 
For actresses, there was an added inducement to pose in idealized attitudes. Gail Marshall 
writes, ‘The links between stage and sculpture are cemented in the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries in acting manuals and in a range of Classical motifs on the popular 
English stage…the specific type of statuary which is consistently invoked is that from the 
Greek Classical Era and the Hellenistic period, and their Roman copies’ (Marshall 1998: 5). 
Classical sculpture was seen as timeless, so, by association, when an actress posed like a 
statue she became timeless Woman. She was a symbol of both the Fall and the state of 
innocence, ‘any sign of modesty…both an admission and a forestalling of knowledge’ (ibid 
11) as when the Medici Venus (which was installed in the British Museum in 1886) shields 
her genitals from view.  
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Henry Irving’s Darwinism 
And yet the tide was beginning to turn away from both Classicism and Romanticism towards 
something more akin to Behaviourism. As I indicated in chapter two, the key figure in the 
transition to a new acting paradigm was not an actor but a scientist: Charles Darwin. His 
influence can be seen very clearly in the performances of Henry Irving, who along with his 
partner Ellen Terry was the most celebrated of English Shakespearean actors in the late 
nineteenth century. Henry Irving’s style reveals how Darwin’s core ideas throw light on the 
impression management tactics of actors, in particular the way that some actors (another was 
Richard Mansfield who toured for decades as Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde) exploited the then 
fashionable idea that beneath the civilized masks of bourgeois society lurked a seething mass 
of bestial impulses.  
 
Physical challenges to gaining audience acceptance proved an initial spur and an ultimate 
advantage. In childhood Irving had suffered an accident that had left him with a dragging leg 
when he walked. In addition, he developed a speech defect, which may have been partly due 
to separation from his mother during formative years. In later life, despite his dandyish 
outward demeanour and his circle of cronies, he cultivated an idea of himself as an essentially 
private soul. As he wrote himself contra Diderot, ‘Every actor has his secret’ (Pollock: 
Preface, xix).  
 
Irving’s relationship with Bram Stoker is equally complex. Irving dismissed Dracula, whose 
hero uncannily brings to mind a number of associations - Jack the Ripper being one, and 
Irving’s Macbeth another. Critics have observed how Stoker’s description of the vampire 
tallies with Irving’s facial characteristics in the role of Macbeth, in particular the hairiness of 
the face right down to the lambchop whiskers. He cultivated in his acting ‘a repertoire of 
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physical behaviours that were always suggestive of a barely submerged savagery’ (Goodall 
173). Even towards the end of his career, after having received the stamp of social approval 
in 1895 with a knighthood (an honour that he originally declined when Gladstone offered him 
it in 1883), he never quite lost this aura: an image of his Lear sitting on his throne surrounded 
by antiquarian objects hints at a dangerous wild man.    
 
Irving’s style exemplified Darwin’s refusal to sever thought from feeling. In this he gives the 
lie to Diderot, who could not fathom how it is that an actor can recreate emotional 
spontaneity a second time. An emotional response has both a voluntary and an involuntary 
aspect. An actor might simulate the external signs of an emotional reaction such as sadness. 
In doing so, the very simulation itself may begin to draw upon involuntary responses. As Jane 
R. Goodall says, the process ‘is not a smooth ride’ (ibid 175). Irving seems to have been a 
specialist in such emotional border-crossing, where his projection of himself as both an 
intellectual actor (he wore spectacles, he wrote prefaces to Diderot and Talma’s writings on 
acting, he was obsessively detailed in his preparatory research) and as a kind of bestial 
throwback would present themselves as alternative readings. The idea that an actor either 
organically feels the moment or must mechanically reproduce that feeling is a kind of crude 
logic-chopping, and fails to account for a performer like Irving.  
 
Spectators had vigorously applauded Kean’s points. But Irving began a procedure whereby 
points would give way to smaller, fussier, more obscure details of stage business - markers of 
Irving’s individuality, his capacity to rethink tradition, as well as of the decline in a style of 
presentational acting in favour of the strategies of Naturalism. Clement Scott, who saw 
Irving’s first outing as Hamlet in 1874, wrote, ‘Those who have seen other Hamlets are 
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aghast. Mr. Irving is missing his points, he is neglecting his opportunities’ (Scott 62). Irving 
did not stand under the footlights and address the audience during his soliloquies. ‘His eyes 
are fixed apparently on nothing…He gazes on vacancy and communes with his conscience’ 
(ibid 63-4).  
 
As so often happens in theatre history, the apparent innovation was viewed as more lifelike. 
‘He is not acting,’ declares Scott, ‘he is not splitting the ears of the groundlings; he is an artist 
concealing his art: he is talking to himself; he is thinking aloud’ (ibid 65). It was not entirely 
innovative, though: both Garrick and Kean were supposed to have avoided making eye 
contact with their audiences at moments of aloneness on stage. Here, as I will clarify in the 
next chapter, Naturalism can be seen to rely in part for its effect upon an idea of hypnotic 
possession.  
 
Irving came to be identified with claustrophobically sentimental English values. But his 
appeal to the populace was in large part down to how successfully his Shakespearean 
performances drew upon a hunger for sensation. Tiffany Watt-Smith notes how it had 
become quite normal for Victorian actors to bend their knees and display ‘starts’. Irving 
received rounds of applause almost every time he appeared to flinch on stage (Watt-Smith 
110-111). The technique of bending the knees and starting was of course standard procedure 
by the end of Garrick’s era. But Irving’s initial attempts to graft Shakespeare onto the popular 
melodramatic imagination were sufficiently novel to secure his reputation. He annoyed critics 
by his perverse accenting of the text. He stressed pronouns like ‘you’ instead of laying 
emphasis on the clarifying parts of speech like nouns: ‘I have heard of your paintings well 
enough…You jig and amble and nickname God’s creatures and make your wantonness your 
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ignorance’ (quoted in West 416). There was nothing new in the nit-picking: Garrick’s 
pronunciation was also subjected to detailed feedback from his educated audience. What was 
new was the motive. Garrick wanted his public to imagine he was one of them; Irving wanted 
to be seen as inimitably private.  
 
Irving’s gestural behaviour offers examples of how he tried to prise open a gap between word 
and movement, a gap that could then be read as inner life. The two pictures of the old king 
Hamlet and Claudius had always presented a staging conundrum. In Rowe’s 1709 illustration, 
they are pictures on the wall, although it seems that from the Restoration on the usual practice 
was for Hamlet to produce two miniatures from his pocket. Kean’s innovation was to find 
Claudius’s miniature on a chain around Gertrude’s neck. Irving dispensed with pictures 
altogether, instead gesturing deictically into thin air: ‘Look here on this picture, and on this!’ 
(3.4.53).  
 
The business of writing in his commonplace book before ‘So, uncle, there you are’ after his 
first encounter with the ghost (1.5.109) was echoed in a cliffhanging moment at the end of 
2.2: ‘The play’s the thing/Wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the king’. As the curtain fell, 
Irving ‘scrawled his notes with an excited up-and-down movement which must have formed 
letters quite twelve inches high’, according to Edward R. Russell, although that did not stop 
the audience from bursting into applause at the novelty (in West 416).  
 
The more tastefully Romantic Edwin Booth (1880) at this moment had made a metaphoric 
gesture ‘as if encompassing his victim with a net’ (Hapgood 174).  Irving’s gesture seems 
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more obviously designed for effect, but it is Booth’s Power Grip gesture that would seem 
self-consciously theatrical with the arrival of fourth-wall staging, electric lighting and 
darkened auditoria. The difference between Booth’s and Irving’s gestures signals a shift away 
from movements aimed squarely at the spectator, towards self- and object-adaptors that hint 
at hidden motives and conflicts. Gesture became a matter of manipulating the real objects in 
the environment so as to suggest an authentic (i.e. mimetic) reality to the fictive world, and to 
hint at the movement of thought within a character.  
 
Not everyone agreed that Irving’s gestural business was warranted, although all agreed it was 
frequently novel. Dutton Cook objected to his messing around with some candlesticks in the 
chamber scene with Gertrude, while much was made of his playing with Ophelia’s peacock-
feather fan during the ‘Mousetrap’ sequence. After Claudius’s exit, he leapt onto the now 
vacant throne with the fan before throwing it away on ‘A very, very – peacock’ (3.2.258). 
There is precedent for this: Garrick would at this moment flourish his pocket handkerchief 
over his head, while Fechter (who is considered to have brought from France to England a 
more credibly conversational style of delivery) tore pages from his playbook and scattered 
them, before holding his own throat as if choking on ‘Ah ha!’ (265). But Irving moved 
byplay to a whole new level, insisting on its right to exist.  
 
Disapproval of his fussy insistence on physical detail surfaced in the reaction to his Iago – 
although that performance was certainly seen as an improvement on his Othello: 
There is peril of the player being subordinated to the “properties” he makes play with. 
Mr. Irving sat or lolled upon a variety of chairs and tables, toyed with a pen, with his 
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swordbelt and trappings, used a poniard as a toothpick, rumpled his hair incessantly, 
waved a red cloak about him bull-fighter fashion, and otherwise occupied himself, 
naturally enough, no doubt, yet often superfluously. (Dutton Cook, in West 417) 
Most of the gestures mentioned in Cook’s criticism are either self- or object-adaptors. They 
are in essence stylized indicators of psychic turbulence. Irving’s restless behaviour was a kind 
of ticking time-bomb, a self-conscious psychologizing of what previous actors had presented 
as choleric symptoms. Sometimes the bomb would go off in a display of ranting and raving. 
The behaviour ties his acting style not only to Darwin but to the Charcot-Freud diagnosis of 
hysteria, a diagnosis applied usually to heavily-corseted Victorian women who had trouble 
with their breathing. After his American tour, Irving’s 1885 Hamlet pared down the 
behavioural eccentricities. Ten years earlier, it must have seemed at times to his audiences 
that Irving was in the throes of a nervous breakdown. But it was really the art of acting itself 
that was in crisis. Eccentric and grand though it still was, Irving’s style can be seen as 
prophetic of film acting.  
 
Although this chapter has inevitably been rather selective, the given illustrations suggest 
ways in which the transformations of gesture in Shakespearean performance paralleled the 
gradual transformation from a social morality of publicly declared obligation towards higher 
purposes to a morality centred upon the rights and claims of the individual. The gestural style 
of Irving, for example, reveals how the combination of Darwin and Freud would prove 
irresistible to the acting profession in its search for a model of credible behaviour that would 
appeal to a new cosmopolitan audience driven by a morality of self-fulfilment. The next 
chapter will pursue this theme through the work of Modernist and Postmodernist 
Shakespeareans.  
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2.1.7 
Six 
Modern and Postmodern Gestures 
 
In 1884 William James published a paper called ‘What is an Emotion?’ The essence of 
James’s idea is that an emotion is no more than bodily changes in response to an external 
stimulus. A year later the related ideas of Carl Lange were published, leading to what became 
known as the James-Lange theory. From around this time onwards, personality would usually 
come to be seen in terms of either inheritance from one’s parents or influences from the 
environment. The conception of the individual as subject to uncontrollable forces reached an 
apogee in the theory and practice of Naturalism. Underpinning Naturalism is a conception of 
the wellsprings of behaviour that reflects a dominant social morality of self-fulfilment in an 
inverted way. If individual happiness through meaningful experiences is the goal of your 
life’s journey, inheritance and social forces may well impede your chances – the sins of the 
fathers are passed onto the sons, a tragic fact for which the sons cannot be held responsible. 
This idea of personality was expressed forcefully in the character of Oswald in Ibsen’s 
Ghosts (1889), whose syphilitic father has passed the disease onto him. While the cultural 
work of Naturalism was in the main based on new writing, though, the debate about the 
bodily basis of emotion, as I have indicated in the example of Irving, carried over into the 
Shakespearean theatre world.   
 
This chapter explores what happened to Shakespearean performance in the eras of 
Modernism and Postmodernism. Beginning with Konstantin Stanislavski, whose work on 
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Othello crystallizes a central issue within acting of the relation between emotion and 
technique, I move on to consider how the Ukrainian director Les Kurbas’ Macbeth illustrates 
key non-verbal tropes of Modernist performance. What connects many of the Modernist 
Shakespearean innovators is sometimes referred to as a ‘turn to the East’, and I contextualize 
that turn with reference to how some practitioners recovered and relabelled the precepts of 
the Noth Theatre master Zeami Motokiyo. Finally, I explore the use of gesture in some more 
recent productions of Shakespeare by companies like The Wooster Group and 
dreamthinkspeak, whose work can be seen to reflect a Postmodern aesthetic.  
 
Stanislavski’s Othello 
No part reveals more clearly how Shakespeare’s theatre relied upon a series of emotional 
shock effects than Othello. Julie Hankey, writing on the play, argues that ‘the indications are 
that both in acting and in nature, feelings or ‘the affections’ could be thought of as separate 
and autonomous qualities that arrived, took possession, and departed more or less 
mysteriously’ (Hankey 9). In some strange way, the actor was not responsible for these 
effects, but rather was subject to them as if in a trance.    
 
The Russian actor and director Stanislavski saw the Italian actor Tommaso Salvini play 
Othello in 1882. Salvini’s performance displayed uncontrollable emotionality on an operatic 
scale. Salvini seemed to offer to the young Stanislavski an experiential model of acting. In 
fact it was a single gesture of Salvini’s that unlocked Stanislavski’s imagination:  
Salvini approached the platform of the doges, thought a little while, concentrated 
himself and, unnoticed by any of us, took the entire audience of the Great Theatre into 
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his hands. It seemed that he did this with a single gesture – that he stretched his hand 
without looking into the public, grasped all of us in his palm, and held us there as if 
we were ants or flies. He closed his fist, and we felt the breath of death; he opened it, 
and we knew the warmth of bliss. We were in his power, and we will remain in it all 
our lives, forever. (Stanislavski 1956: 266) 
The gesture is reminiscent of Booth’s Power Grip as Hamlet, although performed without 
looking directly at the spectators. Salvini performed in Italian, a language unfamiliar to 
Stanislavski. As a result, Stanislavski’s description of the performance focussed on the non-
verbal details; in the event, it was critical to Stanislavski’s development that he reimagined 
the non-verbal.  
 
At the same time, the play is unusual in its realism – there are no supernatural events or 
characters, no epic battles that would have to be staged using theatrical shorthand, and so on. 
For Stanislavski, the challenge of playing a character who in no way resembled him, yet who 
could be made to exist in a realistic world, must have been mouth-watering. If he could 
persuade his audience he ‘was’ Othello, then his reputation as a creator of believable 
characters was secured.  
 
It is peculiar to the character of Othello that it would have prompted Stanislavski to 
restlessness regarding technique and emotional spontaneity. As Lois Potter writes, ‘the 
history of playing Othello is the history of a desire for a degree of identification between hero 
and role that might almost be seen to rule out the need to act at all’ (Potter 1). According to 
Potter, what critics remembered about Salvini’s Othello were his ‘moments of strength and 
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violence’, which Potter does not find surprising since ‘these are things that cannot be faked’ 
(ibid 44). This seems a rather strange assertion to make to me. If the actor does not fake such 
things, for instance because she is aiming at authenticity, she incurs risks, not least the 
potential for physical harm. It bugged Stanislavski greatly that, in his dress rehearsal, he cut 
his Iago’s hand with a dagger, so that the action had to stop while a doctor was sent for. But 
what really bothered him was not that he had injured his fellow actor: ‘what hurt me most 
was that notwithstanding the deadliness of my play the audience remained completely cold’ 
(Stanislavski 1956: 284). He knew that it would do his reputation good to be thought of as 
having an unrestrained temperament, but the truth was he had wounded his Iago in a moment 
of cool restraint. He assumed that because he did not really care, the spectators did not care 
either. He could not yet see how smoothness of movement can function as a guarantee that 
gives the spectator permission to feel. 
 
A key battleground in his struggle was gesture. In An Actor Prepares he attempted to clear a 
space for inspiration by separating it from the ‘rubber stamp’ procedures he associated with 
mechanical acting. Tradition, he wrote, taught the actor to spread the hand over the heart in 
order to express love, to show the teeth and roll the whites of the eyes when jealous (a display 
that he himself tried when rehearsing his Othello), to cover the face with the hands when 
weeping, to tear the hair when feeling desperate. Some gestures were inherited from great 
actors, as rubbing the brow with the back of the hand in moments of tragedy, a movement he 
noted in the performances of Vera Komissarzhevskaya (Stanislavski 1936: 24-5).   
 
Stanislavski’s pursuit of authenticity had led him to the affective psychiatry of Ribot. It was 
Ribot who had proposed that forgotten events left traces that could later be recovered by the 
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memory. This would seem on the surface to be a promising approach to ‘becoming’ a 
character like Othello. In practice, however, Stanislavski had been left dismayed by his 
failure to feel more truthfully using this procedure. In reaction, he would resort to ideas of 
immobility, of stripping away what he saw as ‘the coarse strain of muscles which tears the 
threads of emotion’, a strain that the aristocrat Stanislavski associated with manual labour 
(Stanislavski 1956: 544). When immobility too appeared to fail, he made a breakthrough 
discovery through his work directing opera, a discovery he was to define as tempo-rhythm. 
(ibid 562).  
 
Stanislavski sought to establish an authentic feeling of inner life. At the same time, 
influenced by his encounter with Tolstoy, he recognized a contradictory need for 
transparency – if you really feel it, but cannot reliably show that you are, there is no benefit in 
terms of your reputation.  The contradiction was solved in his mind by the conception of a 
compositional score for the actor, in which the actor would establish an external tempo for a 
segment of movement while attempting to sustain the feeling of an internal rhythm. The unity 
of the performance would then be a function of both tempo and rhythm together. An example 
might be the behaviour of a waiter in a busy restaurant, who may have to work fast but who 
seeks to maintain an air of composure. In other words, the waiter deploys the principle of 
festina lente.  
 
Stanislavski’s second encounter with Othello was in 1930. It seems that the play once again 
forced him to question his procedures. He reversed his usual approach of moving from 
detailed work on the text and character psychology to creation of a physical form for the 
performance, and, after a read-through of the play, plunged into physical improvisation 
before undertaking any further textual work.   
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In the last five years of his life he began to elucidate a new Method of Physical Actions. The 
essence of his new approach was that the actor’s attention should be focused on the precise, 
uninflected carrying out of physical actions, rather than on accessing some inner core of 
remembered feelings. Crucially, each action would have its own essential rhythm. As Jean 
Benedetti explains, playing an emotion then became a matter of creating a story through 
physical actions (Benedetti 93) rather than attempting to conjure up states of feeling. 
Stanislavski had come to believe that appropriate emotions would be released in spite of (or 
because of) the fact that the actor is not concentrating on them.  
 
The model he worked towards, now known as ‘psychophysical’ acting, is beginning to 
displace the received idea of Stanislavski as the proponent of ‘truth-through-emotion-
memory’ in actor training regimes in the UK. One reason for this is that it aligns with current 
thinking about cognition as an embodied activity. Stanislavski’s model here can be seen to 
link with the work of a number of practitioners, including Dalcroze, Laban, Meyerhold, 
Copeau and Lecoq, who found a common ground in the concern with essentializing 
movement.  
 
Modernism and the East 
One origin of this essentializing impulse within Modernism can be traced to the influence of 
the Japanese theatrical forms of Noh and Kabuki. Zeami Motokiyo, the fifteenth-century Noh 
Master, wrote that the highest ideal of perfection for the performer is yugen – grace, a virtue 
that ‘the actor must never separate himself from’ (Zeami 226). This is most clearly shown in 
the nobility:  
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…whose deportment is of such a high quality…their dignified and mild appearance 
represents the essence of Grace. Therefore, the stage appearance of Grace is best 
indicated by their refined and elegant carriage…when presenting a role of fearsome 
appearance, a demon’s role for example, even should the actor use a rough manner to 
a certain extent, he must not forget to preserve a graceful appearance, and he must 
remember the principles of  “what is felt in the heart is ten”, and “violent body 
movements, gentle foot movements,” so that his stage appearance will remain elegant. 
Thus he may manifest the Grace of a demon’s role. (ibid) 
 
Zeami taught that the actor should ‘feel ten and play seven’. This idea nicely captures 
Hamlet’s principle of smoothness, of controlling energy by holding it in potential. It finds a 
parallel in the work of Meyerhold, who stressed the need to always apply tormoz – ‘the 
brake’ – upon one’s movement. Similarly, Laban attempted to articulate an idea of ‘flow’ that 
separated into two aspects he called ‘free flow’ and ‘bound flow’; the second, which 
expresses the notion that the performer is always able to stop the movement once it is begun, 
can be seen as still another elaboration of the Renaissance humanist ideal of festina lente (see 
Davies 2006: 48). Again, for Brecht, leichtigkeit – translated as ‘lightness and ease’ - was an 
essential antidote to emotional hysteria (Brecht 174-5). Lecoq too demanded that his students 
perform with a feeling of élan – a suspension in the body achieved in part through conscious 
manipulation of the centre of mass (Lecoq 70-1). All these practitioners were influenced by 
the stylizations of Far Eastern theatre; and all three shared a commitment to the principle of 
smooth movement. Zeami also extended the concept of jo-ha-kyu, originally applied in the 
eighth century to the rhythmic structure of the bugaku court dance, to movement, in which a 
preparation phase (introduction) leads to an acceleration (scattering) and finally to a climax 
(rushing) that nonetheless ends in a deceleration. This is a surprisingly accurate 
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biomechanical description of intentional human movements like gestures. Its Modernist 
expression can be found in Meyerhold’s basic compositional structure otkaz (the refusal – a 
preparatory counter-movement to gather energy), posil’ (the sending – the commitment to the 
action) and tochka (a point) or stoika (a stance) (Meyerhold’s vocabulary is described by 
Marianne Kubik in Nicole Potter (ed.) 2002: 8-9).   
 
The thrilling novelty of the encounter with Japanese theatre is caught by Grigori Kozintsev in 
his diary of the making of his film of King Lear. In 1928 the young Kozintsev went to see the 
Kabuki Theatre, who were touring Russia, several times with his friend Sergei Eisenstein. 
‘Synthetic art, which was so much talked about in the first years of the revolution, was before 
our very eyes’, he wrote later. ‘The cascades of movements executed by Sadanji Ichikawa 
were broken by static poses, gesture was followed by sound, sound turned into colour, song 
into dance. Everything was metaphorical and had a particular significance which was far 
removed from its apparent likeness’ (Kozintsev 5). He was even more amazed by the Noh 
Theatre, and considered it to be ‘the true presentation of tragedy’. Above all, what registered 
with Kozintsev in the Noh performance was its ‘peace, extreme restraint and complete 
clarity’ (ibid 7). In his diary, he acknowledges how the story he watched reminded him at the 
time of King Lear.  
 
The Modernism of Les Kurbas 
Modernist performance was intensely concerned with stylization; if there is one word that can 
be said to sum it up, that word would be montage. The idea can be turned to use in different 
contexts, but its essential feature is rhythmical contrast. It is exemplified in the work of the 
Ukrainian director Les Kurbas, whose experiments seem to have left their mark on many 
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Soviet theatre artists at the time. Kurbas drilled his actors in ‘mimo-dramas’ – ‘short, mimed 
sequences on quotidian topics to be created by the individual actor, who was required to ‘fix’ 
and ‘objectify’ gestures and movements and then repeat them again and again at will 
(Makaryk 72). The capacity to repeat the exact form of the gesture was for Kurbas evidence 
of the actor’s skill. The resemblance of this technical work to the biomechanical études of 
Meyerhold is striking, except that where Meyerhold circumscribed in exact detail the 
exercises the actor should undertake, Kurbas invited the actor to perform pretty much 
anything, ‘even a sentence from an encyclopedia’ (ibid). The mimo-dramas were to be 
carried out without allowing personal mood or attitude to interfere with the precise execution 
of the movement. At the same time, it was understood that the actor would endow the 
movement with an internal dramatic justification.     
 
Kurbas’s great originality shows through in his Modernist approach to the Shakespeare text, 
which he saw as a resource for theatre-making rather than a literary object. In a sense there is 
nothing new in this idea; indeed, the overall number of productions of Shakespeare’s plays 
that treat the text as sacrosanct has probably always been rather small compared to the 
number that cut and adapt the material. Kurbas’s insight, expressed in an article he wrote in 
1923, was that modern productions of Shakespeare must grapple with the key issue of 
rhythm. Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto had declared the annihilation of time 
and space under capitalism (Marx and Engels 12). The experience of life in the twentieth 
century appeared to be getting quicker and more spatially compressed. Kurbas saw how a 
Shakespearean soliloquy seemed to work in the opposite direction, slowing down time so that 
the full implications of an ethical dilemma could be considered. Somehow the Shakespearean 
text, with (as he saw it) its pausing rhythms, had to be made to function within a modern 
rhythmic structure; only then would it matter to a new age.  
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Kurbas made four attempts on Macbeth. By the time he set to work on the fourth version in 
1923, he was ready to dismantle the painterly illusionism that he saw as the untheatrical 
legacy of the Enlightenment. His rehearsals involved tapping out a rhythm with his hand 
while groups of actors made their way through the play without words. The rhythmicity of 
the performer was placed within the greater rhythms established by the composition of the 
production itself. The geometrical angularity of the actors’ bodily and facial gestures were 
probably derived in part from the full-body gesturing of silent film actors (Kurbas was a 
cinephile with a taste for D.W. Griffith) and in part from dancers such as Isadora Duncan, 
who the company saw in performance in Kiev two months before the first night of their 
Macbeth and whose work they compared favourably with their own mimo-dramas (ibid 72). 
Duncan had a similar effect on Stanislavski, prompting him to rethink his approach to the 
non-verbal.   
 
The style of Kurbas’s Macbeth comes across like a checklist of Modernist tropes, as if 
Kurbas had in one blow invented, and at the same time exhausted, the forms of avant-garde 
theatre for the modern age. The audience faced a brick wall; the stage was black. Perspectival 
illusions of depth were eschewed in favour of a relatively flat horizontal space. This rejection 
of traditional mimetic techniques was further strengthened by the use of stylized make-up, 
drawing attention to the actor’s face as a painted object or a flat mask rather than a surface 
that is given 3-D texture by the play of light and shadow. Gigantic moving placard screens 
were deployed like cinema title-cards, naming the space as ‘Castle’, ‘Precipice’, etc.  The 
actors wore simple work clothes or military costumes with geometric designs suggestive of 
both Medievalism and the latest styles of Futurism and Constructivism. The Porter was 
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reimagined as a grotesque Fool figure whose bulbous nose lit up (it was electrically wired, as 
were the costumes of the Witches). Actors doubled and tripled their roles. And, in perhaps the 
riskiest move, the actors would enter, assume their character, and then, when they had 
finished the scene, would drop the character before leaving the stage. Kurbas had been 
working with this principle, known to the company as ‘turning on and off’, for some time, 
and in performance the effect was utterly disconcerting, as this account reveals:  
When, after the first scene, the screen with its title raced up to the flies in full view of 
the audience, and the actresses-witches walked out into the wings using their normal 
walk (as normal actresses, no longer as witches) Ludmyla Mykhailivna terrifiedly 
exclaimed, ‘Oh God!’, and I felt that she must have crossed herself. (quoted in ibid 
82).  
 
Ludmyla was a member of the intelligentsia, who were delighted and scandalized in equal 
measure by the production. During the sleepwalking scene, Lady Macbeth (played by Liubov 
Hakkebush) crossed to the centre of the stage, ‘where she placed her candle, took off her 
mantle, shook her head until her long dark hair tumbled around her shoulders, and only then 
proceeded emotionally to ‘Out, damned spot!’ Completing her work as the sleepwalking 
Lady Macbeth, she then left the stage as ‘herself’’ (Makaryk in Makaryk and Tkacz 445). 
There is a curious parallel here with Sarah Siddons, whose decision to put the candle down in 
this scene was equally scandalizing to some of her audience.  
 
Kurbas drew upon the Formalist critic Viktor Shlovski’s concept of ‘defamiliarization’ but, 
unlike with Brecht’s transposition of the concept into verfremdung,  Kurbas held onto an 
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essentially Expressionist sense of the spiritual and miraculous revealed through this 
estrangement effect – the word Kurbas used was ochudnennia meaning ‘making or endowing 
with the marvellous’. The Brechtian gestus is a tricky idea to clarify, but its antecedents in the 
theatres of the Far East and in Soviet-Ukrainian Modernism are clear enough. It also seems to 
reach back further still, into popular forms of the Middle Ages, to that combined meaning of 
gest as both an exemplary deed (as in the Gesta Romanorum) and an anti-authoritarian joke 
(as in the word ‘jest’).  
 
Cinematic gestures  
A number of critics have fastened on a perceived relationship between the concept of bodily 
economy and the demand for an efficient workforce under industrial capitalism (see for 
example Pitches 33). It is true that both Meyerhold and Laban justified their interest in human 
movement in part by appealing to ideas of productive effort that bear some relation to the 
‘time and motion’ studies of Frederick Taylor. But a greater influence upon modern acting 
came from the cinema.  
 
The camera amplified those small details of behaviour that would not come across vividly on 
a large stage, especially the details of face acting. Henry Irving had struggled with this 
problem. He felt that byplay with objects, as he called it, was essential to an artist-actor like 
himself. Yet in large auditoria his movements had to be scaled up, so that to some it seemed 
absurd that his Hamlet would pretend to write enormous letters in his commonplace book. It 
may not have seemed absurd to the people sitting in the gods. And Irving knew that such 
moments would be constituted as psychological clues that an audience could be trained 
through repetition to look out for.  
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On smaller stages, and on screen, self- and object-adaptors are a preferred method of 
conveying subtext, partly because they are a kind of low-key, therefore supposedly subtle, 
percussive comment upon speech. They often come across like visual punctuation marks to 
the words they accompany. In addition, they communicate an idea of spontaneous emotion, 
because in everyday life they are involuntary. Performance, though, is characterized by a high 
signal-to-noise ratio. Unwanted background distortion, such as fidgeting or attempts to repair 
one’s speech errors, are usually minimized or eliminated. So if such things are introduced 
into the performance, we take it that the actor is sending a purposeful message about (say) the 
anxiety levels of the character.   
 
I say ‘supposedly subtle’ because it is not correct to assume that in acting ‘small’ is the same 
as ‘subtle’. In the theatre, size of gesture usually relates to matters of visibility – in other 
words, size of auditorium, and size and position of audience. ‘Subtle’ should be defined in 
terms of the quality of the idea one wishes to communicate, rather than how big or small 
one’s gestures happen to be. This point continues to bedevil discussions of acting, in which, 
typically, acting in the theatre is assumed to be closer to faking and acting for the camera is 
assumed to be closer to the truth.  
 
This confusion sometimes reveals how the British theatre continues to privilege a concept of 
disembodied voice. Having tested the newly-constructed thrust stage at the Royal 
Shakespeare Theatre in Stratford-upon-Avon, the actor Nick Asbury tells us, “I came in 
booming. I found I had to drop it down. You can, finally, be subtle. Not something I’ve ever 
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been accused of before” (‘RSC shows off its £112m revamp’, The Guardian, 23rd November 
2010).  A peculiarly British obsession with ‘text-as-voice’, and an idea of stage movement as 
little more than ‘blocking’,  has marked RSC policy since the days of Peter Hall (for a 
defence of Hall’s practice see Holland, ‘Peter Hall’ in Brown, ed., 140-159).  
 
Now, though, the RSC has begun to include within its doors performers who have trained in 
non-conventional ways such as the Lecoq system, such as Kathryn Hunter and Marcello 
Magni (originally of Theatre de Complicite), Paul Hunter (of Told By An Idiot), Christine 
Entwisle and Richard Katz (who both appeared in Hunter’s 2010 production of The Comedy 
of Errors). As a result of such shifting within the profession in the UK, Lecoq’s philosophy 
of training has become normalized, with all that that suggests, in British actor training, as a 
generation who trained with him in the 1980s and 1990s have grown up, as it were, and 
joined the mainstream.  
 
One of the master themes of Shakespearean performance over the last hundred years or so 
has been acts of translation. It often seems to me that the most ambitious and imaginative 
treatments of the plays have emerged out of cultural contexts that stand in a dialogic relation 
to English culture. The so-called ‘physical theatre’ tradition – a convenient label at best – 
draws upon a set of practices and principles, shared between and passed down by 
practitioners, and this tradition as it is perceived has had no small part to play in the 
translation of Shakespeare’s writing into a decidedly modern set of performance styles.  
 
 
 175 | P a g e  
 
Postmodernist gestures 
Lecoq himself remained at heart a Modernist in his outlook; it is indicative of his idea of 
performance that he drew a distinction between quotidian behavioural gestures and gestures 
expressive of a poetic and theatrical imagination. It is characteristic of Postmodernist 
performance, by contrast, that it attempts to break down such hierarchical distinctions 
between what is and is not thought of as ‘performance’. With respect to gesture on stage, this 
is the key point to be noted and, as the following examples will show, in seeking to blur the 
edges of performance and everyday life, Postmodern Shakespearean performance tends to 
undermine ideas of the authenticity of the body as a site of meaning. Instead, bodily gestures 
become unreliable codes or pastiches of codes, their truth claims hollowed out, often leaving 
little more than the fleshy materiality of bodily experience itself.    
 
 
Robert Lepage 
The Canadian actor-director Robert Lepage’s Shakespearean work has focused on a 
particular set of plays: A Midsummer Night’s Dream (four times), Macbeth (four times), The 
Tempest (four times), Romeo and Juliet (once), Coriolanus (once) and Richard III (once). 
Hamlet he used as a resource for creative adaptation in Polygraph and Elsinore. For Elsinore 
he used only Shakespeare’s words – at least in the English version. In fact, critics of this 
production brought attention to how he had managed in some aspects to stick quite close to 
his source material, even though the piece was a one-man performance. The shape of the 
story was still recognizable, as were the characters he (or his English stand-in Peter Darling) 
played.  
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Lepage’s québecois background has drawn a considerable amount of comment, as with his 
‘tradaptations’ for the 1993 Shakespeare Cycle. His auteurist approach to the plays – which 
he seems to see as resources to be mined rather than as texts to be faithfully presented – has 
been interpreted as an act of rebellion against a colonial father. A frequent move in this 
process of harnessing Shakespeare to his own purposes is that the text is translated into 
another language:  
…I think that there’s something about Shakespeare that isn’t fully understood by the 
English-speaking world because the writing is so brilliant and inventive. Often the 
action or the stories are eclipsed by the beauty and the music of the language, and 
that’s untranslatable into French. So you have to shift through that and try to invent 
your own thing and out of that comes really, really interesting things. (Lepage, 
interview with Fisun Güner, The Arts Desk 29 January 2011).  
 
For Lepage the work of making theatre involves creating a first level story that echoes a 
second, bigger story – the ‘what’s behind it’. He will either zero in on a small gesture, almost 
invisible within a symphony of movement yet nonetheless of great significance, or he will 
drive towards the large-scale action, the equivalent of an aria. He tries to achieve this in voice 
as well as in movement. Both are subjected to an essentially musical treatment with the focus 
on achieving an effect of visual and aural counterpoint from moment to moment, sequence to 
sequence, where the small and the large are echoes of each other.  
 
His intention is to cross-fertilize the text with other available materials to create a work that 
speaks as much of his own obsessions as it does of (what we imagine to be) Shakespeare’s. 
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For his English production of A Midsummer Night’s Dream at the Royal National Theatre 
(1992), a non-textual resource was prioritized over the written play: the dream-life of the 
acting company. It was only after their remembered dreams had been offered up in drawings, 
and elaborated upon in improvisations, that Lepage turned with the actors to the script. It was 
essential to Lepage that the imagistic resources deployed in the production would emerge not 
only from the text but also from the imaginations of the acting company.  
 
The opening of the play – arguably the most startling and memorable moment of the entire 
production – featured Puck, played by contortionist Angela Laurier, crossing the stage before 
the audience (who were presumably expecting the house lights to go down) had fully settled 
into their seats, then passing through a pool of muddy water (real dirty water!) to reach up 
and switch off a lightbulb hanging down centre stage, ‘the counter-intuitive gesture of a light 
being extinguished rather than being turned on’ (Fricker 240). The association of Puck with 
an animal like a crab from the beginning of the performance, achieved by an uncanny 
contortion of the actor’s limbs during a lateral glide across the side of the stage, was 
immediately troubling. Isn’t Puck meant to be just a naughty little hobgoblin? This Puck 
wasn’t even going to be human. What is the status of this character’s agency? What is it like 
to be a crab – or, to borrow a famous question from the philosopher Thomas Nagel, a bat, as 
Sally Dexter (Titania) at one point appeared to become, dangling upside down from the 
hanging light? In her bizarre opening move, Angela Laurier seemed literally to sidestep the 
essential question of intentionality, and thus of responsibility for her actions.  
 
We were taken, in a dreamy way, from that moment into a fictive world of murk and muck. 
The critical response at the time noted that Lepage was carving a space for himself as a major 
 178 | P a g e  
 
international artist in opposition to Peter Brook. Brook’s legendary Dream had been a pure 
white box, with actors behaving like figures from the old days of music hall variety shows. 
Of course, we were reminded, the verse was spoken well, so that could always be used to 
excuse the antics on stage. Lepage’s Dream came across to many critics as the diametric 
opposite: dark, sleazy and, worst of all, poorly spoken. Lepage, though, is acutely sensitive to 
how the same text will function differently according to how it is sounded in a particular 
language and cultural milieu. He knows that the actor in pursuit of realness will stress words 
and phrases that have a certain quotidian flavour to them. As a result, other ideas, other 
perhaps stranger resonances, will become muffled. For Lepage, authenticity is not to be found 
in an identification with the world of the play, but in a recognition of its distance from us. In 
such an interpretive environment the gestures of an actor like Angela Laurier can appear like 
messages from another planet. Yet, since she was playing a non-human character, her 
contorted behaviour could still be justified on dramatic grounds. Thus Lepage remains 
committed to the idea that a play like this one can speak to a contemporary audience even if 
its voice is strange. 
 
The Wooster Group: Troilus and Cressida 
The same may not always be said of the experiments carried out by The Wooster Group. In 
their work, it is possible to see one outcome of a social morality of individual self-fulfilment 
taken to extremes, where gestural behaviour threatens to break with communally-held 
understanding altogether and become a self-mocking form indicating either a private sense or 
no sense at all. But closer inspection reveals that the company in performance displays a 
common gestural language, thus suggesting the possibility of a residue of shareable meaning 
in their work.  
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Nowhere was this more evident than in their collaboration with the Royal Shakespeare 
Company on Troilus and Cressida (2012). The Greek characters were rehearsed in London 
by RSC actors under the director Mark Ravenhill, who took over the job when Rupert Goold 
departed; the Trojans, performed by members of the Wooster Group, rehearsed separately in 
New York with the company director Elizabeth LeCompte.  
 
Scott Handy, who played Ulysses, was singled out by the Guardian critic Michael Billington 
in an otherwise damning review. He wrote, ‘Only Scott Handy as a scholarly Ulysses delivers 
the verse with a kind of witty intelligence that we used to take for granted at the RSC’ (The 
Guardian August 9th 2012). Handy seemed somehow at odds with the production. He created 
an impression that he was more civilized than everyone else in the play, not just by speaking 
in that restrained voice that Billington prefers (he was not the only actor to do that) but more 
through his gestural style. He made frequent use of Open Hand Prone and Vertical Palm 
gestures that associate with discreet rejection, or holding something at a distance – the 
something in this case possibly being the situation he felt obliged to operate within. Pronated 
gestures are usually made by individuals who are not feeling very open to negotiation or 
suggestion. He used a particular feature of the Vertical Palm gesture in a rather subtle 
manner. Its associations rely partly on its distal projection: held away from the body, the 
gesture gives priority to the receiver (‘You must stop’), a little closer to the body to the 
shared space (‘We must stop’). He never used it close to his own body (as in ‘I must stop’).  
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The British RSC actors deliberately over-invested in a display of machismo. By contrast, the 
American actors performing as Trojans were obliged to seek out a collective behavioural 
style that accommodated a painful self-consciousness. This seemed to be in the service of an 
idea that the Trojans were suffering an identity crisis; they were played as white Americans 
pretending to be Native American Indians. They then had to try during numerous scenes to 
imitate the gestures of Eskimos represented on TV screens high up all around them. Perhaps 
the characters on TV were meant to be an ironic equivalent of the Trojan gods.  A similar 
approach was taken by the company in their version of Hamlet, where the actors mimicked a 
video of John Gielgud’s legendary Broadway production starring Richard Burton. The idea of 
a paralyzing burden of debt to tradition was enforced by their headdresses, which made visual 
allusions to Classical statues.  
 
Many of the gestures of the Trojans were abstractions of American Indian clichés, like 
holding spears or drinking ‘firewater’. These iconic gestures were performed without 
conviction or dexterity, as if technical skill were inherently suspect as a value. Thus, we 
witnessed a clash of styles in which one side (Trojan) under-performed the text while the 
other (Greek) over-performed it.  
 
Is Troilus and Cressida incoherent? The production seemed to suggest the play promulgates 
an idea of life as being full of irreconcilable contradictions. Yet, in their desire to present the 
contradictions that perhaps lie at its heart, they mistakenly assumed that no character in the 
play is capable of meaning what they say. Human beings, though, have an extraordinary 
capacity for meaning what they say. That includes the capacity for believing their own lies, 
for remembering events that never happened to them, for defending their irrational opinions 
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in the face of attack, for justifying the most inexcusable selfishness and hypocrisy as natural 
and inevitable. They use gestures to help them manage the process of making meaning so that 
they can both believe and appear to believe what they say. Postmodern culture has done 
nothing to alter this facet of human behaviour – it has simply diverted its expression into new 
technological modes such as Facebook and Twitter. Shakespeare, trained and accomplished 
in the rhetorical arts, exposes exactly such hypocrisy in Troilus and Cressida.  
 
Dreamthinkspeak: The Rest is Silence 
The radicalism of the gestural styles of both Lepage and The Wooster Group, rooted in a 
group sense of the text’s larger meanings rather than in individual character, is nevertheless 
predicated upon a spectacle separated from the audience; in that respect, their work has 
remained conventional. Meanwhile, a new wave of theatre practitioners has attempted to 
break down that separation. In the summer of 2012 dreamthinkspeak’s version of Hamlet – 
called The Rest is Silence – was performed in Newcastle Playhouse. But the company did not, 
in a sense, actually perform in the playhouse; rather, they hijacked the playhouse in order to 
perform their work inside a large box situated on the stage of the studio theatre. The audience 
made its way into the centre of this box and waited for the performance to start. There were 
no seats; the audience stood about inside the box. The performance took place around us. The 
walls of the box, it transpired, were large Perspex windows, beyond which were rooms that 
recalled the Scandinavian minimalism of a corporate hotel, office environment or 
contemporary apartment. As the performance progressed in a fluent choreography from room 
to room, in a technique that recalled cinematic cutting, the audience was tacitly invited to 
wander around the box to get a vantage point for viewing the unfolding action. This feeling 
of apparent freedom for the spectator was illusory, however. As the director Tristan Sharps 
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put it in an interview, ‘the audience are completely locked within a world, immersed, and I 
use that as a verb, within a world that we are creating around them’ (in Machon 269).  
 
The production on other occasions deployed large video projections onto the walls and 
ceiling of the box – as when we looked up to find ourselves apparently sharing a coffin with 
Ophelia, while a video showed mourners peering down and scattering soil over the lens. The 
production, centrally concerned as it was with our status as spectators, offered numerous 
similar perspectival tropes. The actor Richard Clews, who played Polonius, told me 
afterwards that when the lights were switched off in a particular part of the set, the actors 
were able to see the audience through that window, whereas when we the audience could see 
the actors in a lit space, they could not see us. We were never acknowledged by the actors 
until the play was finished, and were free to move about as we pleased inside the box. The 
alienating effect of wandering around witnessing scenes through windows was enhanced by 
the use of amplification for the voices. Just as the spatial relationship to the audience was in a 
sense de-authorized, so the language of the play itself was de-authorized by microphone 
technology.  
 
At the same time, the performances aimed for a reality effect through mundane behavioural 
gestures, many of which were adaptors, and muted illusionistic – in fact, televisual - acting. 
Even when attempts were made to draw our attention to the gestures on display, this was 
always situated within a behavioural frame, as when Claudius tried out various gestures in 
front of the bathroom mirror in preparation for his first big speech as the king. The presence 
of a video camera for the king’s speech – which was filmed as if in a corporate conference 
room to an absent audience - reinforced the feeling that the production wanted the audience 
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to imagine the play as being akin to a classy Danish television drama about political 
corruption.  
 
There was a curious blandness in the characterization, most of all in Edward Hogg’s portrayal 
of Hamlet; the actor’s introverted persona required the close-up of film to register with any 
real impact. This effect was perhaps intensified by the extent to which the text had been cut 
down for performance. At times the political force of the characters was reduced. For 
example, Polonius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern were presented as self-regarding idiots who 
amused only themselves. This was manifested in the gestural behaviour of Richard Clews as 
Polonius, whose interactional gestures, extending out from his bent torso to the edge of his 
peripersonal space, seemed at odds with the show’s low-key behavioural style.  
 
For Michael Billington, the production’s intention to convey a ‘disjunction between private 
and public faces’ was evident when Ruth Lass’s Gertrude ‘at one point prays silently in her 
dressing room while Michael Bryher and Stewart Heffernan as Rosencrantz and Guildenstern 
quietly cackle in their closet over Hamlet’s carefully recorded utterances’ (The Guardian 7 
May 2012). Yet we were given little access to either private or public faces behind the 
fishtank windows. The notion that an actor might want to share her performance with the 
public was treated here as if it were suspect.  
 
One possible future for Shakespeare is suggested by dreamthinkspeak’s Hamlet. It was an 
immersive experience in the sense outlined by Josephine Machon in her book Immersive 
Theatres. Site-specific and participatory theatre until recently occupied a rather confined 
niche of the theatre-going public’s activity. It is now becoming increasingly normal for the 
 184 | P a g e  
 
digital generation. Machon shows how the hunger for involvement as well as for new 
sensations has benefited a raft of emerging companies such as Punchdrunk – whose Sleep No 
More (2011) translated Macbeth into a kind of dance-art installation in which the spectators, 
wearing masks, wandered through a number of meticulously arranged rooms conjuring up 
noirish atmospheres of seedy hotels, mental asylums, children’s bedrooms and so on. 
Shakespeare’s words were not featured; in fact, the actors hardly spoke at all. Instead, as the 
New Yorker review had it, ‘We can only watch as the performers reduce theatre to its 
rudiments: bodies moving in space’ (New Yorker, May 2nd 2011).  Thus, for all its striking 
attention to detail and skilful manipulation of the spectator’s sense of dread, the production 
was premised upon an entirely conventional assumption of the priority of the body as the 
guarantor of authenticity. Meanwhile, the text was deployed as no more than one among a 
number of resources (another one being the films of Alfred Hitchcock) for an event aimed at 
creating mood – in contrast to The Rest is Silence, which offered an edit of Shakespeare’s 
script that for much of the time retained at least a linear coherence. What, to my mind, both 
of these Shakespearean events have in common though is a certain air of melancholy 
produced by the uncanny feeling that, despite being publicly staged, they are in some way not 
communal experiences, but rather represent a theatrical summation of the social morality of 
self-fulfilment. They do not, in that respect, signal a radical departure from the decision to 
darken the auditorium that began with the Victorians, but rather its existential endpoint. In a 
similar way, the privatization (or personalization) of gesture that Henry Irving innovated in 
his Hamlet reached a certain cul-de-sac. In spite of the literal closeness of the performer to 
the audience at times, the kind of contact achieved through gesture that was so celebrated by 
the admirers of Garrick, Siddons and by Stanislavski in the presence of Salvini, seems 
strangely out of reach in these experiments in immersive staging.   
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Gamification of gesture 
Where does an embodied Shakespeare go from here? Much has been written concerning the 
ever-increasing dominance of the digital image in Western culture. One rapidly growing 
phenomenon has been called the gamification of reality. This refers to the application of 
game techniques and mechanics in contexts other than computer games. So far interest has 
largely been centred upon consumer products and the training of workers; one such product is 
the ‘Shakespeare’s Globe 360’ app, which offers a virtual and augmented reality tour of the 
London theatre.  
 
There is as well though a momentum in the direction of greater complexity within the gaming 
industry, and it is this industry that is leading the charge into the digital future for commercial 
reasons. At the time of writing, Grand Theft Auto V is the most profitable computer game in 
history. It cost $260 million to produce and made $1 billion within three days – beating the 
three largest movie launches by sixteen days. In part that is down to the blending together of 
game mechanics with cinematic values of visual storytelling: much of the praise for this game 
focused on its eye-catching graphics. Indeed, the environments of the game are ‘open world’, 
meaning that they can be explored by the user outside of the gameplay itself. In this, it bears 
comparison with Punchdrunk’s Sleep No More.  
 
The drive for further sophistication of game architecture is impacting on performance as well. 
As the technology of motion capture allows for ever more detailed representations of 
movement qualities, so the development of a character’s body movement within games will 
become more refined. The alternative descriptor performance capture speaks of an attempt to 
reconfigure the boundaries of art – an attempt driven as so often by technological innovation. 
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And, as so often, the attempt is premised upon recognition of skill in a field where evaluation 
of quality is ambiguous; after all, who is actually controlling the avatar, the actor or the 
software operator?  
 
A recent article in The Observer hints at what may be to come. Game author David Cage’s 
Beyond: Two Souls is a narrative-driven game in which the performances of actors Ellen Page 
and Willem Dafoe were captured in rich detail. Seventy motion capture cameras recorded the 
actors from many angles. Without the assistance of illusionistic settings, the actors had to 
produce a gamut of emotional reactions - four or five variations of a single scene were the 
norm in this game. Both performers in interview referred to the acting process in such an 
environment as being somehow purer or more essential than acting in more conventional 
situations:  
I would respond, take a beat, give the other response, take a beat, another response. 
It’s difficult just for the basicness of memorising the dialogue and having to 
constantly emotionally pivot. You’re doing multiple versions, and that is like some 
sort of sadistic acting boot camp! (Ellen Page, in The Observer October 13th 2013)   
 
This approach to acting makes a demand upon the performer that recalls a similar demand 
made upon Shakespeare’s company. The actor must use her imagination to fill out the details 
missing in the immediate working environment, because from the point of view of resources 
for stimulation that environment is poor. In fact poorer than the Globe: there is no real set or 
character costume to work with, and the props may be only vaguely similar to the objects 
depicted in the game. That said, live performance capture data can nowadays be streamed 
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directly into animation software packages, so that an actor can perform an animated character 
against a backdrop that the actor can see in real time. This may have some interesting 
possibilities with respect to, for instance, non-human characters like Oberon, Titania, Puck, 
Ariel and Caliban. Indeed, at the time of writing the RSC’s artistic director Gregory Doran is 
preparing a production of The Tempest that updates old-fashioned magic tricks like ‘Pepper’s 
Ghost’ through combining 3-D holographic projection with (offstage) performance capture.  
 
The agenda of performance capture is usually to achieve a visual hyper-realism. In practice, 
what it tends to produce in the actor is to some degree an abstraction – a reaching for a 
significant form. The actor is very aware that his movements are being recorded as data for 
further attention. One corollary of this is that when the actor produces behavioural gestures 
such as small pacifying (adaptor) movements, the effect upon the onscreen avatar is curiously 
comical, as if small moments of embarrassment have been amplified.  Adaptors – fidgeting, 
weight-shifting from foot to foot and so on - are routinely deployed within game worlds to 
suggest a reference point of normal behaviour, a phenomenon known in the gaming world as 
the avatar in ‘idle’ mode.  
 
In other words, even the minutiae of behaviour are abstracted, and I think performers who are 
exposed to performance capture environments will adapt their style accordingly. It is as 
though the actor takes on something of the quality of an animated figure. At a recent 
conference, where I spoke on the subject, a delegate expressed dismay that, if I am right, the 
art of acting will be reduced to cartoonish exaggeration. Yet the line of action - a principle 
taught to animators since at least Walt Disney – has its origin in the Classical line of beauty 
that was described by William Hogarth, and that was crucial to actors like David Garrick in 
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the management of their reputation as sophisticated artists.  In this respect, the stylizations 
produced by performance capture are nothing new. But what it does suggest to me is that the 
current debate, centred as it usually is upon how the technology is progressing towards a 
hyper-realism, is the wrong way up. In performance capture, the technology does not try to 
capture the impulses behind the performance: it is the performance that tries to capture the 
imperatives of the technology.    
 
Perhaps one way to carry things forward may be through engagement with those very 
technologies that could be seen as threatening to Shakespeare’s survival - such as gaming. In 
certain ways Shakespearean performance cannot compete with Grand Theft Auto. But 
Shakespeare’s success over the last four hundred years has hinged not only on the power of 
his writing but on its translatability. I have suggested that this is one key feature of his work 
that has guaranteed its survival. One can imagine an event in a synthetic 3-D world, in which 
it is not your real body that goes to a real building to watch a real performance of Hamlet, but 
your avatar that visits a virtual auditorium to watch other avatars performing Shakespeare. If 
that experience still seems too passive for you, you might prefer to perform your own Hamlet 
within a world that you have yourself constructed. In that sense, Garrick’s ghost would return 
in the machine: your Hamlet would not only be like you - your Hamlet would really be you. 
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2.1.8 
 
Seven 
 
The Use of Video in the Study of Gesture 
 
 
In this book I have advanced a concept, borrowed from both Hamlet and movement science, 
called smoothness. And I have identified it by some of the other names it has been given in 
performance histories – yugen, sprezzatura, tormoz, leichtigkeit, élan. I have asserted that the 
concept is inherent in social cognition, because it directly influences the way in which people 
perceive other people’s behaviour and form intuitive judgments about them; hence, 
smoothness is a moral category as well as an aesthetic one.  
 
Such an assertion can hardly be disputed when one looks into the (often depressing) history 
of how people who struggled to ‘move well’ have been treated. But I take the optimistic view 
in seeing that, as the social morality of self-fulfilment continues to make inroads into Western 
culture, definitions of what we mean by moving well are opening up, in the interests of 
freedom of expression, to include bodily shapes and movement paradigms previously held to 
be ungraceful. That story is not for this book. Instead, I have explored smoothness as an 
aesthetic concept, seeing it as a basic component of an effective performance. I would argue 
it is probably the single most important one. There is a risk here that I am simply making a 
selective argument for the type of acting I happen to prefer. So I should like here to offer a 
method of research that could provide evidence for such a claim.  
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As Judith Hall Koivumaki wrote, ‘There is no single, correct methodology for studying 
nonverbal communication’ (Koivumaki 26). Nevertheless, there are methodologies, one such 
being micro-analysis using video. Here I want to offer an example of a comparative micro-
analysis. For illustration, I choose two English actors working within mainstream theatre 
organizations, the first in a performance adapted for filming, the second in an archive 
recording of a live performance. I have chosen a soliloquy from Iago for analysis, to show 
how the same material is handled by two different actors. I have transcribed the actor’s 
speech as it is spoken by them in italics and have indicated terms drawn from 
psycholinguistics and gesture studies in bold.     
 
Ian McKellen 
In 1989 Ian McKellen played Iago for the RSC in a production directed by Trevor Nunn. His 
performance was celebrated as an especially brilliant interpretation of the character. Here, I 
want to use the video recording that was made of the production in 1990 and I take for 
analysis his performance of Iago’s soliloquy in Act 1 Scene 3 (ll. 382-403).  
 
In the recorded version, which is almost exactly two minutes long, Iago has just bid farewell 
to Roderigo (Michael Grandage), who exits camera right. Iago, wearing the uniform of an 
American Civil War officer, stands side on to camera in front of a small table lit from above 
by a hanging lamp. His right hand is in his waist pocket of his jacket as he begins with his 
face to camera. The underlined words indicate the stroke phase of the gesture, i.e. its most 
significant accent.  
 
Thus do I ever make my fool my purse: 
For I mine own gained knowledge should profane 
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If I would time expend with such a snipe 
But for my sport and profit.  
 
He sits down at the table facing forward (left side to camera) and places his hands on the 
table in a clenched position, right hand over left with the left thumb up. This is a frustration 
gesture, and the height of the hands normally correlates to the force of the attitude. The 
thumb moves down as: 
 
I hate the Moor… 
 
He draws a little away from the table and looks down with eyes closed in a low-power 
(hunched) attitude. This is an affect display of rage. He looks to camera.  
 
And it is thought abroad that ‘twixt my sheets  
He’s done my office. I know not if’t be true,  
But I for mere suspicion in that kind 
Will do as if for surety.  
 
During the above section his left thumb rubs the top of his right wrist in a self-adaptor 
gesture that often signals the speaker is seeking reassurance. Peter Holland notes how 
McKellen felt the character’s sexual suspicions were an acceptable foundational motive on 
which to base the portrayal, in contrast to Coleridge’s idea of Iago’s ‘motiveless malignity’ 
(in Brown ed. 2012: 148).  
 
…He holds me well,  
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The better shall my purpose work on him.  
 
A slight readjustment of his hands in a self-adaptor gesture that also cues a preparation for 
change of topic. His eye gaze moves to camera right on: 
 
Cassio’s a proper man.  
 
The look offscreen here towards the door is an ocular deictic. It implies the use of what 
David McNeill calls an origo – an assumed shared horizon with the viewer. He continues to 
knead his fingers.  
 
…let’s see now  
 
He makes a tiny arm movement as if in preparation for the next gesture: 
 
To get his place, and to make up my will 
 
His right hand travels up to his head and he places an index finger on his right temple. This is 
a negative ruminating or evaluating gesture.  
 
Hmm 
 
He points with the same index finger off camera right to the imagined Cassio planted earlier.  
 
 A double knavery 
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He taps his temple with his index finger twice while the middle finger rests on his upper lip. 
This is another evaluation gesture. The closed hand resting on the cheek with one finger on 
the mouth and index finger pointing up to temple suggests critical or negative evaluation.   
 
How? How?  
 
He strokes his chin with three fingers of the right hand in a further extension of the evaluation 
gesture cluster. The chin-stroke – which Darwin described as a meditation gesture, and 
which is mentioned in Henry Siddons as the gesture of a wise man making a judgement – 
begins a process of softening the critical or negative connotations of the evaluation gesture 
cluster.  
 
Let’s see 
 
He taps his lip three times with the middle finger. His face now changes to register surprise, 
as if an idea has struck him.  
 
After some time to abuse Othello’s ear  
 
He holds his hand in an upside-down three jaw chuck Precision Grip gesture. This signals 
specificity of thought.  
 
That he is too familiar with his wife.  
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He now lays his right hand palm down across the left lower arm on the table.  
 
He hath a person and a smooth dispose 
 
The first two fingers and thumb of the left hand now rub together or pick at each other in a 
self-adaptor reassurance gesture.  
 
To be suspected, framed to make women false.  
 
He clenches and unclenches a fist with his left hand, a Power Grip gesture showing stress or 
frustration.  
 
The Moor is of a free and open nature  
 
The right hand reaches forward to take a cigar box from the table. The left hand clutches the 
box from underneath.  
 
That thinks men honest  
 
The right hand opens the box while the left hand tips it over. He takes out three cigars from 
the box.  
 
…that but seem to be so 
 
He shuts the box and puts it back on the table with the left hand.  
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And will as tenderly be led by th’ nose  
 
The right hand puts the cigars in his breast pocket while the left hand holds the pocket open. 
The left hand reaches forward to collect his cap as the right hand finishes putting the cigars 
away.  
 
As asses are.  
 
He collects the cap and puts it on his head, straightening the peak with both hands as he does. 
Both hands are brought down to the table.  
 
I have’t, it is… 
 
The left hand is brought up to the left temple where the index finger revolves in a small 
circular motion. This is a metaphoric gesture in which the completion of an idea is imaged 
as the turn of a wheel. The stroke is landed just before:  
 
…engendered.  
 
He stands up. His left hand touches the left waist pocket of the jacket as he looks up at the 
lamp. He looks to camera in a return to the opening position, but with his upper body posture 
now more open to the viewer.  
 
Hell and night 
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Must bring this monstrous birth to the world’s light.  
 
The scene cuts on his gaze to camera.  
 
Although a full appreciation of the soliloquy would depend on situating the gestural display 
within his overall execution of the role, it is clear that McKellen makes extensive use of 
adaptors here to signal the character’s repression of his negative emotions. The aggressive 
impulse is shown explicitly on ‘I hate the Moor’. As the speech moves towards evaluation 
and planning mode, the gestures complement this shift by focusing his temples and his mouth 
in a sequence of revolving self-touching motions. These gestures are apparently not for the 
viewer’s benefit, whilst the culminating metaphoric gesture on ‘it is engendered’, 
accompanied as it is by a look to camera, gives the idea that Iago wants us to be impressed by 
his Machiavellian intelligence. He appeals to our search for signals of competence as one of 
the two primary components of social cognition.  
 
The use of the cigars (he associates the character with smoking throughout, in a naturalistic 
variation on a theme of Iago as fiery devil) was part of how McKellen sought to position his 
acting style within the overall context of the production, which was ‘defined by a kind of 
hyper-realism’ (Holland in Brown ed. 2012: 149) that loaded the stage with objects. The 
gestures had to fit in with this contextualization and thus were grounded in the quotidian. In 
this, the performance is an illustration of the influence of the cinema upon gesture in 
Shakespearean performance. This version of Iago could not have been performed on the stage 
of Shakespeare’s Globe without sacrificing the impact of its behavioural repertoire. 
McKellen, by scaling his constantly busy, fussy, yet meticulous performance for the camera, 
is able to solve the acting problem that had exercised Henry Irving. Here too smoothness can 
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be detected even at the height of his rage. His body conveys a sense of lightness, of 
suspension punctuated by precise fixed points, throughout. It lends the performance a curious 
air of vulnerability, fragility even – a regular feature of McKellen’s performances.  
 
Tim McInnerny 
Wilson Milam’s production of the play for the London Globe Theatre in 2007 featured a 
well-received performance of Iago from Tim McInnerny. In contrast to Trevor Nunn’s 
version, this production was given a Jacobean setting (with some particularly gorgeous 
costumes).  
 
In the scene, Roderigo shouts his exit line ‘I’ll sell all my land’ from beyond the upstage 
door. McInnerny, standing downstage centre, chuckles to himself, looking half behind at the 
door with his torso facing front, then quickly turns to face front, dropping his expression. 
 
Thus do I ever make my fool my purse 
 
He makes a pointing gesture behind him at the door with the left arm, his fingers giving a 
little contemptuous flick as if brushing away an insect. He crosses stage left.  
 
For I mine own gained knowledge 
 
Addressing the audience still, he holds out his arms to chest height as he walks in an 
openness gesture.  
 
…should profane  
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If I would time expend with such a snipe  
But for my sport and profit. 
 
The arms lower to waist height, brings them into his body, then his right hand takes hold of 
his sword hilt in termination of the idea and preparation for: 
 
I hate the Moor 
 
His head (seen in close-up on the video) moves as if his neck is uncomfortable. He takes a 
few steps to the right. At the same time the volume of his voice drops and moves to a higher 
register to signal self-pity on: 
 
And it is thought abroad that ‘twixt my sheets 
He’s done my office.  
 
He purses his lips as if swallowing his feelings. This movement is exaggerated by the half-
beard he is sporting. He looks down, shifting his weight from one foot to the other and 
putting on a defensive smile to mask his misery.  
 
I know not if’t be true 
 
The left hand comes up to cover and rub the mouth in a self-adaptor gesture of anxiety. It 
may be that holding the hand to the mouth is also a signal that he is lying (it is a gesture that 
children often make when they tell fibs) – if so, it would indicate that he thinks that it is true, 
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but feels too humiliated to fully admit it. He pulls at his nose quickly before the left hand 
moves forward and the index finger points at the audience on: 
 
But I for mere suspicion in that kind  
 
He looks to stage right while the pointing finger draws back slightly to partly indicate his left 
temple. 
 
Will do as if for surety.  
 
He draws a line down the front of the upper torso with the pointing finger on: 
 
He holds me well 
 
The left hand now makes a closed fist thumbs up gesture towards himself.  
 
The better shall my purpose work on him.  
 
He takes one step forward putting his weight onto the right foot with an inbreath, as the left 
hand returns to rest by his side, and the right hand comes up with index finger directed to 
audience: 
 
Cassio’s a proper man.  
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Holding up the finger as the head comes up with a bitter smile to look at the upper tiers of the 
audience.  
 
Huh, let me see now 
 
The right hand comes down on: 
 
To get his place  
 
Both arms spread out to make an openness gesture which is held on: 
 
…and to plume up my will.  
 
The arms come down again. 
 
A double knavery. How, how? 
 
The head is tilted up as if ruminating. 
 
Let’s see.  
 
The eyeline moves down to the middle distance.  
 
After some time  
 
 201 | P a g e  
 
The left hand comes up to the left side of the face and is held suspended in a Vertical Palm 
gesture signalling that he is working out his idea.  
 
to abuse Othello’s ear  
 
He turns his gaze and torso towards stage left as the left hand moves into a gesture with the 
Palm Addressed to the audience.  
 
That he is too familiar with his wife.  
 
The hands are now at waist height with some discreet movement of the torso.  
 
He hath a person and a smooth dispose  
To be suspected, framed to make women false.  
 
Now there is a quick movement as the left hand comes up to make a gesture that moves from 
a deictic on: 
 
The Moor  
 
…to an Open Palm vertical beat gesture on: 
 
…is of a free and open nature  
That thinks men honest  
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The hand has been lowered by now to waist height again. The head and body are turned to 
stage right and looking slightly down. 
 
…that but seem to be so 
 
The left hand rises up again in Palm Prone position to make a metaphoric gesture of an 
undulating path on: 
 
And will as tenderly be led by th’nose 
 
The gesture ripples another time as he pauses, then is held for: 
 
As asses are.  
 
A slight laugh of satisfaction as the left hand is lowered. He looks up to the upper seating 
area.  
 
I have’t, it is engendered.  
 
He leans back and opens out his arms once more as if addressing God, taking one step back 
onto his weight-bearing left leg.  
 
Hell and night  
Must bring this monstrous birth to the world’s light.  
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The sound of a thunderclap offstage as he stares at the sky.  
 
Here, the choice to use quite flat-handed Open Palm gestures signals a certain crudeness of 
manner without resorting to animal pantomimes. These gestures attempt to communicate 
warmth as a primary component of social cognition, in contrast with McKellen’s precise, 
highly controlled but frigid signals of competence. But these feelings are undercut by 
McInnerney’s repeated use of deictics partly as if looking to apportion blame, including at the 
audience, and partly to bolster his own ego when self-pointing. He also uses self-adaptors to 
signal anxiety. This accords with the fact that he shifts his weight constantly from foot to foot 
as if unable to get stable or comfortable. You could read into this that he is already suffering 
from an internal sense of being eaten up by resentment or that he has a kind of restless 
choleric humour – burning up from within, as it were, an impression reinforced by his 
effortful, bellows-like breathing pattern. He comes across as coarser, heavier, less meticulous, 
less smooth but more vulnerable in his humiliation than McKellen. This a film of a live event 
rather than a staged video recording, though, which would account for some of its rougher 
edges. It is possible that McInnerney did not follow the exact gestural pattern he produces in 
the archived version every time he performed the role, although it was probably quite 
consistent over time. The speech is a soliloquy, so he would no doubt have felt that he had 
more freedom to produce whatever gestures come through in the moment of performance.   
 
Comparison between the two performances suggests that McKellen’s work is the more 
carefully prepared. This could be in line with his conception of the character; it is just as 
likely a result of the fact that he was making a film.  
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2.1.9 
Eight 
Interviews and Closing Thoughts 
 
I have sought out connections between a performance history of Shakespeare and a theory of 
gesture. Here, I want to look for these connections through a comparison of the work of the 
choreographer Sian Williams and the gesture scholar David McNeill. My aim is not to recruit 
my interviewees to support my ideas, but to allow their own words to suggest resonances.   
 
Siân Williams  
On 17th August 2014 I met Siân Williams in a café in Hammersmith. A dancer and 
choreographer since 1982, Siân was in west London to work on the movement for a concert 
performance given at Hammersmith Apollo by the singer Kate Bush. Numerous thoughts 
emerge from the interview that resonate with the general themes of this book. She talks of the 
basis of the actor’s power in the effortful practice of bodily disciplines like dance. She puts 
forward the ideas of research as something done ‘on your feet’ and of non-verbal 
expressiveness as the basis of theatrical storytelling. She pays homage to collaborators who 
approach the problem of making theatre in unusual ways; she notes the importance of an 
embodied knowledge of how costume shapes bodily practice, and she thinks deeply about the 
essential musicality of human movement both onstage and off.  In the following edited 
transcript, ‘SW’ refers to Siân and ‘DT’ to myself.  
 
DT: You trained at the London College of Dance and Drama. What was that like?  
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SW: I’d done a lot of ballet from the age of eleven to eighteen with a wonderful teacher at a 
convent, where they thought it was important for deportment to do dance. We had to do it for 
three years compulsorily, once a week, and it was the best thing that could have happened. 
Ann Collier, my teacher, helped several of us who all wanted to train, and we auditioned for 
all the usual places and I got into London College. I really liked the place because we did an 
incredible range of techniques: jazz, tap, folk dancing, ballroom dancing - which was a real 
challenge for the teacher; she used to marvel at our inability to walk in a parallel line. In 
theatre, although I’ve not done masses of that face-to-face partner dancing, when I do I love it 
because I have no fear of that.  
DT: One of things you do nowadays at the Globe is historical dancing – did you do any of 
that at college?  
SW: We had an amazing teacher called Belinda Quirey who was an authority on period 
dance. We’d have it once a week throughout the year for the three years, so I got a great 
grounding in terms of her opinion on the quality of movement. When I started to work at the 
Globe, I had to do it on my feet and do research. They’ve got a fantastic research department 
there. And I had books from college, which have remained my cornerstones, and I always go 
back to them. I read the same things over and over again, because you have to remind 
yourself of a period which seems similar to another block of a hundred years, but there were 
lots of subtle changes in them.  I love interpreting the music of that period, but I’d have my 
own take on it for the purposes of what the director wants, I like to introduce things that are 
not conflicting with that period but I don’t want to play an archive version of it.  
DT: Was that where you met the person you founded The Kosh with?  
SW: I got a job with Ludus Dance Company. Ludus did physical, narrative dance-theatre, 
with social issues for young people. They were intentionally non-verbal, pursuing 
communication only through the physical. We worked collaboratively, and that’s where I met 
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Michael Merwitzer. We were both interested in starting a company with that amalgamation 
drawing in song, dance, movement, anything we felt served the story.  We were most 
interested in playing with expressive forms of human emotion. We wanted to take theatre to 
places that didn’t necessarily get it. And we were telling a story in innovative ways to do with 
unexplored forms, like acrobatics. Johnny Hutch had come to see a show I’d done with 
Ludus. Emil Wolk, who was a wonderful performer from the People Show, had brought him. 
We loved the idea of working with Johnny, this veteran acrobat from the tail-end of the music 
hall. Not only did he have knowledge of his own specialist area, he loved soaking up things 
other people did.  He was a mine of information and was eager to have it passed on to the 
next generation. Our work was right up Johnny’s street, so we’d have sessions together, try 
things out, and we’d say ‘Oh, that’s like dancing, only it’s tumbling – let’s use it!’ So we put 
all these different forms together. It was like physics for Johnny.  He’d look at somebody, 
and see the fulcrum, ‘there’s my bearer, and there’s my two balances,’ that’s what he’d done 
all his life and it was in him, to understand the way two bodies can move together, the pivot 
points to help you balance and make incredible things happen. We’d think, ‘Is that humanly 
possible?’ and then, ‘That’s the perfect image for somebody saying something about what is 
threatening, or risky.’ We were also working with people that were not necessarily highly 
trained dancers. They were actors who were very good movers. So we had to find a common 
ground in terms of the physicality we wanted to use, and work to people’s strengths and also 
challenge ourselves. 
DT: How did The Globe Theatre thing happen? I’m jumping now from the eighties to the late 
nineties.  
SW: I’d worked with Greg Doran at the RSC for a few years. That was a really big leap 
working with a big company, and Helena Kaut-Howson I’d done some work with, so I was 
starting to do some different theatre work. I met Mark Rylance and Claire van Kampen who 
 207 | P a g e  
 
ran The Globe because Claire had been brought to see a show by Sue Parrish, who ran the 
Women’s Theatre Group. A few years went by then they were running The Globe. And Tim 
Carroll, who was an Associate at The Globe, had seen our production of A Matter of Chance, 
had really liked the form and was working with an actor who’d been in that show. So it was 
those connections with seeing work by The Kosh, and I worked with Tim on Two Noble 
Kinsmen at The Globe. I hadn’t been to The Globe before. And I’ve been lucky enough never 
to look back – fifteen years later, and I’ve had this amazing opportunity of working there 
every season. When Dominic Dromgoole came in, my familiarity with the place was 
recognized in a positive way. With your own company, you form your own language and 
way of communicating. In some ways that’s irreplaceable. I think if I can do this work well 
it’s because of The Kosh, of the way I was able to take risks, make something happen that 
was a crazy mixture of ideas from all places – 
DT: It’s a sort of proving ground.  
SW: Yeah, where you think, ‘We’re going to make this work and it’s really strange, we don’t 
quite know what this form is but that’s where we’re going with it.’ In some of these larger 
companies they can’t afford to take those risks so it would be ridiculous to try. With my 
background I can think there is something exciting about the avenues you can go down. And 
you can appreciate the mind of the director – ‘There’s something bubbling away here that I 
want to try and make happen for them’. There isn’t a conflict, because I’d always worked in 
that collaborative way with Michael, I’d always have to understand what he was thinking 
before I could start choreographing. The shift was quite an easy one.  
DT: I’m interested in what it’s like for you with actors when you go into the room.  
SW: If you ask them, they’d probably say, ‘Oh, she expects me to be able to do the 
impossible!’ And you have to almost demystify it, to say, ‘This isn’t any more than you can 
already do, it’s not a dance step, it’s walking with a particular kind of quality to it’. 
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DT: It’s often a choric thing.  
SW: I love watching unison in movement but I also love seeing that there are individuals 
doing it, and The Globe has given me that sense that it doesn’t have to be so tightly, 
regimentally drilled. It can have a feeling that it belongs to those real people who come 
together to make a dance happen. As I understand it, language was a very valuable currency 
at that time. So people really needed to get on the dance floor, however comfortable or 
uncomfortable they might have felt with it. They had to be there, so they could network, and 
they had to execute the pavanne, and it had a really important social function. I love the 
notion that it’s an essential requirement even among the non-court classes. The dances are 
simple in many ways, so you could all join in without having to work something out, and be 
part of one rhythm. There was an Elizabethan sensibility about symmetry, the harmony of 
moving together. Not that we can’t do it. We’re just bouncing up and down to that bass beat, 
but we’re finding a common thread with each other. That’s always a delight for us. But it had 
a lovely refinement, moving one way then another, there’s something really beautiful about 
that. In a lot of the dances that come at the end of the play in The Globe, they sometimes have 
that very pure form, but with a little bit of chaos within it as well, because it suits the release 
that comes at the end of the story, and then it suddenly falls back into order. That’s been a 
lovely choreographic theme we’ve found a few times. You highlight the purity of partnering 
somebody in a graceful fusion because you’ve jostled it about a little bit. There’s a woman 
who works at The Globe called Glynn MacDonald, who’s an Alexander specialist, and she’s 
got a wonderful sense of physical presence that she advises on. She does these sessions with 
the company that’s just about feeling yourself in the space and your use of the upper body. 
She has these images like the sternum is like a dagger pointing the way, to enable you to have 
that bearing that reflects what they wore. The style of clothing has such a command and 
show, and that’s something you’ve got to pull off. We are so far away from that in our mode 
 209 | P a g e  
 
of carrying ourselves and our display of clothing. We almost like to play down the things 
we’re wearing. But you’d have to hold your arms slightly away from your body because you 
had these massive sleeves. There’s a lovely kind of spatial awareness that you needed to 
spiral around each other, because the woman wears voluminous folds of skirt so she has to 
make her way in figures of eight. That’s a courtly thing, because their clothing was so much 
more ostentatious.  You realize that all these clothes were held together with pins. You didn’t 
just crumple up, because you’d risk stabbing yourself. If they sat down, it was perching. And 
it clearly seemed to matter, that there were very precise ways of conducting yourself and it 
would be frowned upon if you didn’t observe some of those things.  
DT: Say you’re working on a sequence. How does it begin for you – with steps, with a 
rhythm?  
SW: It very often starts with the music because it’s the known thing, and I’m often presented 
with that. Someone like Claire [van Kampen] has a very good sense of what can be danced 
to. I love listening to the music, and I make my own framing of it. I read music, and I always 
write out the music for my ‘dancer’ thinking. I hear it in a timing of movement rather than 
notes on an instrument. I hear a complete phrase and I can imagine a shape that would fit 
with that phrase, and that’s how I get each of the sections logged. Then I see the overall 
picture of the music, and if I see that it’s roughly the right length, I start to divide that up into 
little sections of events in my head: ‘It would be lovely if these characters came together at 
this point, then if they departed and danced with other people’. So in that sense I like to think 
of patterning that lends itself to people meeting other people on the dance floor. Sometimes 
it’s being presented to a world out there, and sometimes it’s a more intimate thing with each 
other. I have little ‘x’s on the page and little stick people drawings and shapes, lines of things, 
and I work on it in that way. Then there’s the unknown which is the people themselves, and 
what they produce sometimes in interpreting that is really lovely. So sometimes it goes off on 
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a slightly different path because of what they’re producing. With a play we’re reviving at The 
Globe – A Midsummer Night’s Dream – Dominic wanted Titania and Oberon to come 
together with their entourage, and he wanted two chaotic, excited bands of fairies moving 
through the forest who suddenly come together in an aggressive face-off. So to do that I want 
them leaping and catching each other and maybe some lifts, but I can only make that happen 
with the people, so as we’re recreating that I see one person, ‘Oh, you’re quite small, you 
could easily be lifted by that great big person, and that’s the kind of energy we need.’ I 
wouldn’t have planned anything before I saw them. So it’s always a bit of a mixture of 
responding to the people you have and the direction you want to go in.  
DT: There’s a visual music, one phrase leading to another phrase, repetitions of things – 
SW: Very much. And contrast, building to something. And having done a lot of this work at 
The Globe, it’s interesting to see how it moves into other areas of your work.  
DT: Looking at the behaviour of these people here in the café, do you see patterns?  
SW: Yes. It’s to do with, say, are they for each other in their body language, the way they’re 
positioned in the space in relation to the people around them. You start to pick up on their 
mannerisms with each other. It’s always fascinating to be asked about that, because I don’t 
know how I do it. I just see things, as I’m sure lots of people do. In our last Kosh production, 
we did a piece called Café Chaos, we had these little vignettes of people coming into a café. 
It’s really to do with the architecture of the space. There was a limited number of tables and 
chairs, but because it was an abstraction of a café, you had to have a certain number of tables 
for it to be a café in your mind. And how I felt people should be positioned, then lifting off 
from that, taking things to extremes. We had them moving on top of the tables, extending 
what was happening to them. I like seeing people and not superimposing anything on them 
until they tell me something. And so in life I look at someone and think, ‘Why does that 
particular person make me have a magnetic draw to them?’   
 211 | P a g e  
 
DT: I was learning Neutral Mask with Simon McBurney, and he said that stage presence is 
something you can work on. It’s about rhythm and variety and contrast. Your charisma is 
something you can build, you cut out the noise, find out who you are, and you can work on 
the rhythm of that. Would you say that’s true? 
SW: I take that in terms of the task I’ve had of convincing some actors they can dance, in that 
way of thinking: ‘Of course you can, it’s yours for the taking’. They may not be comfortable 
with applying their movement to a given parameter of a phrase of music, and you saying, ‘It 
has to finish by the time I say eight!’ But they can always move, sometimes really 
beautifully. Sometimes they feel they don’t own that ability. I see people at the beginning of a 
rehearsal process having a scepticism about their own ability to achieve certain things, and by 
the end of it being really confident, suddenly realizing, ‘Of course that’s me, I’m doing this, 
not somebody laying that on me’. I’ve seen it happen, people flourishing in an area of 
performing that they felt they had not got the command of as well as others. It’s not that long 
ago I started working on a form of improvising. This was a door opening for me in the sense 
of anything is possible, and this thing that’s always talked about of being in the moment and 
thinking ‘I hope I can achieve that’. It’s to do with focusing on the things around you, and not 
planning, not being so worked out, and when something doesn’t fall into place, you don’t 
think, ‘Oh, it hasn’t gone the way I wanted it to, so I’ll steer it back to that’, but flow with the 
new thing. All of that is amazing to watch when you see it onstage and you think, ‘These two 
actors are working off each other rather than presenting at right angles to what each other is 
saying’. I think there are lots of techniques that open doors for development of a 
performance, even when you think you’ve done it all, and sometimes the ones you resist are 
really exciting. He won’t mind me saying this, but Tim Carroll’s rigorous way of approaching 
Shakespearean poetry is really hard on some – they feel they’re being intimidated by the 
language before they come out the other side and think, ‘What a revelation’.  I’ve been on the 
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receiving end of some of his exercises and think, ‘If I ever get out of this room in one piece!’ 
but it’s endlessly rewarding.  
DT: There’s no freedom without rules. What are the rules of The Globe as a space? 
SW:  It’s to do with welcoming into the shared space. You acknowledge that you’re on a 
stage that’s sort of floating on this sea of people. And because they’re right there with you, 
they don’t need any delay or halting of the storytelling, they’re almost as present as you are 
on the stage, so the pace of things is acutely balanced. When you’re in a darkened space and 
you have to pull this imaginary audience into you, that’s another process. You’re still 
communicating, but it’s just that at The Globe you’re literally making eye contact when 
you’re telling them your thoughts. Spatially, that theatre welcomes things like being on the 
move when you’re thinking. If it’s a slightly heightened thing, you go for a walk as you’re 
thinking to yourself. Or if you’re listening to someone, you position yourself ready to respond 
to them, but only in the sense that, like when you’re washing the dishes, without you even 
being aware of it, you’re listening to the person who’s giving you their thoughts. And you 
move, and when you finally decide to say something, that’s going to be the moment when 
you stop. It’s very like life in that way, it’s just slightly expanded. That’s why I like those 
moments when you work with the actors in the scene in conjunction with the director, and 
there’s a heightening of what’s happening. That’s always really fascinating.  
 
The next interview moves from a compelling theory of human gesture in general towards the 
work of the actor on Shakespeare.  
 
David McNeill 
At a few points in this book I have acknowledged the influence of Professor David McNeill, 
co-founder with Susan Duncan of the Gesture Lab at the University of Chicago. It is 
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McNeill’s basic psycholinguistic model of gesture that has gained much currency over the 
past thirty years, supported by experimental data from cognitive psychology. Although 
McNeill is not a scholar of performance, he has in recent times shown an interest in the 
subject from the perspective of the actor’s gestures.  
 
What follows is an edited transcription of an email correspondence I had with Professor 
McNeill (DM) between August and 2014 and February 2015. In his responses, it is 
noteworthy that he stresses that gestural styles are personal to the speaker, a thought that 
resonates with the idea developed in the book regarding the increasing dominance of the 
social morality of individual self-fulfilment: recall that an actor like David Garrick may have 
been familiar with the canons of gesture outlined in the manuals of oratory, but his impact 
depended upon his particular style of movement. My insistence that gesture is how the actor 
thinks with her body is partly his theory of co-speech gesture – what he elaborates on here as 
‘communicative dynamism’ - expressed in a simple phrase. Of interest also is how McNeill 
relates gesture in performance to intentionality (see the paragraph below on ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
actions) – in Stanislavskian terms, to ‘the objective’.  
 
DT: If it’s OK with you, I’d like to begin the conversation by asking you to talk a little bit 
about your background – what led you to the field of gesture studies?  
DM: Of course.  A good way to start. My interest in gesture goes way back (as do I).  I can 
identify the landmarks fairly precisely.  The first was in the early 1960s, at the Harvard 
Center for Cognitive Studies.  I had just arrived fresh out of grad school (Berkeley) and found 
myself surrounded by the greatest luminaries of the then new field of cognitive studies.  Two 
of the bright lights, Volney Stefflre and Roger Brown, I saw in constant dialogue. Physically 
they were very different, Stefflre a chunky muscular man, Brown tall and elegant, but what 
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caught my eye was their contrasting gesture styles. This was the first time I had paid attention 
to gesture. I had no idea then that gesture and speech formed a unity or that language was 
involved at all. That realization came few years later; I’ve described the event – my seeing in 
mid-sentence that language and gesture were one “thing”– in the preface of Gesture and 
Thought, 2005.  But before then I saw S and B sculpting imaginary materials, S hammering 
some blocky stuff, I imagined marble, clenched fists banging on it; B weaving something 
delicate, I imagined spider webs.  So this was my first awareness of gesture - they occur, they 
differ with the person, and they are imaginary sculpting.  
DT: Your description of the gestural styles of Volney Stefflre and Roger Brown remind me of 
John Napier’s elaboration of the Power Grip and the Precision Grip.  
DM: This works well for Brown.  His spider-web gestures did include the precision grip, but 
not so for Stefflre – his fists were closed as he pressed against the open, constantly changing 
space in front of him.  What unites their two gesture depictions is a metaphoric use of 
space.  Both were presenting meaning as spatial arrangements modified as meaning changes. 
They differed physically rather than metaphorically, Brown pinches, Steffler pushes, but 
agreed in depicting meaning as something like a structure in space.  
DT: One of the reasons why I find your work interesting is that there has in recent decades 
been something of a change in British acting. In the 1980s and 90s a number of companies 
began to create work that drew upon what were felt to be continental traditions of theatre-
making, the most famous example being Theatre de Complicite. Often, it was just a matter of 
British actors learning how to work with non-British collaborators. Over time, many of the 
performers associated with these companies found themselves working in the mainstream – 
that’s to say, in institutions like the Royal Shakespeare Company – and they brought with 
them a way of working that was more (to use the cliché) ‘physical’. That is, they would tend 
to refuse the traditional prioritization of voice over body in the creation of theatre, and they 
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would see verbal acts as embodied. I count myself among these artists, having trained and 
worked in both the ‘physical theatre’ world (there really isn’t a good term for it) and 
companies like the RSC; part of my motive for this book is to build the bridge between text 
or voice-based drama and movement- or gesture-based performance. I think your concept of 
communicative dynamism is helpful in this regard. I wonder if you could just outline what 
communicative dynamism means to you? 
DM:  I’ve given a lot of thought to communicative dynamism (or “CD”), but I can’t claim 
it.  It comes out of the Prague School of linguistics, Jan Firbas in particular, who introduced 
the concept as part of a movement they had launched called functional sentence 
perspective.  CD is the communicative “push” or “weight” the word has in a sentence for 
advancing meaning.  I’ve found this inherently dynamic idea to be enormously powerful in 
explaining how gesture and speech combine in English or any other language (not just free 
word order ones).  The more the CD, the more elaborate the gesture; the less the less, even to 
the point of the gesture vanishing beneath the surface. I think all this bears on your bridge.It 
is a concet in which the two halves, text and action, converge.  Another concept that bears on 
the bridge is the psychological predicate; I borrow this from Vygotsky.  The psychological 
predicate is the point of newsworthiness in the immediate context of speaking.  Putting CD 
and the psychological predicate together, we get the idea that the push in discourse comes 
from differentiating newsworthiness in the immediate context; and the more the departure 
from expectation, the greater the newsworthiness, the more the push and the CD, and the 
more elaborate the gesture.  This conception of language automatically takes us beyond the 
sentence, the limit of most linguistic analysis. I can imagine actors must know all this already 
intuitively.  And in gesture–speech unity, there is again the bridge.  I wonder how far this 
goes in thinking about performance?  Can entire scenes, all the dialogue, stage setting, actors’ 
movements, etc. etc. be comprehended in terms of CD and psychological predicates?  Here is 
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another idea (not borrowed for once).  In speaking, the speaker shapes context to make the 
differentiation of a psychological predicate with the right significance possible.  Part of the 
bridge in this natural setting is this shaping, a self-creation of context for one’s own 
psychological predicate.  One meaning is two things – the context and the psychological 
predicate, and is irreducible to two single meanings. The speaker manages both at once. Is 
this anything like a performance, including in it the author of the speech?  What does an actor 
do that self-shapes the context?  (I guess many things.) You can see how the performance 
triangle comes from these sorts of considerations. 
DT: I just want to clarify a few things to make sure I’ve got you right. In performance, 
stylization is always at work to some degree. You recognize this in your paper on speech-
gesture mimicry in performance when you refer to ‘extremes of conceptualization’ and to 
exaggeration. But your interest is not in consciously stylized gestures. You see gesture as the 
enactment of imagery that is fundamental to the process of speaking itself. The gesture 
conveys imagery and that is its most important feature. The physical embodiment of the 
gesture is in fact not strictly necessary – it’s possible, as it were, to gesture without actually 
physically gesturing. Absent the physical movement, the speech is as you say already 
orchestrated by a gestural impulse.   
DM: All this is right on.  I am interested in how stylized gestures, as one performs them, 
seem to the actor.  I have a pet distinction between “new” gesture-actions and “old” action-
actions.  The adjectives refer to phylogenesis (and ontogenesis), “new” in human evolution, 
“old” in primate action.  The distinction is fundamentally whether the action has a goal; goal-
direction defines the “old” but the “new” gesture actions do not have goals; one intends to 
communicate something, this is a goal; and the gesture and the speech it unites with is part of 
the realization of this goal; but there is no goal of the gesture itself; it orchestrates the speech 
(changing it from vegetative action, with goals, into speech) but this is not a goal of making 
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the gesture. The gesture arises as part of speaking.  These terms refer to the actions 
themselves, and to how they are organized, qua actions.  Now, taking all this into 
consideration, it may be that an actor’s gestures do have goals, qua actions. The actor is 
thinking of the gesture as a part of the performance itself? Does this seem to be so?  Then the 
gesture is really an action-action, and relates to speech in a fundamentally different way from 
a gesture-action.  Of course, an actor may have both at once, which is quite interesting in its 
potential for interactions of the two modes.  
DT: I have tried this exercise in rehearsals and classes lots of times: take a phrase of text – 
usually something that can be spoken in something like three seconds, that seems like a self-
contained statement. As you speak, make a gesture of some kind. Keep trying different 
gestures until what emerges feels completely connected to the words: an image of them. Now 
take away the physical movement, but speak with exactly the same prosody, exactly the same 
energy as you did when you moved. Imagine yourself making the physical gesture as you 
speak. Now, it’s interesting that what first tends to happen is that the actor’s voice changes 
when they stop making the gesture – their prosody changes. I then have to insist that the text 
should sound precisely as it did when they moved their body while speaking. When that is 
finally achieved, it doesn’t matter if they move or not – it feels like they have caught the 
movement of the text in their voice. In the performance, they may decide to make the 
physical gesture or they may not. One corollary of this is that the actor finds it easier to 
remember her lines.  
DM: This is close to what I would hope!  I have the idea gesture merges with speech by 
“orchestrating” it, as I mentioned – we form speech around it.  Even non-grammatical speech 
chunks this way.  Your students seem to be following this path.  The initial prosody changes 
are most telling.  Gesture and prosody are so alike, and the gesture would orchestrate it most 
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directly.  Then, at last, they move into a mode of secure performance where the gesture seems 
to have dropped out (though I suspect it is present internally). 
DT: Similarly, Michael Chekhov, whose work is being explored by Tom Cornford in relation 
to Shakespeare at the moment, would talk of an inner gesture, a ‘Psychological Gesture’. This 
is private – it’s only for the actor, not shown to the audience in the final performance.  
DM: I know Cornford, indeed, and something of his conception of inner gestures.  I think he 
called them phantom gestures as well (unless they are for some other conception he is 
interested in).  Inner gestures may be unmixed gesture-actions, so clues the audience or other 
actors detect would be untainted by goals, this creating an impression of reality.   
DT: When did you start to become interested in performance, and what prompted your 
interest?  
DM: I had worked out a novel idea of how language came to exist, in us as a species, and 
wrote about it in the How Language Began book.  As I thought about it, I kept seeing areas of 
life where this origin, if it had occurred, would change things.  One was the idea that written 
prose contains hidden gestures.  What we sense as good form is actually a gesture, placed 
there by the author. I cited passages from Pride and Prejudice as examples - saying that we 
touch gestures placed in them by Jane Austen 200 years ago.  This then brought the theatre to 
mind.  If we can do this with Pride and Prejudice, actors can do it with Shakespeare...I met 
two theatre people, Tom Cornford and Ofer Ravid, and read some books addressed to actors 
(like Chekov and Lecoq), and from this developed a great respect for actors' art and self-
discipline. I've also been thinking about "physical" approaches to performance.  Does the 
following have any relevance?   One aspect of gesture is that it frames or, as I say, 
"orchestrates" speech. Speech is built around it (the reverse of the popular view). I wonder if 
there is an equivalent orchestration of performance by the actor's movements?  Both spoken 
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lines and movements are meaningful, but gesture/movement is fundamental. Is this anything 
like a physical approach?   
 
There are numerous points of interest here. But perhaps the most important one for my 
purposes can be teased out of his final proposition: that if, contrary to what is usually 
believed, speech is built around gesture, then perhaps a Shakespearean performance is built, 
first of all, not around the text but around the gestures of the actors.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This book has been premised upon three ideas:  
 
1. Gesture and speech are not separable systems, but are intertwined because all thought 
is embodied; 
2. In order to gain social acceptance, actors had to learn and display a principle of 
smoothness because people associate smoothness with high status; 
3. The cultural developments in gestural behaviour among influential Shakespearean 
actors parallel historical developments in social morality.   
 
In a recent newspaper article, John Sutherland argued that Shakespeare’s words are dying for 
us, and that soon we will barely be able to understand his language at all (The Guardian 
October 11th 2013). The case is open to debate, but nonetheless it seems clear to me that those 
who wish to produce Shakespeare for new audiences must pay renewed attention to the 
actor’s body. In particular, practitioners and theorists need to reflect upon how gesture and 
speech are a single system, so that neither gesture nor speech is prioritized as more authentic. 
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It is impossible to say what the results of such reflection might be. The futures for 
Shakespeare in practice that I have suggested are only a handful of possibilities, and they may 
turn out to be irrelevant. History is not a deterministic process; it is an unpredictable mix of 
forces and accidents, and Shakespearean practice is no exception.  
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2.1.10 
 
Further reading 
 
 
The following can inevitably be no more than a general guide to further research and 
exploration into what is a vast and complex subject. The reader is encouraged to use my 
indications as encouragements towards the discovery of her own patterns and connections.  
 
For gesture theory the reader is urged to consult David McNeill (1992), Adam Kendon and 
Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen (1969).  
 
For a cultural history of gesture see Bremmer and Roodenburg, eds. (1991). Elaine Fantham 
(1982; 2002; 2006) is a valuable guide to Roman rhetoric in performance, while Corbeill, 
(2004), Aldrete (1999) and Brilliant (1963) both produced important works on the topic. 
Anglo-Saxon and Medieval gesture is treated in varying ways by Dodwell (2000), Barasch 
(1987; 2003) and Schmitt (1991). For Renaissance gesture and its relation to courtesy, see the 
monumental work of Norbert Elias (1994) as well as Bryson (1998), Burke (1995) and 
Becker (1988). For Renaissance uses of rhetoric see Plett (2004), Mack (2011) and Enterline 
(2012). For Reformation culture and its influence on theatre see Degenhardt and Williamson 
(2012), Pettegree (2005) and King (1982).  
 
For questions of acting relating to Shakespearean and other Renaissance practitioners, some 
useful material is found in Astington (2010), Stern (2009; 2004); Gurr and Ichikawa (2000), 
Dessen (1986) and Styan (1967). Peter Thomson (2000) takes the long view and is a witty 
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and sensible guide. In the Introduction I refer to some of the major players in the central 
debate on Elizabethan acting – the reader is invited to consult those works also. For the 
subject of the passions and humours on Shakespeare’s stage, see Escolme (2013), Paster 
(2004).Paul Ekman’s edition of Darwin’s work on emotion (1872/1998) is essential reading.  
 
For gesture in acting from 1650 to 1850, the essential (though also contestable) text is Barnett 
(1987), but see also Woo (2008), West (1991) and Woods (1984). See also Hughes (1987), 
Pullen (2005), Asleson (2003) and Howe (1992) on actresses, Cunningham (2008), Benedetti 
(2001) on Garrick and Kahan (2006) on Kean. Of interest also is Roach (1985).  
For Victorian actresses, see Marshall (1998). On Irving and Darwinism, see Goodall (2002). 
Of interest for the period is Schoch (2006).  
 
Stanislavski’s Othello is discussed in Stanislavski (1936/89), Hankey (1987) and Potter 
(2002). The Modernism of Les Kurbas is covered in Makaryk and Tckaz (2010) and Makaryk 
(2004). Material on Laban is found in Davies (2006) as well as in his own works (especially 
1988/2001). Other influential movement practitioners such as Lecoq are discussed in Evans 
(2009). For Lepage, see Dundjerovic (2009) and Fricker (2010). Useful material on 
dreamthinkspeak is found in Machon (2013).  
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2.2 
LECOQ AND SHAKESPEARE 
 
This chapter will show how an actor who has been trained in what I will call “the Lecoq 
tradition” may approach the rehearsal of Shakespeare’s text. No one can legitimately claim to 
make statements that are true in all contexts for all actors who have come into contact with 
Lecoq’s work. It is possible, however, to argue for patterns of agenda, vocabulary and 
approach, and in trying to do so I will draw largely upon Ariane Mnouchkine’s production of 
Richard II (1981) for her company Théâtre du Soleil. In addition, I will refer to two 
productions of Shakespeare I directed, for which my approach was influenced by Lecoq’s 
ideas: A Midsummer Night’s Dream (2009) and Macbeth (2011), both at St Peter’s Arts 
Centre, Preston in the UK. I will also mention in passing two productions of Shakespeare 
plays by Theatre de Complicite for elements of supporting evidence.  
 
Lecoq’s repertoire of concepts and exercises has been subjected to continuous revision in the 
hands of those who trained either at his school or with other teachers who have absorbed his 
influence. As Franc Chamberlain has said, “There is no ensemble with whom he is uniquely 
associated, no performer who is the Lecoq disciple par excellence […] there is no pure Lecoq 
form” (Chamberlain and Yarrow, 2002: 22).  
 
There is no pure Lecoq form. But there is an intense focus upon form within his pedagogy. 
Ariane Mnouchkine, in a discussion of her production of Richard II, says: “Finally, for all 
theatre one needs a form” (Williams, 1999: 93). Bryan Singleton elaborates upon this: 
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“Mnouchkine’s role was to establish a working form and then to harness the improvised 
scenes into a coherent set of visual images consistent with the overall aesthetic of that form” 
(Singleton, 2010: 40). For my production of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, I drew upon 
German and American cinema of the 1920s and 1930s to provide a set of provocations 
towards what I hoped would become an overall aesthetic form. It is a familiar move of the 
Lecoq tradition to refer to the visual languages of cinema, and Lecoq himself taught students 
to play with theatrical analogues of film editing techniques in his teaching of “cartoon mime” 
(Lecoq, 2000: 108-9). In my production, the actors found their first impetus for their 
characters by imitating the physical and vocal mannerisms of Greta Garbo (Hippolyta), Clark 
Gable (Lysander), Claudette Colbert (Hermia), Cary Grant (Demetrius) and Katherine 
Hepburn (Helena). The rhythms of scenes featuring the lovers were modelled on scenes from 
screwball comedies like Frank Capra’s It Happened One Night (1934) and Howard Hawks’s 
Bringing Up Baby (1938).  Meanwhile, the supernatural characters were inspired by F.W. 
Murnau’s 1922 horror movie Nosferatu (Oberon) and James Whale’s 1935 Bride of 
Frankenstein (Titania). It was out of the collision between the machine-gun dialogue and 
percussive physical slapstick of screwball comedy, and the heavily atmospheric, slow, 
physically extended performance style of German Expressionism (and its American 
derivatives at Universal Studios) that the visual and aural world of this production gradually 
emerged.  
 
For Mnouchkine, the search for form meant “an immediate voyage towards Asia, because 
everything is there, for music, dance, sacred art, or theatre” (Williams, 1999: 94). Some 
critics like Dennis Kennedy have seen a kind of decontextualizing intercultural tourism at 
work in productions such as Mnouchkine’s Richard II (Kennedy and Young, 2010: 10). At 
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the same time, Kennedy himself discloses just what it is that draws the Lecoq tradition to the 
East: 
 
The foregrounding of embodied over verbal expression in Asian performance aesthetics, in 
formalized systems that appear highly stylized and presentational compared with realist 
representation, transpose Shakespeare according to a different order from that of textual 
translation, which occurs in the same (i.e. linguistic) medium. (ibid: 17-18) 
 
Kennedy’s use of the word “transpose” here echoes Lecoq’s conception of theatre as a game 
that can be “transposed”: that is, it is “reinserted into the dramatic dimension” (Lecoq, 2000: 
45) so that one idiom is then seen in terms of another. The act of transposition, which may 
involve borrowing or adapting a theatre language from another culture, will in itself 
foreground the means of representation. The dangers of cultural piracy are to some extent 
offset by a sense of visual eclecticism that marks many productions emerging out of the 
Lecoq tradition. This is partly a consequence of the essentially collective nature of work in a 
company such as Mnouchkine’s. She felt that critics who accused her of Orientalism had 
failed to notice that there were no exclusive references to a particular Asian form in her 
production. For Judith Miller, what mattered most about the turn to Asia was “the latitude it 
afforded her to create the feeling of staged ritual. Mnouchkine took from Asian theater a 
model that allowed her to perfect a gestic system and clarify physical lines” (Miller, 2007: 
80). Eclecticism was also a feature of Theatre de Complicite’s production of The Winter’s 
Tale, as was noted by Peter Holland: “The cumulative effect was exhilarating in its rapidly 
switching moods. It was a production in which anything was possible to match a play 
perceived as narrating the joys of possibility” (Holland, 1997:  124).  
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When Mnouchkine set to work upon Richard II, she fastened her attention not only upon a 
form that might be found to transpose what she saw as “the ritual and chivalric universe” 
(Williams, 1999: 93) of the play, but also upon the characters in terms of what she called 
“states”. A state refers to the passion that the actor “must express in relation to the character” 
(ibid: 94); it is an emotional attitude shown through the body. The actor Philippe Hottier 
(who played the Duke of York in Richard II) breaks it down into a base state, or general 
“attitude to life”, and a series of secondary states that the character “will inhabit […] 
successively in joy, anger, aggression, etc. The base state is modified through the secondary 
states” (ibid: 106). Since Mnouchkine believed that it is “through the passions of his 
characters” that Shakespeare “expresses his understanding of human beings” (ibid: 95), her 
focus was on encouraging actors to “show what situation and what state the character who 
utters the word is in” (ibid: 96).   
 
How does the Lecoq actor get at these states in rehearsal? The key is in Lecoq’s remark that 
“states and passions are expressed through gestures, attitudes and movements similar to those 
of physical actions” (Lecoq, 2000: 75). It is necessary to have a kind of physical reference 
point from which to make attitudes. This is found in the concept of neutrality. Lecoq thought 
of neutral mask work as deploying “a natural extension of the gestures acquired through 
sports” in the “training of dramatic characters” (ibid: 4). Thus it is seen as a useful “tool 
towards characterization” (Murray, 2003: 73). The training in neutral mask was the point of 
origin for Mnouchkine in her work on “base states” and “sub-states” of passions for the 
characters of Richard II (Singleton, 2010: 40).  
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The source material for these passions, or attitudes, was the Shakespearean text, and in 
particular its imagery – which Mnouchkine saw as “a raw material for performance” (ibid). 
The actor’s task was to “capture those images and convey them in a decoded form,” since if 
“he only conveys the word, it will not be decoded for the theatrical representation” (Williams, 
1999: 97). The problem with this approach, however, is that even if you believe that to 
convey the word alone is insufficient, you may still see an act of decoding as itself a form of 
coding in need of decipherment. This objection has been raised by John Russell Brown, who 
argues that Mnouchkine interpolated into performance the “alien mechanism” of an 
unfamiliar theatrical language that “will tend to isolate the on-stage experience from the life-
experiences of spectators and performers” (in Kennedy and Young, 2010: 40). It is a criticism 
that I think should be taken seriously by the Lecoq tradition – but then, Mnouchkine’s point 
was that “Shakespeare is not our contemporary” (Williams, 1999: 93). Her focus upon 
passions can be seen to draw attention to the text’s relationship to both the early modern 
psychology of humours (see Roach, 1993: 23-57) and with classical oratory. These are both 
arguably key conditions for a properly historicized realization of Shakespearean drama. Peter 
Holland’s critique of Complicite’s The Winter’s Tale hints at this when he notes that “the cast 
took full measure of the play’s rhetorical moments” (Holland, 1997: 125). In my own 
practice, I encourage actors to take the text’s invitations to “draw out in space and in gesture” 
(Williams, 1999: 106) the internal movements of the passions in gestures that are both 
physically committed and precise in their shape and timing. As Mnouchkine says, “what’s 
beautiful in theatre is when an actor transforms a feeling, a memory, a state or a passion. No 
one sees pure passion unless the actor transforms it into performance, that is to say into a 
sign, into a gesture” (ibid: 102).  
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The search for physical form of this sort in practice tends to involve much game-playing. To 
work in a game-like fashion on a scene would be to apply a restriction to it, and to test what 
this can produce by way of meaning and action. To demonstrate, here is a game drawn from 
Lecoq’s ideas about the fixed point of movement. Two actors play out a scene. The rule is: 
one actor makes a move, the other actor then makes a move in response, and so on. At any 
moment of their choosing, either actor can stop and wait. The actors are basically placing 
fixed points, like cinematic freeze frames, into the scene at any time they like. The actors 
must not try to convey what the attitude suggested by the fixed point means. They simply 
play the game, and the meaning of the attitude is allowed to take care of itself for the time 
being.  
 
I used this game when I rehearsed Macbeth. In 1.4, Duncan praises Macbeth before making 
Malcolm Prince of Cumberland. Before discussing the scene, I invited the actor playing 
Duncan to move, and then to assume a fixed point when and where he liked. The other actors 
on stage were permitted to move only in reaction to his fixed points. After a few goes at the 
game, I encouraged the actors to play it again as they spoke the text. This approach led us to a 
dynamic scene, structured by interruptions in the flow of the dialogue, where the court 
appeared to be in suspended animation as everyone tried to second guess what the king’s 
attitudes actually meant, and thus what he was going to say or do next. To a certain extent, as 
the game is transposed into the dramatic dimension, there is a principle of disguising at work: 
we didn’t really want the audience to interpret the scene as a game but as a meaningful 
structure. The game, though, will never be totally abandoned in performance. And because 
everyone on stage knows what the game is, an important result of this approach is, in my 
view, the emergence of group complicity.  
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Thus, the script can be understood as a resource for game playing. Mnouchkine described her 
work on the text as “jouer frontal” (Singleton, 2010: 40). The basic rule was: don’t tell each 
other, tell the audience. “In rehearsal, every time the actors found themselves talking to each 
other, it didn’t work. I said to them, ‘Tell it to the audience’ […] I’m convinced that 
Shakespeare’s text must be spoken in this way. As soon as you begin to modulate, to refine, 
to make it subtle, you water it down” (Williams, 1999: 94). So the actors frequently faced the 
audience as they spoke, especially when playing the King’s courtiers. Through this simple 
restriction, a highly presentational performance style was discovered. Mnouchkine worked 
with the company on using their visual imaginations to place in the audience the objects of 
their speech. Meanwhile, the reactions of the non-speaking characters were played through 
(initially improvised) gestures. “The result was a visual staging of sub-text and an 
exteriorization of inner psychology” (Singleton, 2010: 40).  
 
As Simon Murray suggests, for Lecoq “thought and language are all consequent upon 
movement and gesture” (Murray, 2003: 76). “Action,” says Lecoq, “is inscribed into words” 
(Lecoq, 2006: 92). The actor must “feel the text as a dynamic event” because a good text “is 
full of movement, and it carries a series of events that are dynamic before being literary” 
(Fusetti and Wilson, 2002: 99). To illustrate this, I will describe a classic Lecoq game – a 
game I often use in rehearsals and one that was part of Kathryn Hunter’s text work for her 
production of Othello for the Royal Shakespeare Company in 2009 (I discuss the production 
from the perspective of actor Patrice Naiambana, who played Othello, in Brown, 2012: 181-
5). Two actors face each other, balancing horizontally a bamboo stick between them using the 
palms of their hands or the tips of their index fingers. Their task is to move, and to keep the 
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stick in balance. So the actor is practicing how to embody a rhythm of pushing and pulling. It 
seems almost childishly simple. In practice, it demands complex tactics, as the actors try to 
read each other’s intention and move accordingly without using words. The stick is then 
balanced between other parts of the body, and the actors attempt to construct a rhythmical 
sequence of moves that are interesting for the spectator. Next, the actors remove the stick and 
play the game again as if it were still in place. Then the game is played again and the 
dialogue of the scene is spoken. The result can be charged with the dynamics of an encounter 
mediated primarily through the body. Such a dynamic was in evidence in the first meeting of 
Oberon and Titania in my own Midsummer Night’s Dream (2.1), as the characters appeared 
to push and pull each other around the stage during their angry exchanges, whilst always 
keeping in imaginary tension a fixed distance from each other.   
  
During rehearsals for The Winter’s Tale, Theatre de Complicite would undertake physical 
preparation for their encounter with the text for all of the morning and most of the afternoon, 
not beginning to apply themselves to the words until around 4pm usually (See Purcell in 
Brown, 2012: 162). What were they doing all day? Playing with bamboo sticks? Not only 
sticks. There is also ball work, which is designed to sharpen one’s skill at turn-taking and at 
keeping light in the body in the moment of reaction and risk-taking (such as catching and 
returning the ball at speed). Yet surely a far more sophisticated encounter awaits us if we 
engage with the words of Shakespeare, say through table discussion, before we try to put the 
scene on its feet? My claim, and my experience, is that this may be felt to be true by and for 
the director and the actors, but it is not automatically true for the audience, and it is to the 
audience – even if only as an ‘idea’ – that the Lecoq actor turns from the very outset of 
rehearsal. She knows that no amount of verbalized engagement with the text is worth a bean 
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to an audience unless she can embody the fruits of this engagement so that it is made 
available to them.  
 
This embodiment is vocal as well as physical. The Lecoq tradition, finally, admits of no 
distinction between the two activities. Voice is understood as part of the body; in the moment 
of speaking, voice is understood as gesture. Lecoq, it is true, did not work in detail upon the 
training of the voice. This can lead to a lack of confidence in vocal handling of the text, 
which is presumably why Theatre de Complicite felt it necessary to work with Patsy 
Rodenburg when they rehearsed Measure for Measure for the National Theatre (in 2004). In 
my own classes on Shakespeare, and in rehearsals as a director, I work on voice through 
gesture. The actors speak the text performing a physical gesture for each phrase (and 
sometimes a gesture for each word of the text). These gestures are performed by the whole 
body, not just the hands; the impulse for a gesture can come from the feet, the knee, the 
pelvis, the sternum, the nose, the top of the head, and so on. The external forms of some of 
these gestures may be kept in performance. But where they are not, the actor is encouraged to 
speak the phrase with the same intonation she used when rehearsing the gesture. The 
influence of the gesture remains even when the gesture itself is not performed.  
 
Ariane Mnouchkine worked at the level of the word itself:  
Confronted with this text, we have worked from word to word, as if we were at the foot of a 
mountain, attentive to each word pronounced by these great visionary primitives, trying to 
see what they see, in order for us in turn to be able to show it, to place it in space, in bright 
light.  (Williams, 1999: 89-90) 
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Similarly, when the actor Clive Mendus began work on Measure for Measure for Theatre de 
Complicite, he was invited by director Simon McBurney to take the text one word at a time: 
 
Simon’s principal ambition from before we got into the rehearsal room was to have the text 
flow like a river of words. So the idea was to start with the first word of the play ‘Escalus’, 
and the river was to flow right through until the last word, which is ‘know’. (Mendus, 2006: 
260) 
 
I think the origin of this word-by-word procedure is to be found in Lecoq’s approach to 
poetic language. Lecoq worked with the different languages spoken by his students, inviting 
them to discover the “physical dynamic” of individual words, embodying them as they 
sounded them out (Lecoq, 2000: 50).   
 
For all that Lecoq’s via negativa appeared at times to consist of variations on the theme of 
“That’s not it!”, there remained in his laboratory an openness to the performer’s ideas. For 
example, in the auto-cours sessions, students worked in small groups on a given theme in 
their own time, then presented this to the school at the end of the week. As a result of this 
kind of self-directed, shared imaginative work (that is then subjected to criticism from the 
teacher(s) and other students) the actor becomes more attuned to the audience. He is taught to 
listen to – in a sense, to think like – the audience.  
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For A Midsummer Night’s Dream, I drew upon this approach. A case in point was the 
Mechanicals: at their first rehearsal, I left them to work together for some time on the theme 
‘The Mechanicals Arrive’. They then presented the outcome of their collaboration to the 
whole company, who were invited to comment upon it. Through this, we developed a group 
scene with many engaging little details, showing how each of the Mechanicals could make a 
good entrance and establish who they were in relation to each other. As a company, we 
applied this procedure in many of the play’s group scenes, and incorporated resulting 
propositions into the production.  
 
For Mnouchkine’s Richard II, a gestural code intended to transpose into a theatrical idiom the 
company’s sense of the play as essentially ritualistic was developed in rehearsal by the actors 
themselves, as were the eclectic costumes, according to actor Philippe Hottier (Williams, 
1999: 107). Entrances were practised at speed as a kind of ‘carcarole’; as the actors began to 
work on these entrances (in which a character presents himself to the audience as he arrives), 
the musician Jean-Jacques Lemêtre began to search for a way of offering “rhythmic support” 
as well as “different sounds for each character” (ibid: 108). The point is that the musician was 
invited to participate in the act of collective creation in rehearsal, offering the kind of 
“support [that] helped the actor to perceive his own rhythm” (ibid). Of course, a company 
that prioritizes the creativity of all its members must find a way of cutting against the text’s 
focus on the big roles without necessarily undermining it. One simple way to negotiate this is 
by doubling, an approach that seemed to pay dividends for Complicite’s eight-actor version 
of The Winter’s Tale, most evident from the praise given to Kathryn Hunter in the 
production. Peter Holland wrote that, in moving between the roles of Mamilius, Time, 
Paulina and the Old Shepherd, Hunter gave each role “its own value, none simply grist to her 
own brilliance” (Holland, 1997: 125).  
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The true agenda of ensemble theatre is, I suggest, not to create a (largely false and frequently 
oppressive) groupthink among participants in which ‘I feel the same as you’, but rather to 
carve out a space in which common agreements can be made regarding the necessary tasks. 
That said, we should be careful of privileging the idea of the ensemble. Lecoq insisted on the 
need for the actor’s imagination to stand alongside that of the writer or the director. Such an 
emphasis takes on a utopian flavour within the borders of Lecoq’s converted gymnasium in 
Paris. But theatre companies are not always put together from actors who have all trained in 
the same approach. A group of disparate individuals may not find it easy to share a working 
vocabulary, or a sense of priorities. It may be that an actor wishes to do no more than take 
care of her own performance. This is not automatically a bad thing, but it means that, for 
those actors who are attuned to the Lecoq tradition, yet who find that others in the room are 
not, the feeling that one is entitled to be regarded as an author – at least of the non-verbal 
performance text – can sometimes play out as a problem. And, of course, logistics or artistic 
temperament may dictate that, before the actors even turn up to work on day one, a pre-
production process is already well under way, during which the director and designer(s) have 
finalized a number of key decisions with respect to the production, and thus collaborative 
engagement in the creation of a theatrical language will not be on the rehearsal menu.  
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2.3 
THE ECOLOGY OF A SENSE OF GOOD TIMING   
  
We often think we can sense good timing in the telling of a joke or in a moment of drama. At 
the same time, we also think that every performer has their own special timing. How do we 
reconcile this apparent contradiction? Where do we get the belief in a sense of timing from? 
Is good timing only in the mind of the individual – either the performer or the beholder? If so, 
it’s largely a matter of taste. If not, upon what basis of evidence could a performer be trained 
to improve their timing?   
  
According to the OED, there are at least seven distinguishable uses of the English word 
timing. From around 1300 it referred to the fact of an event occurring, but with an additional 
sense of good fortune or opportunity: it had a moral and emotional component. From the 
Renaissance onwards, timing became associated with the notion of a performance or a choice. 
Around 1575 (especially in the humanist disciplines of music and oratory) it came to refer to 
the action of singing or speaking at or according to a specific time (i.e. a rhythmical 
measure). From 1647 it took on a more general sense of a choice regarding when something 
should be done so as to maximize one’s chances of achieving one’s aims. Around 1859 this 
sense of choice was extended to sport, particularly cricket, where timing came to mean the 
control of the speed and moment of execution of a stroke etc. through movement 
coordination.  Three points of relevance to this chapter emerge from these definitions:  
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1. Timing has a moral and emotional component;  
2. Timing is a matter of a choice or a performance;  
3. Timing relates to co-ordination of movement for a desired effect.   
  
To analyse timing properly, we have to separate the signal - the behaviour - from the 
surrounding noise. The noise is the range of small, usually unintentional movements of the 
body that may accompany one’s larger actions in the moment, for instance when a task is 
cognitively demanding.  A related problem is that human behaviour is not always made up of 
single movements in isolation, but often consists of clusters of movements. So is it better to 
single out a particular movement from the cluster or to take the cluster as a whole?   
  
One solution to the problem is to consider the goal of the movement. If I scratch my nose 
with my finger, there may be some accompanying movement that enters into the picture as 
noise, but the purpose is clear. So we could take such a motion as a single unit of action, 
while any movement that doesn’t serve that purpose would be considered separately if at all, 
and that helps to control the variables somewhat - although there is always a degree of noise 
or variability in the execution of any movement.   
  
The next step is to consider how these action units are structured temporally: is this a purely 
subjective structuring, or are there universal properties of the brain that produce temporal 
structure? Many psychologists and psychophysicists, such as Ernst Pöppel, Jacques Michon, 
Richard Block and Paul Fraisse, have argued that the brain requires a time window to process 
contextual information. This window has been defined as ‘the time interval in which sensory 
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information and concurrent behaviour are to be integrated within the same span of attention’ 
(London 2004: 30); it constitutes a temporal platform for consciousness. Fraisse suggested an 
average of two to three seconds, with an upper limit of five seconds, as the duration of this 
time window (Fraisse 1984: 9-10).  In other words, every two to three seconds we segment 
reality into integrated ‘pictures of the present’ (ibid 88). The common name for this temporal 
integration is the psychological present.   
  
The psychological present – the moment of processing the stream of information that 
constitutes our environment – is not a continuous event, in spite of our feeling that it is. 
Instead, the brain packages the continuous stream of sensory information and internal 
responses into discrete units so that we can then decide what to do next – such as store this 
information in longer-term memory, or make a prediction, or a decision, or take an action, or 
simply discard the information as not worth keeping in one’s memory (which is what we 
actually do with most of it). The brain is essentially turning a stream of sensory data into a   
chunk of meaning. The three-second window of temporal integration, as it is known, is how 
everyone perceives the world around them. In fact we may well share this perceptual binding 
of events into a subjective present with higher mammals (Pöppel 1997: 59).   
  
If we create these time windows in our own minds, then we ought to be able to sense and 
respond to them in others. I suggest that this capacity forms the basis of our feeling that 
someone has a good (or bad) sense of timing. It is partly because of our experiential sense of 
the psychological present, for instance, that we are able to perceive that there is such a thing 
as rhythm. By rhythm I mean the perception of a sense of order in the stream of data from the 
environment (or from within our bodies, as with a heartbeat). We perceive the repetition of a 
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stimulus within a given interval. We pick out repeated stimuli and call them accents. What 
we are doing, as the music theorist Justin London argues, is directing attentional energy to a 
point in time - or rather, to an event that occurs at that point. We project a sense both of 
temporal location and of salience onto that event (London 2004:  23). Thus it is that we are 
able to define a pattern in time and anticipate future stimuli. This capacity to perceive a 
pattern within a set of stimuli, and thereby to make predictions about the pattern, is at its 
simplest what rhythm means. A grouping of discrete elements into a perceived rhythm is one 
example of the durational process by which we apprehend and link together a set of objects to 
form a kind of narrative of what is happening now.   
   
Evidence for temporal integration was gathered by Schleidt and Kien (1997). It is their 
concept of ‘action unit’ that I have borrowed for this chapter. They analysed 1,542 action 
units drawn from five different cultural groups. They found that 93% of the action units they 
analysed took between two to three seconds. The principle applies to both voluntary gestures 
and involuntary movements like fidgeting. Some people of course seem to move more 
quickly or slowly than others as a rule. In this case, they will usually still try to incorporate 
their movements within a given action unit, thereby confirming the three-second principle 
(Schleidt 1988). The rule that most gestures are two to three seconds long includes 
gesturesfor-speaking, since they are timed to synchronize with speech and speaking itself ‘is 
embedded in temporal windows of up to 3 seconds duration giving speech its rhythmic 
structure’ (Pöppel 2004: 300). Thus, not only do we perceive using a three-second default 
rule, we tend to behave in accordance with it as well. When we come to talk about emotions, 
we may find that displays of, say, frustration, anger or excitement result in more and quicker 
body movements. The person begins to look agitated. How are we able to tell this, unless we 
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have a measuring stick? And the measuring stick, in this case, is a model of rhythmic 
behaviour determined by the three second window of the psychological present. This is how 
we understand a person to be in a state of relative homeostasis: their movements fit into the 
window.  Of course, there are contextual factors to take into account, such as a person’s 
habitual rhythmicity or ‘spontaneous tempo’, but this does not contradict the principle - it 
merely confirms it, because we define a quality like ‘quickly’ with reference to the 
threesecond window. By way of further illustration, Scott Fairhall and colleagues noted that 
‘although the duration of individual shots in Hollywood films varies greatly, it is rare to find 
shots less than around 2 seconds’, probably because ‘event information is accumulated over a 
period of a few seconds, making clip durations of 2-3 seconds an ideal compromise between 
efficiency (showing as many different shots as possible in a short period of time) and ease of 
viewing’ (Fairhall et al 2014: 5). By ‘ease of viewing’ the authors are referring to the fluency 
with which information can be processed mentally; the concept of efficiency will be 
addressed later in this chapter.   
   
Another fundamental principle behind human movement is biomechanical efficiency. I don’t 
mean that every single move we make in any given environmental context is efficient; clearly 
that isn’t the case. I mean that bodily efficiency is adaptive: it has evolved to operate like a 
default setting. Whenever possible, in order to safeguard its wellbeing the human body 
reverts to homeostasis – it carries out a complex set of internal interactions to maintain or 
return the body to stable physical and psychological functioning. To achieve homeostasis you 
must seek a balance between effort and reward – in a word, you must use your energy 
efficiently.   
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How does efficiency manifest in the movement itself – are there formal properties of the 
movement that can be generalized across different contexts? I think there are, and they relate 
to a sense of good timing. For example, Tamar Flash and Neville Hogan have outlined a 
mathematical model of ‘maximum smoothness’. They state that ‘voluntary movements are 
made to be as smooth as possible under the given circumstances, at least in the absence of 
any other overriding concern’ such as the need to move fast in the situation (Flash and Hogan 
170). Smoothness is measured in terms of ‘jerk’, which refers to the rate of change of 
acceleration. The smoothest movement is the one that minimizes the quantity of jerk. 
Assuming a movement that begins at rest in one position and ends at rest in another, then a 
bell-shaped curve has been shown experimentally many times to pertain for voluntary 
movements in primates. If you calculate the average velocity of the movement (velocity 
means speed in a certain direction), and then you work out the peak velocity, i.e. the fastest 
speed in a certain direction that the movement achieves, you can derive a ratio of peak 
velocity to average velocity. Smoothness is defined as a constant ratio of 1.88. So at its 
fastest point a smooth movement in a given direction is almost – but not quite - twice as fast 
as its average velocity. For repetitive sequence movements this ratio drops to 1.57, just over 
one and a half times as fast. Hogan and Flash show that the model extends beyond single 
movements into multi-joint motions and from straight motions to curved ones.   
  
When other concerns become prioritized due to context, such as speed, accuracy or force, it 
becomes possible to produce a measure of deviation. Even more interesting, though, is that 
asymmetric velocity profiles are more characteristic of discrete, goal-directed movements as 
opposed to rhythmically repeated movements. That’s because we gravitate towards 
 271 | P a g e  
 
homeostasis, and a goal-directed movement is usually carried out in an effort to get closer to 
homeostasis, i.e. in a context where homeostasis is relatively absent.   
  
This may suggest one way that we read a person’s intentions. Manera, Becchio et al, in a 
number of experiments, have shown that individuals can read social intentions from the 
kinematics of movement alone. A point-light display that provides only minimal information 
on the joint movements of an arm as it reaches for an object gives sufficient data for subjects 
to anticipate whether the person will reach for the object with an intention to cooperate, 
compete or perform an individual action with it. Competitive behaviour was readily 
associated in their research with a fast speed, and cooperative behaviour with a more natural 
speed (see Becchio et al 2012). Your motor system does not simply react to the sight of 
another person’s movement – it uses its own motor experience to predict the intention behind 
that movement (within the first 500ms – half a second - of the movement). It could not do 
this without a feel for what is a natural, i.e. a default, speed for the movement. This lends 
further support to the idea that there may be a kind of ‘neutrality’ available to human 
movements, at least in this limited biomechanical sense.      
  
Smoothness means that the body manifests a minimum amount of jerk in the completion of a 
task – most particularly at the boundaries, i.e. the start and end points of the movement. To 
clarify here what I mean by boundaries: Marr and Vaina (1982) showed that a movement 
sequence can be decomposed into motion segments. These motion segments are bounded by 
more or less static states, producing a tripartite structure (‘state-motion-state’). The 
movement segment is thus discrete:  ‘it has an unambiguously identifiable start and stop; 
discrete movements are bounded by distinct postures’ (Hogan and Sternad 2007: 16). This 
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general principle may resonate with practitioners and teachers familiar with movement 
systems for performer training. It is also a standard model deployed in sports sciences for 
breaking a movement (such as a javelin throw) into discrete segments for analysis: 
preparation-execution-rest.   
  
But perhaps the perception of boundaries is itself purely subjective? Here again, the evidence 
suggests otherwise. Newtson and Engquist (1976) demonstrated that perceived event 
boundaries (which they called ‘breakpoints’) coincide with sudden changes of behaviour. 
People are remarkably consistent not only in segmenting observed motion events but also in 
viewing breakpoints as the most intelligible or salient aspect of the movement. Consistency 
of segmentation happens regardless of the specific interpretation people give to the motion 
event; that is, we perceive the boundaries of units of action in the same way whether or not 
we agree about the goal of the action. Nonetheless, Newtson and Engquist argued that the 
breakpoint serves not only as a demarcation point but as a kind of summary of the meaning of 
the segment. In other words, even if I don’t agree with you on what the movement signified, I 
will agree with you that the breakpoint is where the meaning landed. What matters is how the 
movement is begun and how it is completed. Rubin and Richards (1985) extended this work 
on motion segments. They viewed visible motion boundaries as marked by a brief application 
of force constituting a start and a stop or a discontinuity such as a change of speed and/or 
direction. The negotiation of physical breakpoints at the boundary of an action is critical to 
both the feeling and the meaning of smoothness.   
  
Of course, to ‘story’ one’s experiences in this way is not a value-free activity. It is 
emotionally and morally charged; that is to say, movement is driven by affect. Affect is the 
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most basic form of feeling. It is, very simply, the often unconscious sense that something is 
either good or bad. The sense of good or bad is related to homeostasis, the feeling that your 
psychological and physiological well-being is paramount (Craig 2009). Clearly, feelings of 
good or bad are not always and only internal: they are social. That’s what I mean by using the 
word ‘ecology’ in the title of this chapter: ecology is the study of interactions between 
organisms (such as people) and their environment (which of course includes other people). 
Timing is not just something you have; it is something you display, something you negotiate, 
something you share.   
  
To both support and extend the idea of the moral-affective aspect of timing, I turn now to 
research that has accumulated over the last fifty years by many social psychologists, notably 
including Susan Fiske (Fiske et al 2007), Andrea Abele (Abele 2003) and Bogdan Wojciszke 
(Abele and Wojciszke 2007; 2014). This research looks at the basic dimensions of social 
cognition, and concerns itself with schemas, stereotypes, attributions and the like. Many 
social psychologists have come to a general agreement that there are two dimensions of social 
cognition, which often go under the name of agency (or competence) and communion (or 
warmth). Agency relates to the achievement of individual goals, while communion is a matter 
of social relations - but of course there’s some overlap between them. In essence these 
dimensions make sense of two fundamental questions that must be answered in any encounter 
between (minimally) two persons:  
  
1. What are your intentions towards me? Are they beneficial or harmful? In other words, 
are you an opportunity or a threat?  
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2. Are you actually capable of carrying out the opportunity or the threat suggested by 
your behavior?   
  
How does this relate to a person’s behavioural timing? To answer that, we must return to the 
idea of smoothness. Smoothness is a quality of movement that is often felt to signal an 
attractive, trustworthy or competent person. It is a key to managing one’s social relationships 
because it constitutes a set of discreet bodily signals that people respond to when conferring 
judgment upon the individual who displays it. To put it simply, the completion of the three 
parts of a movement phrase, executed with an appropriately economical amount of force, is 
taken as a signal of both warmth and competence. It’s not hard to see why: if your peak 
velocity is more than twice your average velocity, such jerkiness can easily be like an alarm 
signal to my visual perception. I automatically ask: why are you moving that fast? And if 
your movement is in my direction, that can be even more alarming. Smoothness of movement 
in fact answers to both components of social cognition: it signals both agency and 
communion – competence and warmth. (For a discussion of smoothness in relation to acting 
see Tunstall 2016; for a historicizing critique of the aesthetics of efficiency see Evans 2009).    
  
To summarize:  
1. The three-second window of temporal integration is a default structure upon which 
our perception of timing is built;  
2. Smoothness of movement, which is partly an outcome of temporal integration, is a 
preferred mode of behaviour for actor and observer because it associates with 
homeostasis;  
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3. Homeostasis is a physical and psychological necessity with direct consequences for 
social morality through its connection to affect;  
4. Social morality has two primary components: warmth/communion and 
competence/agency.   
5. Smoothness of movement answers to both components: warmth and competence.      
  
I have looked at a range of evidence in support of an objective, or at least psychologically 
sufficient, concept of ‘good timing’ derived from the three-second window of the 
psychological present, and subject to the constraints of the principle of smoothness. I now 
want to consider briefly the stylization of actors’ movement. Everyone knows that in some 
movement disciplines there is a conscious regard for a kind of stylized movement that takes 
the form of abstracted duration. A number of practitioners and procedures may spring to 
mind. The goal of this abstracted duration is often to extract desirable features of the 
behaviour from the overall background of movement, and to extend the physical (and, it is 
argued, expressive) possibilities of these features. For instance, very often a movement is 
slowed down in order that its component parts may be better understood. It is also known that 
slowing down movement enhances the perception of intentionality (Caruso et al 2016).  
Nevertheless, comprehension of, say, an etude by Meyerhold begins with perceived natural 
features of the movement – the necessary combination of muscle efforts for throwing a stone, 
for instance (see Pitches 2003). However extended the movement may be, the perception of 
its timing will be against the kind of psychological background that is subject to the rules that 
I have been outlining: the three-second window and the principle of efficiency leading to 
smoothness. Whenever an intentional action, with its tripartite structure (state-motion-state), 
is carried out beneath or beyond this temporal threshold, there is an immediate feeling that 
 276 | P a g e  
 
what you’re looking at is not simply unselfconscious everyday behaviour. This may well 
constitute part of the difficulty of carrying off such movements. It’s not just that the muscle 
exertions are hard and strange – it’s that the timing is hard and strange as well because it 
attempts to push against the three-second window. And this may become more or less 
significant. To execute an action unit such as scratching your nose in half the preferred time 
may create surprise, whereas to execute it in twice the preferred time may create suspense.   
  
My hope is that the evidence I have presented and the inferences I have been drawing from it 
will resonate with practitioners and teachers who find their own points of connection with 
some of the terms and ideas I’ve described. To that end, I can recall many of the exercises 
and games I have learned from others, such as the clown and mask expert John Wright, that 
were geared towards a group feeling of good timing. John would always refer what 
improvisers were doing to the group, which acts as the audience. For instance, in one simple 
but potent exercise, the performer enters into the space and waits for a response. Often, 
nothing much happens. He or she then tries something; the audience responds by clapping 
heartily, or a little bit, or not at all. The performer is trying to understand what the audience 
wants by reacting to their reaction, allowing its intensity to guide the improvisation (for this 
and similar games, see Wright 2006). When this is successful, as the performer and the 
audience become more entrained to each other’s psychological present, a feeling grows in the 
room that the performer is discovering not only their timing but their stage presence, whose 
components are both rhythmic and ethical - because presence is a matter of both agency 
(competence) and of communion (warmth). On that point, I return to a central theme of this 
chapter: that timing is not merely personal, but is irreducibly social.   
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2.4 
EMBODIED COGNITION AND SHAKESPEAREAN PERFORMANCE   
  
The theory of Embodied Cognition has underpinned a broad and expanding field of inquiry 
within cognitive studies since the mid-1970s (see Lakoff, 2012: 773-5). It has also received 
attention from those theatre scholars who since the early 1990s have been exploring the 
topics of embodiment and cognition in relation to Shakespearean production, actor training 
and methods of rehearsal. A by no means exhaustive list of such pioneering scholars would 
include Mary Thomas Crane (2001), Bruce McConachie (with F. Elizabeth Hart 2006; see 
also 2008, 2013, 2015), Rhonda Blair (2008), Amy Cook (2010), Rick Kemp (2012, 2017), 
Evelyn Tribble (2011), John Lutterbie (2011), and the contributors to Embodied Cognition 
and Shakespeare’s Theatre (Johnson, Sutton and Tribble, eds., 2014). In this chapter, I mean 
to outline what Embodied Cognition is; single out some aspects of it that pertain to 
performance theory and practice, and relate these aspects to different strategies for the 
Shakespearean text that I have modelled upon some influential theatre practitioners. In doing 
so, I’m not suggesting that all of these practitioners were precursors or proponents of 
Embodied Cognition; rather, the intention is to see what light an understanding of Embodied 
Cognition might shed upon rehearsal methods. Thus, I aim to move from the general to the 
particular, from the theoretical to the practical.  
  
What is Embodied Cognition? It can be understood as the proposition that an individual’s 
cognitive and bodily processes should be seen as interdependent. As George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson (1999) demonstrated, this conception marks a radical break between ‘first 
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generation’ cognitive science, which tended to consider thinking as disembodied - a 
computational activity somehow separate from the material reality of the human brain - and 
‘second generation’ cognitive science, which sees thinking as grounded in both 
neuroanatomy and bodily (sensorimotor) experience. There are variations of emphasis within 
the field, from the somewhat guarded claims of Alvin Goldman (2013) that an individual’s 
cognition is embodied to a significant degree, to the ‘extended mind’ hypothesis of Andy 
Clark (2008), who argues that the idea that cognition is embodied may be applied beyond the 
human frame into features of the environment itself, such that (to use Clark’s most famous 
illustration) a person’s notebook can be seen as playing the role of a biological memory. 
Differences aside, it is the focus upon brain physiology combined with bodily experience that 
gives Embodied Cognition its radical uniqueness. Many experiments have demonstrated that 
people’s engagement with the environment through their senses, and even the behaviour of 
their internal organs, affects what and how they think. For example, it has been shown that 
our thought patterns are influenced by tiredness, by hunger, by carrying weight, by cold or 
heat, by the shape, relative hardness and roughness of an object we are holding, by the 
posture we happen to be in - and so on (see e.g. Williams and Bargh 2008; Zhong and 
Leonardelli 2008; Jostmann, Lakens and Schubert 2009). Evolutionary processes have 
resulted in human brains that are adapted to seek out and to respond actively to external cues 
(called affordances by the perceptual psychologist James J. Gibson), or to internal 
physiological events, in terms of their relevance to our needs and their functional usefulness. 
Indeed, more than any other animal, we imagine and construct objects and environments that 
furnish us with affordances.   
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We might see such an engagement as a kind of adaptive priming effect. Some psychologists 
have considered this priming effect to be an indication that humans suffer from implicit bias 
in their judgments. For example, we might feel that on a pleasantly sunny day we are more 
disposed to be generous towards someone who asks us for help. The next day, if the weather 
is downright miserable, we might not be in the giving vein. On the surface, this behaviour 
seems to be a mistake; after all, the person who asks for our help is the same whatever the 
weather, and the person may think the worse of us because our behaviour appears arbitrary. 
However, we shouldn’t necessarily think that Embodied Cognition causes us to be deluded in 
our decisions. For one thing, it seems unlikely that millions of years of evolution would lead 
to such maladaptive behaviour. Perhaps there is a hidden logic to the workings of Embodied 
Cognition even if information from the environment leads us into counter-factual thinking. 
On a pleasant day, when it is relatively easy to stay warm and dry, you may feel that you 
have enough energy to spare to help someone out; on a cold, rainy day, you may feel that 
many activities are more costly in terms of time and effort since you have the weather to deal 
with, and thus you feel the need to devote more energy to yourself.   
  
Nearly everything that goes under the name of Embodied Cognition happens under the radar 
of conscious awareness. Our thoughts pop into our head, and it hardly seems relevant to 
wonder how they got there. This is also a trick of evolution, designed to keep us focussed on 
what matters to us. After all, if you are facing danger and you get an impulse to run for your 
life, it probably won’t benefit you to stop and reflect upon what mental process led to that 
impulse; you’re more likely to survive if you just run. Conscious or not, Embodied Cognition 
makes sense when it is set against a backdrop of evolutionary constraints and motives. Some 
research into the evolutionary drives that undergird it has unearthed intriguing results. An 
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important paper by Klein, Cosmides, Tooby and Chance (2002), for instance, demonstrates 
how priming helps us understand other people’s behaviour by introducing boundary 
conditions into our judgements. Since behaviour can change according to the situation (e.g. 
the weather), it follows that personality traits cannot be set in stone. So, in order to 
understand what someone is like, we draw upon general information from semantic memory 
(‘this person is usually helpful and friendly’) and specific instances from episodic memory 
(‘this person wasn’t helpful and friendly when it was raining yesterday’). In any human 
interaction, it’s usually necessary to make quick inferences on the basis of what are 
unlabelled signals, because most behaviour doesn’t arrive with a signpost declaring its 
meaning.  It is because cognition is embodied that we are able to determine not just the 
unchanging facts about a person but those aspects of their behaviour that can serve as more or 
less reliable signals, and in this way Embodied Cognition feeds forward into decision-
making.   
  
There is a useful connection to be made here to Lisa Zunshine’s concept of ‘embodied 
transparency’ (Zunshine 2012). Zunshine draws upon a range of examples from poetry, films, 
television comedies, paintings and novels to build an intriguing argument: that cultural 
products trade on our eagerness to read people’s minds on their bodies. At the same time, 
though, since people tend to agree that ‘the body speaks’, we attempt to hide the potentially 
compromising or threatening signals of our own inner lives by adopting behavioural masks. 
For Zunshine, the power of fiction lies to a considerable extent in its capacity to provide 
representations that offer privileged moments of access to the thoughts and feelings of 
characters: ‘We get to see fictional characters at the exact moment when their                        
body language betrays their real feelings. This is in contrast to real life, in which there is 
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always a possibility that we will misinterpret seemingly transparent body language, 
particularly in a complex social situation, or that people will perform transparent body 
language to influence our perception of their mental states’ (Zunshine 2012, xix).  This 
strikes me as a particularly successful application of embodied cognitive science that helps to 
clarify what is often vaguely labelled as ‘truthfulness’ or ‘authenticity’ in acting.    
  
Zunshine was among the first wave of path-breaking scholars mentioned above. Two recent 
examples give a flavour of the ways in which newer scholars are building upon their 
explorations. A 2016 collection of essays edited by Rhonda Blair and Amy Cook, Theatre, 
Performance and Cognition: Languages, Bodies and Ecologies contains pieces by Neil 
Utterback and by Christopher Jackman on actor training, Edward Warburton on dance and 
Laura Seymour on Julius Caesar. Seymour draws upon the work of George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson in her discussion of the significance of gestures such as kneeling for relations of 
political power in the play. And an edition of the journal Connection Science devoted to 
‘Embodied Cognition, Acting and Performance’ (2017) seeks amongst other things to 
broaden the discussion into the situation of conservatoire training (for example in Ysabel 
Clare’s essay on Stanislavsky’s system as ‘enactive cognitive embodiment’). On that subject, 
it may seem as though there’s nothing especially new about the principle of embodiment in 
itself. For example, in the field of actor training, during the 1990s many conservatoires in the 
UK latched onto the continental traditions of movement-based practices championed by 
pedagogues like Jacques Lecoq – although conservatoires tend to be selective in their 
delivery of Lecoq’s curriculum. There was also a rethink of Stanislavsky’s model of realism 
in acting in the wake of interventions by scholars like Sharon Carnicke (1998/2009). And 
along with that has come a promotion of the work of those disciples who took issue with their 
master Stanislavsky – most notably Vsevolod Meyerhold and Michael Chekhov – as well as 
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practices adopted from other disciplines such as martial arts. Thus, much conservatoire 
training – at least, in the UK - has led to a renewed focus on the ‘psychophysical’ resources 
of the actor. However, it is one thing to declare that actors must find ways to embody their 
characters, and quite another to adhere to the more radical principle that all cognition is 
inherently embodied. It is not uncommon for actor trainers to insist upon embodiment while 
clinging stubbornly to the kinds of mystical ideas about a nonmaterial mind, self or spirit that 
were a feature of the world-views of canonical ancestors like Stanislavsky and Laban. Here 
too, Zunshine’s argument applies, since such still-prevalent mind-body dualism speaks of the 
common human desire to be accorded privileged status as an expert in mindreading.   
  
Of course, artists have always wanted to get out of the body, and the yearning to do so has 
resulted in some extraordinarily beautiful art. But, to repeat, Embodied Cognition theory 
stresses that every idea that comes to us is grounded in our bodily anatomy and experiences - 
including the very idea that we would yearn to get out of the body. We simply cannot think, 
we cannot imagine, we cannot yearn, outside the body. According to Lakoff and Nunez 
(2000), even the most rarefied abstract thinking, such as higher mathematical reasoning, has 
its origin in basic physical facts such as our bilateral symmetry and our sense of spatial 
orientation.   
  
It’s time to see how we might apply such an idea to the performance of a play by 
Shakespeare. Since earlier I was talking about how the weather affects people’s thoughts, 
why not King Lear, a play well-known for attempting to put a thunderstorm on stage:  
 KENT. Who’s there, besides foul weather?  
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GENT. One minded like the weather, most unquietly. (3.1.1-2)  
  
How do we rehearse these opening lines to the scene? Here are some, by no means 
exhaustive, possibilities for two actors playing Kent and the Gentleman, who I shall refer to 
as ‘you’:  
  
1. Sit around a table with the script and talk through what it means. You might try 
speaking the lines a few different ways, using intonation patterns to communicate 
different meanings. Then stand up and say the lines whilst moving about in the 
rehearsal space away from the table. Perhaps another person reacts to what you do, 
gives instructions, offers direction, ideas and encouragement, and so on.   
  
On the surface, this ‘table talk, then on your feet’ approach doesn’t seem like the most 
embodied way of starting work on the script. However, Embodied Cognition theory reminds 
us that all experiences are processed through the body, and that includes sitting around a table 
talking about the play. So as soon as you sit down at a table your thought processes will be 
affected; the issue is then whether or not the kind of embodied experience you’re having will 
help you in performing the text (and perhaps it might). The relative hardness of the chair you 
sit in will impact what you imagine and feel about the text, as will the shape of the table, the 
distance between you and the other people around the table, where you sit at the table (e.g. at 
its corner, in the middle etc.), along with any objects placed on the table…along with what 
you were already feeling when you sat down (for example, you were hungry). If this table 
and these chairs, and this physical relationship to the other people, are not actually relevant to 
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the staging of the scene, you could make inappropriate choices in your intonations and 
gestures. There’s a possibility that the scene will fall into a kind of passive state. The moment 
an actor sits in a soft chair, for instance, the effort to resist gravity is reduced and the result is 
often a loss of projected energy in the body and voice as the actor begins to sink into the 
furniture.     
  
Arthur Glenberg and colleagues have developed a strategy to help children read called 
‘Moved by Reading’ which draws upon a simulation theory of language comprehension. In 
Glenberg’s words, ‘we understand language much like we understand situations: in terms of 
the actions the situation, or described situation, affords’ (Glenberg 2011: 7).  The situation 
described in the text is simulated using our neural systems of action, perception and emotion. 
In my experience, actors who are inexperienced or not confident with Shakespearean text can 
be helped further at the stage of ‘table talk’ using an approach based on Glenberg’s strategy. 
The actors are presented with toys to play with, representing the characters and the 
environment. In the first reading, the actors act out the situation by physically manipulating 
the toys on the table (as if they were puppeteers, or directors creating an action plan for the 
scene using a model box). In the second reading, the toys are removed and, while speaking 
the text, the actors imagine moving them in the same way. Of course there is nothing new 
about asking an actor to create mental imagery; the difference is that by using toys at the 
reading stage, the actor – like the child learning to read – is, in Glenberg’s words, ‘likely to 
engender a significant motor component in addition to visual imagery’ and this motor 
component ‘increases the range of information encoded’ (ibid: 12).   
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2. Learn the lines in advance of rehearsal. Stand in the rehearsal space and, without 
discussing what the lines mean, move about in the space saying the lines to your 
scene partner.   
  
Here, you’ve put the script down so your hands are free for gesturing; you’re working out 
what the scene is about on your feet rather than being potentially stuck in a physical posture 
like sitting. Perhaps you move with what you sense as changes of thought or intention. The 
voice coach Cecily Berry used to teach actors a preparation exercise for that: you walk and 
talk, and change direction every time you hit a punctuation mark in the script. It might begin 
to seem as if your feet are doing the thinking. The notion that different parts of your body can 
do the thinking, which I have borrowed from Michael Chekhov, has been explored by Tom 
Cornford (2012). The strategy tends to require, though, that you have either done your 
homework or you are experienced at handling Shakespeare’s language.   
  
3. On your feet, improvise verbally around the content of the scene before moving onto 
the text.  
  
This exercise bears a resemblance to what Stanislavsky called ‘active analysis’. With each 
pass, you move closer to using the actual words written in the script. Meanwhile, the physical 
actions of the scene are being worked on in ever greater detail.   
  
One variation of this strategy is to render the text into your own words first. You might do 
this around a table (with or without toys as you see fit). Then speak your contemporary prose 
 289 | P a g e  
 
version with a commitment to an intonation pattern that suggests the purpose behind the 
speech. At the same time, you are invited to make gestures that illuminate the purpose still 
further:   
  
KENT. (holding up a hand as if to stop the GENTLEMAN) Who’s out there in this awful 
weather?  
GENT. (holding up his hands in submissive greeting) I’m feeling like the weather – very 
troubled.   
  
Having worked out a pattern of intonation and movement which makes sense of your 
response to your partner, return to the script and perform as far as possible with the same 
intonation and the same movements:  
 
KENT. (holding up a hand as if to stop the GENTLEMAN) Who’s there, besides foul 
weather?   
GENT. (holding up his hands in submissive greeting) One minded like the weather, most 
unquietly.   
  
Having performed this to your satisfaction, the next stage is to eliminate the gesture, but 
perform as though you are making the gesture in your imagination. The gesture takes on 
something of the quality of what Michael Chekhov called Psychological Gesture (Chekhov 
2002), an internalized representation of something essential about the character; it also bears 
a resemblance to the second part of Glenberg’s reading strategy. The results of this exercise 
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can be very encouraging if you stick to the game of performing the script with the same 
purposeful intonation and gesture patterns as your personalized version of it, and if you 
commit to the stage of performing the gesture in the imagination while speaking. It’s useful 
to have a director in the room to insist that you don’t alter the intonation as you move towards 
internalizing. The psycholinguist and gesture scholar David McNeill, in an interview I 
conducted with him by email, wrote about my adoption of this exercise:   
  
Gesture and prosody are so alike, and the gesture would orchestrate it most directly. 
Then, at last, they move into a mode of secure performance where the gesture seems 
to have dropped out (though I suspect it is present internally). (Tunstall 2016, p.158)  
  
Gestures embody the speaker’s mental imagery, and furnish evidence for the proposition of 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) that thinking happens through the body. It follows from this that, 
as McNeill contends, a composed written structure like King Lear contains within its 
language hidden gestures that are in principle recoverable; in this exercise, the actor is 
attempting to unearth them and make them visible. In a similar vein, Rick Kemp shows how 
gesture analysis can support ‘the common practice in rehearsing Shakespeare of identifying 
the “active” word in a line, and consciously executing a gesture to accompany it. This gesture 
may or may not be carried through to performance, but serves to enrich the actor’s physical 
experience of the text, thus integrating written language with speech and gesture’ (Kemp, 
2012: 36-7).      
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4. You have a bamboo cane about four feet long. You hold one end of it, and your scene 
partner holds the other, with one finger or in the palm of your hand. You move 
together, keeping the stick between you, pushing and being pushed around the space 
through the stick, and you explore this relationship for a while. Then you play the 
same game whilst speaking the dialogue. After a while, remove the stick but continue 
playing with an idea of physical influence, of pushing and pulling with your partner, 
at the same distance. The possibilities of the game with respect to timing, 
synchronicity, mimicry, force, scale and so on can be developed as you play with the 
text.   
  
Here, a game derived from Jacques Lecoq is used to bring you, the actor, into a conscious 
awareness of how your body moves in relation to the affective dynamics of the scene. The 
patterns of movement can be as large, expansive and stylized as you please. Other games 
from the traditions of ‘movement-based’ performance can be used in a similar manner, such 
as the Viewpoints approach of Anne Bogart (Bogart and Landau 2005), or the choreographic 
language of Rudolf Laban (see Bradley 2009).  As with rehearsal exercise 3, the movements 
can be reduced, disguised or even dropped altogether while you continue the game in your 
imagination. The style of performance may be wedded to a behavioural verisimilitude, but 
there would still be an intensified awareness of your body in its relation to your partner’s 
body, coupled with mental imagery.   
  
These are just four approaches to rehearsal drawn from various practitioners that suggest 
ways in which attention may be placed upon the body’s primary role in the creation of 
meaning. Of interest to me, following the conception of embodied transparency coined by 
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Lisa Zunshine, is how Shakespeare’s dialogue offers Kent (and the audience) immediate 
access to the inner life of The Gentleman, a character we know nothing about. In doing so, he 
accomplishes many other things: he reinforces any offstage sound effects or onstage body 
language attempting to conjure up the weather for the audience; he puts us in Kent’s shoes as 
the character who is doing the mindreading; he creates the potential for a trusting relationship 
between the two men; and, in suggesting how the weather influences people’s thoughts and 
feelings, he reinforces the cosmic metaphorical significance of the storm.    
  
But here I want to stress that the agenda is not to make Shakespeare’s writing appear more 
embodied than it is; on the contrary, it’s hard to imagine a verbal structure more intensely 
engaged with embodiment than his dramatic language. My crude paraphrasing of the lines of 
Kent and the Gentleman reveal this - I have failed, for instance, to find an acceptable 
substitute for the almost offhand manner in which Shakespeare embodies the foul weather. It 
becomes a person with an unquiet mind, a personification that the scene amplifies as it 
continues:  
 KENT. I know you. Where’s the king?  
GENT. Contending with the fretful elements:  
   Bids the wind blow the earth into the sea  
   Or swell the curled waters ‘bove the main,   
   That things might change or cease. (3.1.3-7)  
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In the ensuing scene, the weather is amplified still further into an apocalyptic assembly:  
 LEAR. Blow winds and crack your cheeks! Rage, blow,  
  You cataracts and hurricanoes, spout  
  Till you have drenched our steeples, drown the cocks! (3.2.1-3)  
  
The weather gods behave like vengeful, destructive people and as, Zunshine would say, they 
get inside your head. Lear cannot think of the weather in a disembodied way, because no 
thinking is disembodied. As one works through any play by Shakespeare, one finds this over 
and again: the words are full to the brim of ‘body-ness’.   
  
I have discussed Embodied Cognition in terms of individuals responding subconsciously, and 
yet actively, to the environment. This response is not the product of a brain that is a blank 
slate. As the work of James Gibson and Ulric Neisser (2014) revealed, we do not look at the 
world with unprepared eyes. To return to an earlier theme, we perceive the world with 
sensory equipment that has been primed by evolution to discover what the environment may 
offer us by way of affordances. Further: we try to construct a world that will furnish us with 
those affordances we, largely unconsciously, seek. With that in mind, there is a fifth rehearsal 
strategy to be added, one which owes something to the utilitarian methods of Meyerhold (see  
Paavolainen, 2012: 53-92) and which finds an interesting parallel in Rhonda Blair’s 
description of working on Anton Chekhov’s Three Sisters by inviting her actors to make 
sculptures out of human bodies (Blair, 2008: 100-103):   
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5. Learn your lines before you enter the rehearsal room. Then, using objects, sound and 
light, construct an environment in the room which affords you opportunities to move, 
to manipulate the objects, and/or to relate to your scene partner in different ways. This 
world and the things in it may not necessarily bear any obvious relation to the world 
described by the playwright. They need only provide stimulating challenges to your 
senses. Now - play.    
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3 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this submission, I have presented a range of material that explores different angles upon 
the topic of embodiment in performance. My focus was Shakespeare for a number of reasons.  
 
To begin with, my own practical experience in that field lent me a confidence to speak. In 
fact my research began life as a basic question that had dogged me as an actor: when I am 
speaking Shakespeare’s text – which seems so self-sufficient as a structure of meaning – what 
am I supposed to do with my body? Should I ‘get it out of the way’, if such a thing were even 
possible? Should I use it as a means of supporting the verbal structures of the play, and if so, 
how? Or (as I mentioned at the close of my book) might I even want to prioritize the images 
my body creates over Shakespeare’s body of words?  
 
The second reason was, as I suggested in the introductory chapter to the book, that scholars of 
Shakespeare in performance have been reluctant to speak of how the actor’s body engages 
with the meanings of the text. I have suggested probable explanations for this in that chapter, 
and to some extent the book and related chapters were an attempt to fill that explanatory gap.  
 
The third reason is that scholars have positioned embodiment as being within the so-called 
‘performative turn’ of the field. This is reasonable enough, and speaks to how performance 
has itself turned its attention away from the word and towards the body. And that is not only 
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true of avant-garde forms: as I wrote in the book, the influence of teachers such as Lecoq has 
been thoroughly woven into the mainstream in the UK. I was a beneficiary of that influence 
in my work with the Royal Shakespeare Company as an actor, movement director and 
associate director. The problem is that Shakespeare’s medium is the word, and while there is 
room for a performance of Shakespeare that sidesteps this medium or replaces it with the 
image, there will always in those cases be a trade-off that to many people – and I am one – 
will seem not fully adequate as a response to Shakespeare’s imagination. They may serve the 
director, the performer, the unique event; at some point in the act of new theatre creation, 
Shakespeare will almost inevitably be reduced. Thus, I felt what was needed was a bridge 
between the languages of the script and the body, and my intention in writing the book was 
partly to build that bridge.  
 
The final reason was that a theory of performance that wants to draw down the body must 
sooner or later provide some trustworthy evidence. I’d like now to explore this question in 
some detail, because it constitutes probably the most contested part of my research field, and 
in exploring it I hope to clarify future directions of work.  
 
An issue that continues to prove a sticking point for theories of Embodied Cognition is the 
reliability of the evidence used to support it. Such an issue matters to this submission because 
the status of available evidence that may be deployed to establish a secure footing for 
performance theory has been a recurring theme of my work. In my book, for instance, I 
prefaced my historical survey of gesture in Shakespearean performance with remarks on the 
problem of an incomplete and unreliable visual archive. Where I have pursued interpretations 
drawing upon ‘soft’ sciences, recent years have seen a troubling replication crisis within a 
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field that would otherwise provide me with strong evidence. Nowhere is this crisis of 
evidence more sharp than in the field of psychology, and it is within psychology that 
Embodied Cognition essentially rests. While questions about some of the most notorious 
psychological experiments – such as Stanley Milgram’s fake ‘electric shock lab’ and Philip 
Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment – have bedevilled those studies, the recent so-called 
‘p-hacking scandal’ was sparked partly by the work of Amy Cuddy, Dana Carney and 
colleagues on ‘power posing’, a study that I mentioned in my book. The initial faith in the 
premise behind power posing – that by assuming a certain posture, the body will produce 
androgens like testosterone that will then influence the subject’s sense of belief in their own 
performance – led to exaggerations of its effect, followed by climbdowns and recriminations. 
The idea of ‘fake it till you make it’ (to use Amy Cuddy’s own expression from her TED 
talk) may be intriguing from the point of view of acting technique, but it’s doubtful whether it 
will suffice as a justification for theories of such an overarching idea as Embodied Cognition.  
 
So too with the work of John Bargh and his colleagues and followers, which has been 
frequently held up as a series of findings with radical implications for philosophy. Their 
experiments showing that subjects who drank warm coffee had ‘warmer’ feelings towards 
interaction partners than those who imbibed cold drinks, while in other studies the weight of a 
clipboard appeared to affect the ‘weighting’ of a subject’s judgement, and so on – these 
struck some parties as quite extraordinary revelations of how the brain processes 
environmental information to produce thoughts and feelings. The implication was that a 
death-blow had finally been struck to Cartesian mind-body dualism. Unfortunately, these 
experiments too have failed to replicate. While I have not relied heavily upon such studies to 
underpin my exploration of the relationship between Embodied Cognition and the 
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performance of Shakespeare, nevertheless in my explication I may have cited them with at 
times more confidence than perhaps was warranted.  
 
Given the replication crisis, is one left to rely upon chains of philosophical reasoning or 
subjective descriptions of how something ‘appears’ to one’s perception?  Not necessarily, and 
I would like to now suggest some ways in which my research agenda can be taken forward.  
 
In my chapter ‘Embodied Cognition and Shakespearean Performance’, I felt it was important 
to stress the point that an account of embodiment must bite the evolutionary bullet. I mean 
that too often performance scholars (and scholars within the soft sciences) have written about 
the human body with not even a passing mention of the fact that human bodies are products 
of natural selection. The human animal has been engineered by adaptive processes over 
millions of years into its current phenotype – its physical manifestation and (as we are 
discovering more and more) its behaviours. I have not given an account of why there has 
been a reluctance to discuss the body in this way; instead, in my book I played down my 
attachment to an evolutionary version of Embodied Cognition while incorporating the crucial 
work of Charles Darwin on the expression of emotions. I took care in the book to frame that 
work historically. This was because I was wary of inviting criticism from performance 
scholars who remain attached to a view of evolutionary theory as a gateway drug to Social 
Darwinism. Since publication of the book, though, the criticism that evolutionary humanities 
masks a disquieting ideological agenda has come under pressure from advances in the field of 
biological psychology that have provided more evidence of the genetic mechanisms that feed 
into the range of human behaviours.  
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My research agenda is now pushing further into the territory of the neuroscience of how the 
body adapts to stress. In this I am following a path laid down by the evolutionary biologist 
Robert Sapolsky on stress behaviours. As well, my reading into the evolutionary biology of 
stress mechanisms has led me to the polyvagal theory of Stephen Porges. Stress responses are 
of demonstrable importance to theatre. Dramas are fundamentally structures of conflict – in 
other words, they are machines for the artificial production of stress responses both in the 
world of the fiction (within characters) and in the reality of the performance (within the 
actors and the audience). Sapolsky shows that stress responses are adaptive – so long as the 
situation is a temporary one; for example, it makes sense for the stress response system to 
kick in if there is an immediate threat to one’s safety; once the threat has been dealt with, the 
system can once again return to its norm. The problem occurs when relatively small doses of 
stress are continually being produced in response to repeated life challenges, for instance the 
constant harassment from a bully in one’s workplace. Sapolsky demonstrates that this low-
level repeated stress response increases the risk factor for many serious contemporary 
ailments such as heart attacks. By contrast, the good feelings of elation or release that occur 
at the end of a dramatic performance may be clarified by Sapolsky’s idea of how the body 
handles short bursts of stress.  
 
The work of Stephen Porges has attracted the attention of some performance researchers  
recently. For instance, Vicky Wright of Making Faces Theatre Company has been developing 
some extraordinary masks; she brings together subjective insights from performance 
workshops with fossil data collected in collaboration with paleontologists. I hosted a day-
long workshop with her at the Guildford School of Acting in January 2018 in which student 
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actors explored movement possibilities with some of her masks. Her intention is to use the 
masks as tools for teaching evolutionary theory to young people. Given that evolution is an 
inherently counter-intuitive concept, and thus hard for most people to grasp, her work – 
which seeks to get students to embody phenotypes that illustrate key themes of evolutionary 
development - holds great educational promise.  
 
An important part of her approach is to create a ‘safe space’ not in the commonly-used sense 
of the phrase but rather in Stephen Porges’s more basic sense: as a space where the responses 
of the autonomic nervous system are controlled by the ‘vagal brake’. This refers to an 
activation of the vagus nerve that promotes homeostatic functions and social engagement. A 
key component of this activation process is the slowing down of the heart rate. Heart rate 
variability (HRV) has been shown to relate to social cognition, a subject that is at the centre 
of my book, and one that I made reference there to in relation to gestures of emotional 
expression in Shakespearean performances.  
 
Such work continues to hold much potential for our understanding of how Shakespeare in 
performance may engage the embodied self. The use of HRV as a measuring device for the 
responses of performers as well as audiences, in rehearsal, on stage and in front of the camera 
or the microphone, is equally promising and at present under-researched. Wireless 
technologies such as Polar (a chest strap with a wifi signal) make it possible now to record 
the variations of stress and other emotional responses in a performance – in effect, to graph 
Embodied Cognition through a performance of Shakespeare. This could provide a new 
evidence base for research into embodiment.  
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I have also been working recently with colleagues within the Clinical Psychology department 
at Surrey to prepare a research project into Development Cooordination Disorder (dyspraxia), 
in which body movements will be recorded by motion capture. These recordings are shown to 
participants who are then questioned about their interpretation of the movement qualities. My 
premise is to further test the idea I put forward in my book that smoothness of motion signals 
high status. The intention would be to use the movement data in the creation of a short film 
involving puppetry, in collaboration with puppetry director and designer Mervyn Millar, to 
engage the public in the subject of DCD. At the time of writing, my colleagues have 
successfully presented initial findings at the 13th International Conference on Developmental 
Coordination Disorder in Finland, and our research funding bid has been submitted to the 
ESRC for decision in November.  
 
These projects suggest some promising directions of travel for future cross-disciplinary 
research. What draws them together is my belief that scholars of embodiment need to be 
more rigorous not only about the logical and philosophical implications of their preferred 
theory, but also about the evidence bases that may be drawn upon to support that theory. As I 
hope my examples show, these evidence bases need not be seen as hostile to historical or 
other kinds of contextual approaches to understanding performance. To the contrary, in fact: 
they indicate fascinating directions for thinking not only about Shakespeare in performance 
but about the interpretation of dramatic character – and, finally, for thinking about 
embodiment itself.  
 
 
 305 | P a g e  
 
 
Works consulted 
Cuddy, Amy (2012). ‘Your body language may shape who you are’. Presentation for 
TEDGlobal. Accessed 24th June 2019 at: 
https://www.ted.com/talks/amy_cuddy_your_body_language_shapes_who_you_are. 
Gentle, Judith and Shaheen, Aliah (2019). ‘Perceptions of Coordinated Movement’. 
Presentation for 13th International Conference on Developmental Coordination Disorder, 
University of Jyväskylä, Finland.  
Porges, Stephen W. (2011). The Polyvagal Theory: Neurophysiological Foundations of 
Emotions, Attachment, Communication, and Self-Regulation. New York and London: W.W. 
Norton & Company.  
Sapolsky, Robert (2004). Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers. Third Edition. New York: Henry 
Holt and Company.  
Sapolsky, Robert M. (2017). Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst. 
London: Penguin.  
 
